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Abstract
This thesis studies possible outcomes of the government’s policy (increased price trans-
parency) to the retail gasoline market. Chapter 2 investigates one of possible outcome of
the government’s price policy on the retail price setting and provides new evidence of ‘hot air
balloons and bricks’ that retail prices respond more quickly to decreases in costs but respond
slowly to increases in costs. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the government’s policy served as
unilateral disclosure of the leading firm’s future price information to the supply and demand
sides of the retail gasoline market, respectively. Chapter 3 presents empirical analyses of price
leadership and perfect price alignment to explore the effect of an increased price transparency
policy on the supply side. We propose evidence that the government’s policy is the underly-
ing cause of price leadership and price coordination. Finally, using regional household-level
data across 20 Taiwanese regions, Chapter 4 semiparametrically examines the effect of the
government’s policy on the demand side. We find evidence of intertemporal substitution that
the government’s policy helps to plan consumers’ future purchase.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Many governments in developed economies have liberalized their energy markets and effi-
ciently regulated their energy prices, but the Taiwan government has re-regulated its energy
prices. This thesis is a case study of the Taiwan gasoline market, and it tries to delineate the
structure of the Taiwan gasoline market with its price regulation.
In September 2006, the Taiwanese government introduced a new price regulation policy,
the price adjustment formula. Its aims were to stabilize commodity prices and prevent the
occurrence of high inflation, when international crude oil prices increased dramatically. How-
ever, it seems not to have considered the possible implications for competition in the retail
gasoline market.
This thesis consists of three essays, and each one analyzes the competitive impacts of the
government’s price regulation policy, the price adjustment formula (PAF), in: (i) the role of
the price adjustment formula on gasoline price setting; (ii) the effect of the price adjustment
formula on the future method of information sharing on the supply side; and (iii) the effect of
transparent price policy on the demand side. To explore these three main effects, we initially
limit our attention to the background of the Taiwan gasoline market.
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Due to a lack of natural resources such as energy minerals - crude oil and coal - natural
resources of energy minerals have been imported to produce and supply energy utilities
(electricity, gasoline and gas) to individuals in Taiwan. Taiwan is heavily dependent on foreign
energy minerals to improve economic development. Hence, their economic performance is
highly correlated with energy prices, the international prices of minerals and the domestic
prices of electricity, gasoline and gas.
The current market structure of the gasoline supply market in Taiwan is a duopolistic
industry. Prior to the end of the 1980s, gasoline and diesel in Taiwan had been supplied
by the state-owned enterprise, China Petroleum Corporation (CPC), which was effectively a
vertically integrated franchised monopoly in the Taiwan petroleum industry. By the end of
the 1980s, Taiwan began to deregulate and liberalize its gasoline supply industry. The private
sector, Formosa Petrochemical Corporation (FPCC), had been permitted to refine petroleum
products in 1992 and supply gasoline and diesel to consumers in Taiwan from mid-2000. In
September 2002, the largest refiner, Exxon Mobile, and its subsidiary ESSO, entered the
gasoline supply market in Taiwan, and the market structure of the Taiwan gasoline supply
market became a triopoly. However, it only operated for a short time, until November 2003.
Due to an underlying reason of imbalance of import tariffs between domestic and foreign
fuel suppliers, a foreign supplier, Exxon Mobile, withdrew from the Taiwan gasoline market
in November 2003. Domestic suppliers (CPC and FPCC) were granted a tax exemption
from imposing import tariffs since they imported crude oil to be refined into fuel products.
However, a foreign supplier (Exxon Mobile) exported final petroleum products to the Taiwan
market and had import tariffs imposed on them - 10% for gasoline products and 5% for
diesel. The government’s trade policy and the tax imbalance of import tariffs resulted in
entry barriers to foreign suppliers and made reductions in the competitive intensity in the
Taiwan gasoline market.1 Since Exxon Mobile withdrew their gasoline and diesel supply from
the Taiwan market, the gasoline supply market in Taiwan has become a duopolistic industry
again. Figure 1.1 presents a timeline history of the Taiwan gasoline market structure.
1Energy tariffs and taxes are listed in Appendix 2.C.
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CPC
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2
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FPCC
Note: The Taiwan gasoline market structure timeline contains three specific times
(2000M07, 2002M09 and 2003M12) and four market structure forms (Monopoly, 1st
Duopoly, Triopoly, 2nd Duopoly). A domestic gasoline supplier (FPCC) started to sup-
ply gasoline and diesel products to consumers in July 2000, and the gasoline market
was restructured as a duopoly. In September 2002, a foreign gasoline supplier (ESSO)
entered the Taiwan gasoline market and supplied gasoline products, and the gasoline
market was restructured as a triopoly. A foreign gasoline supplier (ESSO) exited the
Taiwan market at the end of November 2003. From December 2003, the Taiwan gasoline
market was restructured as a duopoly.
Figure 1.1: Taiwan Gasoline Market Structure Timeline
As crude oil prices had a rising tendency in 2006, the government introduced the price
adjustment formula to prevent the occurrence of huge fluctuations in retail gasoline prices.
The price adjustment formula was introduced to mainly target supplier CPC, the state-owned
enterprise, whereas FPCC, as a private supplier, was not subject to the regulation.2 Hence,
FPCC was free to set its own retail prices of gasoline products. In addition, under the price
adjustment formula, CPC’s future price information was publicly disclosed to consumers as
well as to FPCC. The price adjustment formula can be considered as a unilateral dissemina-
tion of future price information in the gasoline market.
To conclude in the Taiwan petrol retailing market, the government can intervene in retail
gasoline prices in two ways: (i) direct intervention - ownership of the state-owned enterprise;
and (ii) indirect intervention use of the price adjustment formula as a framework for retail
pricing. In the first pattern, the government might approve an executive order to directly
intervene in the retail gasoline prices of the state-owned enterprise. The government would
2The price adjustment formula is an executive order made by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and its
effectiveness is only delivered to the state-owned enterprise.
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approve an executive order (freezing retail prices) forbidding adjustments of retail prices when
rapid increases in international crude oil prices occurred. This direct intervention played
an important role in retail gasoline price setting. In the second pattern, the government
introduced the price adjustment formula to the state-owned enterprise and established a
framework to be an advisory measure of retail prices that can, in principle, be overturned by
the first pattern, direct intervention. In this thesis we restrict our attention to the second
pattern of indirect government intervention, the price adjustment formula.
In terms of the market structure of the gasoline market and the government’s price regu-
lation policy mentioned as above, we can use the Taiwan gasoline market as a case study to
provide a different empirical study compared to other developed countries such as European
countries, the US and Canada. Furthermore, under the circumstances of the government’s
transparent price regulation policy, we intend to empirically examine our three main aspects
and explore the differences between our main results and the existing literature.
Prior to our empirical studies, we begin by defining the government’s transparent price
policy, the price adjustment formula. The price adjustment formula is an executive order
to the state-owned enterprise (CPC) and is obligatory. However, its effectiveness does not
apply to a private supplier (FPCC). A private supplier has no need to enforce compliance
with the price adjustment formula. The procedure of the price adjustment formula is publicly
disseminated via the website of the state-owned enterprise (CPC) to the public, who include
consumers and the competing firm (FPCC). Consumers and the competing firm are able to
gather transparent future price information through the procedure of the price adjustment
formula. Therefore, this thesis focuses on three aspects to explore the effects of the price
adjustment formula. First, we investigate whether the introduction of the price adjustment
formula has affected how the retail gasoline price is adjusted in the market. Second, on the
supply side we discuss how two existing firms’ dynamic price response reacted according to
the introduction of the price adjustment formula. Finally, we pay attention to the demand
side and explore how consumers’ purchase decisions have responded to transparent future
price information. These three aspects will be empirically discussed in the following chapters
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- 2, 3 and 4.
Returning to our three empirical Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we provide different econometric
frameworks to investigate the government-regulated price transparency on competition in
the Taiwan gasoline market. The first essay, Chapter 2, addresses a debate about the role
of the price adjustment formula in retail gasoline setting. A stylized example of ‘rockets and
feathers’, a phenomenon found in other countries is that the retail price responds rapidly to
increases in crude oil prices but responds slowly to decreases in crude oil prices, as has been
found in many previous studies. We test whether this phenomenon is observed in the Taiwan
gasoline market. In addition, we take into account the effect of the price adjustment formula
in our effort to examine the response of retail prices. However, according to the application of
the price adjustment formula, the other gasoline suppliers can adopt the same retail prices as
the state-owned enterprise sets. Therefore, the effectiveness of the price adjustment formula
has become a debate in the Taiwan economy. By analyzing the role of the price adjustment
formula and examining retail pricing behavior in Taiwan, this chapter uses standard and
quadratic partial adjustment models to provide insights into explanations of the effectiveness
of the price adjustment formula and retail gasoline pricing behavior. Our results suggest
that the price adjustment formula had significant impacts on retail gasoline price setting,
and we provide evidence of the phenomenon of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’: retail prices
respond more quickly to cost decreases than increases under the implementation of the price
adjustment formula.
Chapter 3 studies the effect of the government’s transparent price regulation policy, the
price adjustment formula, in three ways: firms’ price setting mechanism, price leadership and
anti-competitive outcomes. A priori, we characterize the role of the government’s transparent
price regulation policy in a duopoly. After characterizing the role of pre-announced policy,
we focus on examining whether the price adjustment formula has an impact on firms’ price
setting, and leads to price leadership events and anti-competitive outcomes. We propose
empirical analyses on discussing the government’s transparent price policy. Our key results
present that: (i) the price adjustment formula could soften the impact of positive crude oil
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shock on the leading firm’s retail price setting; (ii) the price adjustment formula resulted in
a greater incidence of price leadership; (iii) the government’s transparent price policy and
consequent price leadership resulted in the competing firm perfectly aligning with the leading
firm’s retail price. This chapter finds evidence that the government’s transparent price policy
would lead to a reduction in the degree of competitive intensity in the retail gasoline market.
The effect of the government’s transparent price policy on the firms’ price response is
discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 pays attention to whether the introduction of the gov-
ernment’s transparent price policy, the price adjustment formula, affected how consumers
made their purchase decisions. In this chapter, we use a variety of semiparametric estimation
techniques to model gasoline demand, since semiparametric gasoline demand for households
has been applied widely in most relevant literature. The advantages of semiparametric ap-
proaches are efficiency improvements to parametric estimates and avoidance of the curse of
dimensionality from non-parametric estimates. By combining relevant literature of semipara-
metric techniques and their advantages, in this study we can have flexible non-parametric
estimates and efficient parametric estimates. Our main results show that: (i) price elasticity
of gasoline demand for households is relatively inelastic in urban and rich regions but it is
relatively elastic in rural and poor regions; and (ii) the introduction of the government’s
transparent price policy helped consumers to plan future purchase responses, which served as
intertemporal substitutions in gasoline consumption decisions for households. This chapter
presents evidence that the introduction of the government’s transparent price policy offered
potential benefits to consumers.
To sum up the overall findings and contributions of this thesis: First, we develop a new
pattern of possible retail price response to delineate retail price adjustment in Taiwan, and
verify the existence of the new phenomenon of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’ that is contra-
dictory to the stylized fact of ‘rockets and feathers’ found by existing literature. Second,
we discuss the government’s price regulation policy as a unilateral disclosure of future price
information. We find that the introduction of the price adjustment formula served as a future
method of information sharing, which resulted in price leadership and price coordination in a
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duopolistic gasoline market. Evidence of price coordination is consistent with existing litera-
ture (Albæk et al., 1997). Third, we present disaggregated household gasoline demand using
a regional household level dataset, and we give an illustration of a semiparametric approach
in a small country. This illustration provides empirical evidence that the government assisted
consumers to plan their future purchases as inter-temporal substitutions.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes our results and provides considerations for further research.
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Chapter 2
Speed of Price Adjustment in
Retail Gasoline Prices: ‘Rockets
and Feathers’ or ‘Hot Air Balloons
and Bricks’?
2.1 Introduction
A stylized fact of ‘rockets and feathers’ is that retail prices respond rapidly to increases in
crude oil prices but respond slowly to decreases in crude oil prices, as has been found in
several previous studies (e.g., Bacon, 1991; Borenstein et al., 1997; Balke et al., 1998; Reilly
and Witt, 1998; Deltas, 2008; Yang and Ye, 2008; Lewis, 2011; Remer, 2015). In the Taiwan
gasoline supply market, many people discuss whether the retail gasoline price adjustment
is presented as ‘rockets and feathers’. After the market liberalization in 1992, the market
structure of the gasoline supply market has been restructured three times to result in four
periods with different market structures: (i) a monopoly; (ii) the first duopoly; (iii) a triopoly;
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and (iv) the second duopoly. Furthermore, the government has re-regulated retail gasoline
prices during the second duopoly period. Hence, the retail gasoline price setting has become
a controversial topic in Taiwan society.
In the beginning of the second duopoly period, crude oil prices had dramatic increases,
which resulted in increases in retail gasoline prices. In order to stabilize retail gasoline prices
after increases in crude oil prices, the government introduced the price adjustment formula
(PAF) to regulate retail gasoline prices. However, under the regime of the price adjustment
formula, the state-owned enterprise sets petroleum products’ retail prices in advance, then
the private sector decides to follow the state-owned enterprise’s price setting decision. As
a result of the same retail price setting by both suppliers, the aim of the price adjustment
formula and its contribution have been a subject of debate over the period of implementing
the price adjustment formula in the Taiwan gasoline market.
The purpose of this paper is to measure the roles of market structure and the price
adjustment formula in a retail price setting and examine whether the phenomenon of ‘rockets
and feathers’ happens in the Taiwan gasoline market. The data of the methodology were
collected from the Taiwan gasoline market over a period from August 1999 to December
2012, using monthly data.
This study empirically examines whether asymmetric pricing behavior happened in the
Taiwan gasoline market. First we test the speed of price adjustment using the standard partial
adjustment model. We next use the quadratic partial adjustment model to precisely evaluate
the effect of the price adjustment formula. Given different market structures in Taiwan, we
discuss pricing behavior separately in both empirical exercises. In the first empirical exercise,
we provide evidence in support of the effects of the government intervention on the retail
fuel price setting. For example, we find that under direct intervention, ownership of the
state-owned enterprise retail prices responded slowly to changes in crude oil prices, but given
indirect intervention, the price adjustment formula retail prices were most likely to respond
quickly to changes in crude oil prices. The second exercise provides no support for the presence
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of ‘rockets and feathers’ in the current market structure, which is a duopolistic market. The
results of the second exercise suggest that retail prices respond slowly to increases in crude
oil prices and respond quickly to decreases in crude oil prices. Our results confirm that the
retail price response in Taiwan is more a case of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’ rather than
‘rockets and feathers’.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes relevant existing studies;
Section 2.3 describes econometric methodology in this empirical study; Section 2.4 analyzes
econometric results and explains the role of the price adjustment formula; Section 2.5 sum-
marizes the findings of this paper.
2.2 Literature Review
This section briefly summarizes some previous influential studies that are related to this
paper, and also shows stylized facts of asymmetry of price setting in a variety of markets.
In a broad study, Peltzman (2000) uses large samples of 77 consumer products and 165
producer products to do analysis of asymmetric pricing behavior. His work is different from
previous papers which investigated asymmetric pricing behavior in single selected markets,
e.g., gasoline, banking, and agricultural products. As Peltzman’s finding shows, the tendency
of asymmetric pricing behavior is found in more than two of every three markets examined
within the abundance of samples. The stylized fact of asymmetric pricing behavior is also
found in various markets, such as banking, vegetables and fruit, and pork and beef.1
The topic of asymmetric pricing behavior in gasoline market has been increasingly dis-
cussed in the most of relevant studies. Bacon (1991) uses the ‘rockets and feathers’ approach
to describe the relationship between gasoline prices and crude oil prices in the UK gasoline
market. He finds that this phenomenon involves that the retail prices respond faster to pos-
itive oil price shocks than to negative shocks. And in further work, Borenstein, Cameron
1See Arbatskaya and Baye (2004) for banking, Ward (1982) for vegetables and fruit, and Goodwin and
Harper (2000) for pork and beef.
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and Gilbert (1997) examine and confirm the existence of asymmetric price setting in the US
gasoline market, and also present that the source of this asymmetric behavior might be from
adjustment lags and sellers’ market power in the market. Deltas (2008) uses monthly data
of the US gasoline market to examine the relationship between retail and wholesale prices,
and finds asymmetric behavior in the 48 contiguous states. Remer (2015) uses the US daily
station-level gasoline price data to investigate asymmetry in the response of retail prices to
cost changes. He provides evidence of asymmetric pricing in the US gasoline market, and par-
ticularly finds that the price adjustment of premium gasoline is slower than regular gasoline
when costs decrease.
However, However, some of studies present evidence of no emergence of asymmetric pricing
behavior in the US and Canadian gasoline markets. Godby et al. (2000) apply the threshold
regression model to present no evidence of asymmetric pricing behavior in the Canadian retail
gasoline market. Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) use an error correction model with daily price
data to test the hypothesis of rockets and feathers in the US gasoline market. They find no
evidence of asymmetric pricing behavior in wholesale price, and argue that daily adjustment
of gasoline price is instantaneous and symmetrical to changes in crude oil prices.
There is a variety of explanations for asymmetric pricing behavior. First, the oligopolistic
coordination theory might be a possible explanation for the asymmetric response of retail
prices to changes in cost. Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997) identify that asymmetric
pricing behavior might be explained by the oligopolistic coordination theory. They argue
that sellers tend to sustain their coordinated price rather than make a price-cutting decision
with a negative cost shock, and for seeking profit maximization, sellers raise retail prices with
a positive cost shock. Second, search costs might be another possible explanation for asym-
metric pricing. Yang and Ye (2008) exploit a dynamic consumer search model with learning
asymmetry. They find that higher consumer search costs may result in asymmetric pricing in
the market. Lewis (2011) develops a price search model to provide an alternative explanation
for asymmetric price adjustment. He provides theoretical predictions and presents empir-
ical evidence to argue that consumers’ search behavior would significantly influence firms’
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retail price adjustment. Remer (2015) also investigates the relationship between asymmetric
pricing and consumer searches, and finds evidence that consumer search costs may be the
possible underlying cause of asymmetric pricing.
This paper builds on the previous existing study by Bacon (1991) to examine whether
‘rockets and feathers’ occurs in the retail gasoline market in Taiwan and identifies the role
of the government’s policy, the price adjustment formula, on retail price adjustment. Bacon
(1991) exploits a quadratic adjustment model to empirically examine the speed of adjustment
of the UK retail prices of gasoline to changes in crude oil prices. In contrast to Bacon’s paper,
we extend a new possible explanation of Bacon’s quadratic adjustment model to identify the
response of retail gasoline and diesel prices to changes in crude oil prices. This paper uses
a standard and quadratic partial adjustment model to evaluate the speed of adjustment of
fuel prices to cost shocks and the effect of the government’s price regulation policy on price
adjustment speed. Given both standard and quadratic partial adjustment models, we re-
examine whether the ‘rockets and feathers’ pattern is observed in the retail gasoline market
in Taiwan.
2.3 Methodology
The goal of this study is to examine the presence of asymmetric price response and the
importance of the price adjustment formula on the retail price setting. We have set out with
four research questions to achieve the objective of this study. These questions are:
(i) How did retail prices respond to changes in crude oil prices and exchange rates?
(ii) Did the response of the retail prices depend on market structure?
(iii) Was there an asymmetry between price rises and falls?
(iv) How did the price adjustment formula affect the response of retail prices?
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To answer our research questions and discuss the retail pricing behavior between on-policy
and off-policy periods, the econometric model in this study should encompass two concepts
from market structure conditions and the links between retail price changes and cost changes.
The partial adjustment model was used for the analysis of gasoline price asymmetry in the
1990s. A widely-known study was illustrated by Bacon (1991). The partial adjustment model
in the study of British gasoline price asymmetry involves a lagged gasoline price, which would
indicate the dynamic nature of gasoline prices. Therefore, the partial adjustment mechanism
allows us to examine whether price asymmetry existed in the Taiwan retail gasoline market.
The econometric model of this study is based on the definition of the ‘rockets and feathers’
hypothesis provided by Bacon (1991), and then we use two approaches to model the links
between cost changes and retail gasoline price changes. The first approach, the standard
partial adjustment model, simply estimates retail price adjustment speed. Only looking
at the estimates of the price adjustment speed is not enough to gather information about
the upward and downward retail price adjustment directions if observations of positive and
negative price adjustments cannot be split from the retail price data. Even if price data
are split into observations of positive and negative price adjustment, the standard partial
adjustment model still has difficulties in precisely evaluating the price adjustment directions.
The difficulties are that the current price change might be influenced by the current or
lagged cost change, and the standard linear partial adjustment model only provides the price
adjustment speed evaluation. Therefore, the standard model may neglect to identify the
price adjustment directions in response to cost increases and decreases. Although the price
adjustment direction cannot be observed by using the standard model, the response of retail
prices under the market structure base can be observed.
The second approach, the quadratic partial adjustment model, is the main econometric
task in this analysis of price asymmetry. The quadratic model provides possible adjustment
directions in response to cost increases and decreases. The difficulty of interpreting the
price adjustment directions from the use of the standard model will not be included in the
use of the quadratic model. In the quadratic model, there is no need to split price data
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into observations of positive and negative adjustments in order to infer the price adjustment
directions. The use of the quadratic model can make it easier to provide the patterns of the
possible adjustment range in response to cost increases and decreases. Then, the discussions
of Bacon’s quadratic partial adjustment model will be extended as appropriate in relation
to deliver contributions in the analysis of price asymmetry. Therefore, the use of the partial
adjustment model in this study would provide appropriate results about the retail gasoline
price adjustment response over a period of a dozen years.
2.3.1 Standard Partial Adjustment Model
The partial adjustment model has been a popular method of explaining dynamic adjustment
activity in the existing literature. The partial adjustment model is assumed to include the
lagged actual retail gasoline price and the ‘target’ level or the ‘equilibrium’ level retail gasoline
price. We suppose that the target-level price is exactly determined by the government’s price
regulatory policy, the price adjustment formula (PAF), and so the target-level price of this
study could be construed as cost changes. This dynamic model would describe the adjustment
response of the actual price to cost changes. The first method of this study is the standard
partial adjustment model to determine the link between actual retail prices and target-level
prices. The standard partial adjustment model is written as
pt = pt−1 + λ(p
T
t − pt−1), (2.3.1)
where pt is the actual retail price of petroleum product at time t, p
T
t is the target-level
retail price of petroleum products at time t, λ is the speed of adjustment for petroleum
products, and λ ∈ [0, 1]. If λ = 1, the adjustment of the actual retail gasoline price is
instantaneous to the target-level retail gasoline price, while the adjustment of the actual price
is infinitesimally slow to the target-level price if λ = 0. The standard model generally presents
the adjustment speed of the actual retail gasoline price, p, to the target-level retail gasoline
price, pT . According to the estimated speed of price adjustment, λˆ, we could explore whether
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the actual retail price would be immediately adjusted to the target-level retail price, and find
out what constraints cause non-immediate price adjustment response if λˆ is a relatively small
fraction. Equation (2.3.1) can be re-written as
pt − pt−1 = λ(p
T
t − pt−1). (2.3.2)
2.3.2 Quadratic Partial Adjustment Model
The second approach is the quadratic partial adjustment model, and investigating this
quadratic mechanism is the major task in this study. We apply this approach to express
possible adjustment directions of the actual retail gasoline price to cost increases and de-
creases. In addition to existing possible adjustment directions to cost changes proposed by
Bacon (1991), we extend the approach to discuss a new pattern of possible adjustment range.
The quadratic partial adjustment mechanism is given as
pt = pt−1 + α(p
T
t − pt−1)
2 + β(pTt − pt−1). (2.3.3)
Re-arranging equation (2.3.3), the new form is written as
pt − pt−1 = α(p
T
t − pt−1)
2 + β(pTt − pt−1), (2.3.4)
where α and β are the coefficients of the quadratic term and the linear term. If α = 0, the
quadratic adjustment model would be rearranged as the standard partial adjustment model.
Thus, testing the hypothesis, α = 0, is the first work in this quadratic mechanism. The null
hypothesis is given by
H0 : α = 0,
H1 : α 6= 0.
If the null hypothesis of the linear adjustment model is not rejected, the quadratic partial
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adjustment mechanism might be rearranged to the standard partial adjustment mechanism
as an equation (2.3.2).
If the null hypothesis of the linear adjustment model is rejected, the possible adjustment
range can be interpreted by a variety of values of α and β. Prior to interpreting α and β,
equation (2.3.4) can be differentiated with respect to the difference between target price at
time t and actual retail price at time t − 1. Differentiating equation (2.3.4) with respect to
(pTt − pt−1) gives
d(pt − pt−1)
d(pTt − pt−1)
= 2α(pTt − pt−1) + β.
Given a variety of values of α and β and a differentiated equation, there are three patterns
of possible adjustment range in the retail prices in response to cost shocks. The first and
second patterns of possible price adjustment response were discussed by Bacon (1991), but
the third pattern was not involved in his study. We begin with the first pattern, where retail
price adjustment responds more rapidly to rises in costs than declines in costs if both α and
β are positive (α > 0 and β > 0). Then, the second pattern is where price adjustment is
faster to react to decreases in costs if α is positive and β is negative (α > 0 and β < 0). In
this paper, we exploit the third pattern of possible price adjustment range. The third case
is where we suppose that retail price responds slowly to increases in costs and quickly to
decreases in costs if α is negative and β is positive (α < 0 and β > 0). These three patterns
of possible adjustment in response to changes in costs are depicted in figure 2.1. The solid
line interprets the first type of price adjustment with positive values of α and β; the dot line
interprets the second type of price adjustment with a positive value of α and a negative value
of β; the dash-dot line presents the third type of price adjustment, with a negative value of
α and a positive value of β.
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Figure 2.1: Possible Price Adjustment to Changes in Costs
2.3.3 Interpretations of Coefficients in the Linear Term
Testing the hypotheses that the values of λ in the standard linear adjustment form and the
values of β in the quadratic adjustment form, if the null hypothesis of the linear adjustment
model (H0 : α = 0) holds, is conducted to present the speed of retail price adjustment to
changes in costs. The hypotheses are:
(i) testing values of λ:
H0 : λ = 0,
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H0 : λ = 1;
(ii) testing values of β if α = 0:
H0 : β = 0,
H0 : β = 1.
These four cases of null hypotheses suggest that: (i) the first and third cases in which the
null hypotheses of λ = 0 and β = 0 are not rejected give infinitesimally slow adjustments
to changes in crude oil prices; (ii) the second and fourth cases of λ = 1 and β = 1 show an
instantaneous adjustment to changes in crude oil prices.
2.4 Data and Empirical Results
2.4.1 Data Description
This study consists of two different sources of monthly observations from the supply and
demand sides from August 1999 to December 2012, for a total of 161 months. The first
source from the supply side contains monthly Dubai and Brent crude oil prices and the
exchange rate for the US dollar to the Taiwan dollar. Prices of Dubai and Brent crude oil
are collected from the Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities and the World Bank.
The exchange rate for the US dollar (USD) to the Taiwan dollar (TWD) is gathered from
the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan). The second source, from the demand
side, contains the state-owned enterprise’s monthly retail price data, which are collected from
the Petroleum Price of Information Management and Analysis System, the Bureau of Energy
(Taiwan).
The state-owned enterprise adopted the price adjustment formula to set new gasoline
prices on the Sunday of every week from September 2006. During the period of implementing
the price adjustment formula, the state-owned enterprise’s retail gasoline prices were occa-
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sionally frozen by direct government intervention if international crude oil prices increased
dramatically. This direct government intervention may influence our outcomes in studying
the relationship between the price adjustment formula and the response of retail prices to
changes in costs. Therefore, using monthly data is crucial to study a rising concern about the
price adjustment formula influencing the retail gasoline price setting, and has advantages to
eliminate the possibility of influence of direct government intervention in this study. However,
there is a limitation on using monthly data. The state-owned enterprise’s new retail gasoline
prices were adjusted weekly. We might not provide precise evidence about the effect of the
price adjustment formula when we utilize monthly price data. In order to eliminate the gov-
ernment’s intervention on retail gasoline price setting (freezing retail prices) this limitation
will not be taken into account in this study.
In order to examine the retail price behavior in response to changes in costs, we split the
time periods, which are from August 1999 to December 2012, into four time periods that are
based on a history of the Taiwan gasoline market structure. A timeline history of the Taiwan
gasoline market structure is depicted in figure 1.1 in Chapter 1. The four time periods are:
(i) a monopoly (1999M08-2000M06); (ii) the 1st duopoly (2000M07-2002M08); (iii) a triopoly
(2002M09-2003M11); and (iv) the 2nd duopoly (2003M12-2012M12). Given different market
structures, we individually examine how Taiwan retail gasoline prices respond to changes in
costs.
Let us restrict attention to monthly data from the cost side. Historical monthly data of
Dubai and Brent crude oil prices and exchange rates are collected from the World Bank and
the Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Dubai crude oil and Brent crude oil
are priced by US dollars per barrel (USD/barrel). Crude oil prices and exchange rate data
are graphically presented in figure 2.2. Figure 2.2a interprets that Dubai and Brent crude
oil prices had an increasing movement from 2004 to 2007, a quick decline during the second
half of 2008, and a positive growth after a dramatic decline in 2008. Figure 2.2b shows the
movement of the exchange rate between 1999 and 2012. The exchange rate between Taiwan
dollars and US dollars shows a negative tendency over 14 years.
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Figure 2.2: Crude Oil Prices and Exchange Rate
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Next, we return to focus on monthly observations of the actual retail fuel prices from the
leader of the retail gasoline market, CPC. Retail prices of gasoline and diesel are gathered
from the Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic Affairs (Taiwan), and are presented in
figure 2.3. Figure 2.3 lists actual retail prices of four types of fuel products, which are
92 unleaded gasoline, 95 unleaded gasoline, 98 unleaded gasoline and diesel. Three types of
gasoline products are categorized into three grades as regular grade (92 unleaded), mid-regular
grade (95 unleaded) and premium grade (98 unleaded). This paper pays more attention to
mid-regular grade gasoline (95 unleaded) since sales of 95 unleaded gasoline account for the
vast majority of the total sales of unleaded gasoline products.2 Figure 2.3 shows the trend
of the actual retail prices of fuel products from August 1999 to December 2012. The actual
retail prices of fuel products fluctuated less during the monopoly, first duopoly and triopoly
periods. During the second duopoly period, the actual retail prices rose gradually before
September 2006; however, the actual prices obviously fluctuated after September 2006. A
possible reason to explain these obvious fluctuations of the actual prices is that the retail
prices were more tightly linked to the fluctuations of crude oil prices, due to the introduction
of the price adjustment formula in September 2006.
Furthermore, to estimate the response of retail prices to changes in costs, we utilize partial
adjustment models, which are discussed in Section 2.3. As the purpose of this study aims
to present the analysis of retail gasoline price behavior in four types of market structure, we
reset the target-level price at the beginning of each market structure in compiling target-level
price data. The compilation of the target-level retail prices is exactly determined by following
the procedure of the price adjustment formula.3 Given the procedure of the price adjustment
formula, the target-level retail prices are associated with the actual Dubai and Brent crude
oil spot prices and the actual spot exchange rate for the US dollar (USD) to the Taiwan dollar
(TWD). Thus, variations in the target-level retail prices can be construed as cost variations.
2Sales of 95 unleaded gasoline account for around 75% of the state-owned enterprise’s total sales of unleaded
gasoline products.
3The target level retail gasoline price is computed by following the procedure of the price adjustment
formula, which is illustrated in Appendix 2.A, where we also reveal a simple illustration to clarify how a new
retail gasoline price was set by the procedure of the price adjustment formula.
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As market structure setting is considered in this analysis, each market structure period has
its own distinct target-level retail gasoline and diesel prices by following the procedure of
the price adjustment formula. The target-level price data are diagrammatically presented in
Figure 2.4.
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2.4.2 Empirical Analysis
This empirical analysis aims to answer the research questions in section 2.3 and provide a
precise evidence of retail price adjustment in the Taiwan retail gasoline market. I accomplish
this analysis by using the standard and quadratic partial adjustment models. We initially use
the standard partial adjustment model in equation (2.3.2) for presenting the simple measure of
the speed of retail price adjustment, and then utilize the quadratic partial adjustment model
in equation (2.3.4) for testing whether asymmetric pricing behavior existed, and consequently
evaluate the effect of the price adjustment formula in the Taiwan retail gasoline market. The
estimates of the standard and quadratic partial adjustment models are obtained by using the
ordinary least squares. The estimated results of the standard partial adjustment model are
reported in tables 2.1 and 2.2 in section 2.4.2.1 and the estimated results of the quadratic
partial adjustment model are reported in tables 2.3 and 2.4 in section 2.4.2.2.
2.4.2.1 Estimating Price Response Speed by the Standard Partial Adjustment
Mechanism
Given an expression of the speed of price adjustment in equation (2.3.2) and a consideration
of the market structure setting in section 2.4.1, table 2.1 presents estimates of adjustment
speed parameters over four market structure periods. Moreover, as table 2.1 shows, we split
the second duopoly period into two time segments, the pre-PAF (2003M12-2006M08) and
the post-PAF (2006M09-2012M12), which are based on the time of implementing the price
adjustment formula.
We begin to limit attention to estimated adjustment speed parameters in table 2.1. Es-
timated adjustment speed parameters of four fuel products, λ, are statistically significant at
the monopoly and the second duopoly periods. During the monopoly period and the second
duopoly period, there existed retail price regulation on fuel products. First, the gasoline
industry and retail prices of fuel products were regulated by the government in the monopoly
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period. Second, during the second duopoly period the state-owned enterprise’s retail prices
were regulated by the price adjustment formula from September 2006 and intervened in by
the government’s executive order - freezing retail gasoline prices from November 2007 to May
2008 when crude oil prices increased. This result suggests that price regulation might explain
the significance of the price adjustment speed parameters.
In particular, to compare the price adjustment speed parameters between the monopoly
periods and the post-PAF period of the second duopoly period, we find that the speed of retail
price adjustment in the post-PAF period was five times greater than in the monopoly period.
The retail price adjustment speed parameters of four fuel products in the monopoly period
are smaller than 0.2, λ < 0.2, but in the post-PAF period the parameters are greater than 0.6,
λ > 0.6. Retail prices responded slowly to changes in costs during the monopoly period, when
the government directly intervened in retail prices. However, retail prices responded quickly
to changes in costs during the post-PAF period when the government indirectly intervened
in retail prices through an advisory guide of retail prices by the implementation of the price
adjustment formula. This finding reveals that direct government intervention (ownership of
the state-owned enterprise) lowered the speed of retail price adjustment, and indirect gov-
ernment intervention (the price adjustment formula) resulted in a close relationship between
the response of retail prices and changes in costs.
While finding the significance of the adjustment speed parameters in the monopoly and
the second duopoly periods, we find that there is no statistical significance of the adjustment
speed parameters of four fuel products in the first duopoly and triopoly periods. Although the
adjustment speed parameters of four fuel products in the first duopoly and triopoly periods
were not significant, the estimated result presents that there was a slower retail price response
to changes in costs. In sum, these results provide evidence about a slow price response to
changes in costs existing at the periods of the monopoly, the first duopoly, the triopoly and
the pre-PAF, and also confirm that direct intervention would result in a slower price response.
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Table 2.1: Estimates of the Standard Partial Adjustment Model
Perioda
Monopoly 1st Duopoly Triopoly 2nd Duopolyb
Pre-PAF Post-PAF
Obs. 11 26 15 33 76
λ92 0.1840
∗∗ 0.1000 0.2156 0.2530∗∗ 0.7235∗∗∗
(0.0697) (0.1028) (0.1932) (0.0992) (0.0622)
R2 0.4107 0.0364 0.0817 0.1690 0.6431
Durbin’s Alternative 0.8294 0.9052 0.7884 0.3006 0.8482
λ95 0.1545
∗∗ 0.0946 0.2253 0.2411∗∗ 0.6931∗∗∗
(0.0560) (0.0926) (0.1668) (0.0947) (0.0622)
R2 0.4324 0.0400 0.1151 0.1683 0.6231
Durbin’s Alternative 0.7596 0.9226 0.6366 0.2988 0.9191
λ98 0.1148
∗∗ 0.0950 0.2046 0.2225∗∗ 0.6457∗∗∗
(0.0360) (0.0851) (0.1545) (0.0867) (0.0597)
R2 0.5043 0.0474 0.1113 0.1706 0.6095
Durbin’s Alternative 0.6797 0.9545 0.7169 0.2550 0.7988
λdiesel 0.1571
∗∗ 0.0467 0.0084 0.2815∗∗∗ 0.7374∗∗∗
(0.0558) (0.0620) (0.1666) (0.1001) (0.0693)
R2 0.4422 0.0222 0.0002 0.1981 0.6010
Durbin’s Alternative 0.8999 0.9042 0.5583 0.3366 0.9727
a Time periods from 1999 to 2012 include four types of market structure: (i) monopoly (1999M08-
2000M06); (ii) 1st duopoly (2000M07-2002M08); (iii) triopoly (2002M09-2003M11); and (iv) 2nd
duopoly (2003M12-2012M12).
b The time periods during the 2nd duopoly without the application of the price adjustment formula are
called the pre-PAF period, and with the application of the price adjustment formula are the post-PAF
period.
Standard error in parenthesis. *** Statistically significant at 1 percent level. ** Statistically significant
at 5 percent level. * Statistically significant at 10 percent level.
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To improve our understanding of the response of retail prices to changes in costs, we
test both whether the price adjustment affected the retail price adjustment speed and the
response of retail prices to changes in costs. In order to examine the effect of the price
adjustment formula we rely on two steps. We first restrict our attention to the second
duopoly period. Recalling the market structure setting, the second duopoly period includes
the deregulated period (pre-PAF) and the regulated period (post-PAF), which would help us
to make a comparison about the effect of the price adjustment formula between deregulated
and regulated periods. Second, we split the post-PAF period into three time intervals, as the
first price rise time interval (2006M09-2008M07), the price decline time interval (2008M08-
2008M12) and the second price rise time interval (2009M01-2012M12). The time interval
setting is associated with an upward/downward trend of retail gasoline price, and figure 2.5
clarifies this time interval setting.
Figure 2.5: Time Interval Setting at the Post-PAF Period
Pre−PAF Period Post−PAF Period
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Note: A solid vertical reference line at time 2006M09 denotes the time of the implementation of the price
adjustment formula. The 2nd duopoly period is split into two time periods as the pre-PAF (2003M12-
2006M08) and the post-PAF (2006M09-2012M12) periods. The post-PAF period includes three time
intervals: (1) the first price rise time interval (2006M09-2008M07); (2) the price decline time interval
(2008M08-2008M12); and (3) the second price rise time interval (2009M01-2012M12).
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We estimate the retail price adjustment speed parameters of four fuel products using
equation (2.3.2), the standard partial adjustment formula, and the report estimated param-
eters in table 2.2. The estimated adjustment speed parameters in the deregulated (pre-PAF)
period are reported in the first column of table 2.2, and columns 2, 3 and 4 of table 2.2 present
estimated adjustment speed parameters in the regulated (post-PAF) period. We focus on a
major fuel product, 95 unleaded gasoline. The estimated adjustment speed parameter, λ95,
in the deregulated period, is smaller than in the regulated period. This reflects that indi-
rect government intervention, the price adjustment formula (PAF), boosted the retail price
adjustment speed. This result is also presented in the studies of three other fuel products.
Next, we compare the retail price adjustment speed parameters on three time intervals
over the post-PAF period, and again we focus on 95 unleaded gasoline. The estimated
adjustment speed parameters in columns 2, 3 and 4 are statistically significant and present
that the retail gasoline prices responded slowly to changes in costs during the price rise time
intervals but responded quickly to changes in costs during the price decline time interval.
This finding confirms that indirect government intervention (the price adjustment formula)
resulted in a slow (quick) adjustment speed in response to increases (decreases) in costs.
This result provides a contrast to the existing stylized fact, ‘rockets and feathers’, and seems
instead to be ‘hot air balloons and bricks’. Similarly, this finding is presented in connection to
three other fuel products. Furthermore, our estimates also present that the premium gasoline
(98 unleaded gasoline) price adjustment speed is slower than regular (92 unleaded gasoline)
and mid-regular (95 unleaded gasoline) price adjustment speeds. This evidence is consistent
with existing evidence by Remer (2015).
To support the finding of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’, we test hypotheses of the value
of the adjustment speed parameter (λ), which is addressed in section 2.3.3. Firstly, both
null hypotheses, H0 : λ = 0 and H0 : λ = 1, are rejected at 1% and 5% significance level
at the first and second price rise time intervals. Testing these hypotheses of the values of
the adjustment parameters, we can see that over two price rise time intervals, the estimated
adjustment speed parameters are different from the exact values, zero and one, and express
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that the actual retail price had a fractional adjustment in response to cost increases. Secondly,
however, we obtain the rejection of the null hypothesis, H0 : λ = 0, and fail to reject the null
hypothesis, H0 : λ = 1 at 1% and 5% significance levels at the price decline time interval. This
interprets that there was virtually instantaneous actual retail price adjustment in response
to cost decreases.
Given the use of time series data in this study, there is a potential problem about serial
correlation. If serial correlation exists in our time series data, our OLS estimators’ efficiency
will be affected. For example, the presence of serial correlation may cause the underestimated
variances of estimators and the rejection of the null hypothesis. Hence, serial correlation may
be a concern for the efficiency of our estimates. To deal with this potential problem, we test
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in our model. As equation (2.3.1) expressed, the
lagged dependent variable is contained in the partial adjustment model. We therefore use
Durbin’s alternative test to ensure the efficiency of our least-squares estimates. The p-values
of the Durbin’s alternative test are reported in tables 2.1 and 2.2. The null hypothesis of
no serial correlation failed to reject, so the potential problem of serial correlation would not
arise in our estimates.
Although the standard partial adjustment model contributes an essential evidence of ‘hot
air balloons and bricks’ to the analysis of price asymmetry from table 2.2, it still has lim-
itations in supporting this key finding. The main limitation of supporting this finding is
estimating the price adjustment parameters with a small number of observations; for exam-
ple, estimated results of the third column (price decline period) with five observations in
table 2.2. An estimation with a small number of observations would potentially result in
unreliable results, and any short-lived major shock would be too influential under this con-
dition. Therefore, the standard partial adjustment approach is not effectively appropriate to
establish the links between retail price changes and cost changes.
Excluding the limitation of a small number of observations, we can conclude: (i) direct
government intervention (ownership of the state-owned enterprise) led to a slower retail price
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response to changes in costs; (ii) under indirect government intervention (the price adjustment
formula) the response of retail prices was closely tied to changes in costs; (iii) given the
implementation of the price adjustment formula, there is no evidence of ‘rockets and feathers’;
(iv) the response of retail prices to cost changes was not affected by market structure, but
depended on the government intervention.
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Table 2.2: Estimates of Adjustment Speed in the 2nd Duopoly
Perioda,b
Pre-PAF 1st Price Rise Price Decline 2nd Price Rise
Observation 33 23 5 48
λ92 0.2530
∗∗ 0.5637∗∗∗ 0.9441∗∗∗ 0.5762∗∗∗
(0.0992) (0.1649) (0.1070) (0.0775)
R2 0.1690 0.3471 0.9512 0.5405
Durbin’s Alternative 0.3006 0.7919 0.2162 0.6005
λ95 0.2411
∗∗ 0.5466∗∗∗ 0.9128∗∗∗ 0.5421∗∗∗
(0.0947) (0.1598) (0.1046) (0.0809)
R2 0.1683 0.3472 0.9501 0.4888
Durbin’s Alternative 0.2988 0.7895 0.1690 0.3233
λ98 0.2225
∗∗ 0.5134∗∗∗ 0.8541∗∗∗ 0.5002∗∗∗
(0.0867) (0.1500) (0.0977) (0.0797)
R2 0.1706 0.3474 0.9503 0.4557
Durbin’s Alternative 0.2550 0.7836 0.1350 0.2376
λdiesel 0.2815
∗∗∗ 0.5800∗∗∗ 0.9991∗∗∗ 0.5462∗∗∗
(0.1001) (0.1774) (0.1134) (0.0896)
R2 0.1981 0.3270 0.9510 0.4418
Durbin’s Alternative 0.3366 0.8227 0.2024 0.4260
a The first period is the pre-PAF period (2003M12-2006M08), and the second, third and fourth periods
are the post-PAF period (2006M09-2012M12).
b The post-PAF period contains three intervals: (i) the first price rise interval (2006M09-2008M07);
(ii) the price decline interval (2008M08-2008M12); and (iii) the second price rise interval (2009M01-
2012M12).
Standard error in parenthesis. *** Statistically significant at 1 percent level. ** Statistically signifi-
cant at 5 percent level. * Statistically significant at 10 percent level.
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2.4.2.2 Possible Adjustment Directions by the Quadratic Partial Adjustment
Mechanism
This empirical analysis is designed to capture the effect of the price adjustment formula on
the retail price setting and the relationship between retail pricing behavior and the price
adjustment formula. The analysis of the price adjustment is continued while providing con-
sistent evidence of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’. We now return to the main econometric task
of this study, the quadratic partial adjustment model. As we addressed in section 2.3.2, the
possible price adjustment directions to cost changes can be established by using the quadratic
partial adjustment model. The existing two patterns of possible adjustment directions are
extended to three patterns, which are also clarified in section 2.3.2. For discussions of the es-
timated results using the quadratic partial adjustment model, initially we use the quadratic
model to separately estimate coefficients at each single market structure period, and then
look at coefficient estimates during the second duopoly in exploring the relationship between
the price adjustment formula and the retail price response.
The first coefficient estimates over four market structures from the quadratic adjustment
model in equation (2.3.4), which are shown in table 2.3. Table 2.3 reports that the estimated
price adjustment speed parameters are statistically significant during the post-PAF period.
Next, we first test the null hypothesis of the linear adjustment mechanism, as discussed in
section 2.3.2. The null hypothesis, Ho : α = 0, is rejected at 5% significance level. Because
of the rejection of the null hypothesis of linear adjustment (Ho : α = 0), there are negative
values of α and positive values of β, which provide an opposite finding to evidence found
by Bacon (1991). Recalling a discussion in a variety of values of α and β in section 2.3.2,
we could use the third pattern of the possible price adjustment range to describe how retail
prices responded to changes in costs in the Taiwan gasoline market.
As the new pattern of possible price adjustment direction is defined in section 2.3.2,
the estimated results from table 2.3 suggest that when the partial adjustment formula was
implemented, the actual retail price had a slow adjustment in response to cost increases
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and a quick adjustment in response to cost decreases. This finding confirms the previous
finding of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’ by using the standard partial adjustment mechanism
in section 2.4.2.1. In particular, the limitation of a small number of observations is removed
in this section. Due to the removal of the limitation of a small number of observations, the
estimated results from the quadratic partial adjustment mechanism can provide precise and
reliable evidence about the retail price adjustment of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’ in the
Taiwan retail gasoline market.
Table 2.4 reports that the estimated coefficients from the quadratic partial adjustment
model in equation (2.3.4) and columns 2 and 4 show the significance of the estimated coef-
ficients over the price rise time intervals. Since the significance of the estimated coefficients
is found at both price rise time intervals, we test the null hypothesis of linear adjustment
mechanism (Ho : α = 0) at these two time intervals. We fail to reject the null hypothesis
of linear adjustment mechanism, which suggests that the estimated coefficients of quadratic
term can be omitted. Given acceptance of the null hypothesis of linear adjustment mecha-
nism and the significance of the estimated coefficients in the linear term, then we test the
values of β to explain the retail price adjustment speed in response to changes in costs, which
is discussed in section 2.3.3. The null hypotheses of β = 0 and β = 1 are rejected at two price
rise time intervals. The findings in columns 2 and 4 suggest that retail prices did not respond
immediately to increases in costs. Moreover, we turn our attention to a comparison of the
price adjustment speed parameters between fuel products. Coefficient estimates confirm that
the adjustment speed of premium gasoline price is slower than regular, mid-regular gasoline
products and diesel. This finding is consistent with evidence found in section 2.4.2.1.
Again, the quadratic partial adjustment model may cause a potential problem of serial
correlation by using time series data. So, we use a test of the null hypothesis of no serial
correlation to ensure the efficiency of our estimates. The p-values of the Durbin’s alternative
test are presented in tables 2.3 and 2.4. These p-values indicate that there is no serial
correlation in the model, and the efficiency of our estimates is not affected when the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation holds.
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Given coefficient estimates in tables 2.3 and 2.4, empirical evidence reveals that the price
adjustment formula took an essential role in reducing retail price adjustment speed in response
to cost increases, and evidence of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’ in the response of retail prices
in Taiwan retail gasoline market is confirmed by our new pattern of possible adjustment
range.
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Table 2.3: Estimates of Quadratic Adjustment Model
Perioda
Monopoly 1st Duopoly Triopoly 2nd Duopolyb
Pre-PAF Post-PAF
Obs. 11 26 15 33 76
α92 0.3547 0.0289 −0.1425 0.0901 −0.0530
∗∗
(0.2107) (0.0733) (0.1620) (0.1079) (0.0233)
β92 −0.2026 0.1197 0.2211 0.1802 0.6625
∗∗∗
(0.2385) (0.1159) (0.1949) (0.1325) (0.0662)
R2 0.5517 0.0426 0.1333 0.1873 0.6664
Durbin’s Alternative 0.8605 0.9392 0.5249 0.3588 0.9145
α95 0.1474 0.0248 −0.0789 0.0813 −0.0491
∗∗
(0.1850) (0.0604) (0.1484) (0.0984) (0.0227)
β95 −0.0450 0.1123 0.1981 0.1722 0.6355
∗∗∗
(0.2567) (0.1036) (0.1787) (0.1265) (0.0664)
R2 0.4698 0.0467 0.1342 0.1863 0.6456
Durbin’s Alternative 0.9764 0.9610 0.3147 0.3560 0.8363
α98 0.0098 0.0236 −0.1114 0.0650 −0.0430
∗∗
(0.1058) (0.0509) (0.1145) (0.0822) (0.0204)
β98 0.0971 0.1125 0.2187 0.1624 0.5925
∗∗∗
(0.1955) (0.0944) (0.1555) (0.1158) (0.0636)
R2 0.5048 0.0559 0.1713 0.1869 0.6316
Durbin’s Alternative 0.6356 0.9893 0.6910 0.3022 0.7084
αdiesel 0.2866 0.0081 −0.0448 0.1741 −0.0591
∗∗
(0.1865) (0.0497) (0.1619) (0.1152) (0.0252)
βdiesel −0.1615 0.0511 0.0048 0.1483 0.6677
∗∗
(0.2138) (0.0687) (0.1728) (0.1319) (0.0735)
R2 0.5581 0.0233 0.0060 0.2532 0.6292
Durbin’s Alternative 0.8266 0.9011 0.3248 0.6130 0.8467
a Time periods from 1999 to 2012 contains four types of market structure: (i) monopoly (1999M08-
2000M06); (ii) 1st duopoly (2000M07-2002M08); (iii) triopoly (2002M09-2003M11); and (iv) 2nd
duopoly (2003M12-2012M12).
b The time periods during the 2nd duopoly without the application of the price adjustment formula
are called the pre-PAF period, and without the application of the price adjustment formula are the
post-PAF period.
Standard error in parenthesis. *** Statistically significant at 1 percent level. ** Statistically significant
at 5 percent level. * Statistically significant at 10 percent level.
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Table 2.4: Estimates of Quadratic Adjustment Model in the 2nd Duopoly
Periodab
Pre-PAF 1st Price Rise Price Decline 2nd Price Rise
Observation 33 23 5 48
α92 0.0901 −0.0271 −0.0182 0.0702
(0.1079) (0.0964) (0.1233) (0.0478)
β92 0.1802 0.5834
∗∗∗ 0.8757 0.5336∗∗∗
(0.1325) (0.1824) (0.4806) (0.0819)
R2 0.1873 0.3495 0.9515 0.5610
Durbin’s Alternative 0.3588 0.8420 0.2839 0.8425
α95 0.0813 −0.0244 −0.0142 0.0715
(0.0984) (0.0904) (0.1181) (0.0474)
β95 0.1722 0.5648
∗∗∗ 0.8575 0.4980∗∗∗
(0.1265) (0.1767) (0.4741) (0.0850)
R2 0.1863 0.3494 0.9504 0.5130
Durbin’s Alternative 0.3560 0.8373 0.2430 0.5573
α98 0.0650 −0.0196 −0.0174 0.0646
(0.0822) (0.0794) (0.1043) (0.0434)
β98 0.1624 0.5288
∗∗∗ 0.7822 0.4566∗∗∗
(0.1158) (0.1556) (0.4461) (0.0840)
R2 0.1869 0.3493 0.9507 0.4807
Durbin’s Alternative 0.3022 0.8262 0.1939 0.4456
αdiesel 0.1741 −0.0193 −0.0004 0.0650
(0.1152) (0.1051) (0.1272) (0.0523)
βdiesel 0.1483 0.5964
∗∗∗ 0.9976 0.5099∗∗∗
(0.1319) (0.2023) (0.5102) (0.0937)
R2 0.2532 0.3280 0.9510 0.4599
Durbin’s Alternative 0.6130 0.8631 0.3097 0.6627
a The first period is the pre-PAF period (2003M12-2006M08), and the second, third and forth periods
are the post-PAF period (2006M09-2012M12).
b The post-PAF period contains three intervals: (i) the first price rise interval (2006M09-2008M07);
(ii) the price decline interval (2008M08-2008M12); and (iii) the second price rise interval (2009M01-
2012M12).
Standard error in parenthesis. *** Statistically significant at 1 percent level. ** Statistically signifi-
cant at 5 percent level. * Statistically significant at 10 percent level.
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2.5 Summary of Chapter 2
In this paper we identify the characteristics of the price adjustment formula in the retail price
setting in the Taiwan gasoline market, and study the relationship between the response of
retail prices and the price adjustment formula. The empirical exercises, using the standard
and the quadratic partial adjustment models, explicitly describe how retail prices responded
to changes in costs, and precisely identify the impact of the price adjustment formula in the
Taiwan gasoline market.
Following our estimates from the standard and quadratic partial adjustment models, we
find that: (i) direct government intervention - ownership of the state-owned enterprise - led
to a slower response of retail prices to changes in costs; (ii) retail prices closely followed a
trend of changes in crude oil prices; and (iii) under indirect government intervention - the
price adjustment formula - we find evidence of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’: that retail prices
responded more quickly to decreases in costs but responded more slowly to increases in costs.
First, under different market structures we individually estimate price adjustment speed
parameters. Given the estimated results, we find that direct government intervention - own-
ership of the state-owned enterprise - resulted in a slower price response to changes in costs.
However, under indirect government intervention - price adjustment formula (PAF) it led
to a boost of the adjustment speed of retail prices. As the results show, in measuring the
effects of both direct and indirect government intervention, direct intervention had a smaller
impact on the response of retail prices than indirect intervention.
Second, although our results identify that the price adjustment formula boosted the price
adjustment speed, significant estimates also provide evidence in manifesting a slow retail price
response to increases in costs and a quick retail price response to decreases in costs during
the period of the implementation of the price adjustment formula. This reveals that the price
adjustment formula tried to stabilize retail prices of fuel products when costs increased.
Third, coefficient estimates in the second duopoly period, from both the standard and
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quadratic partial adjustment models, highlight important evidence in the Taiwan gasoline
market. We find evidence of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’ in the Taiwan gasoline market. The
results from the standard partial adjustment model present a slower (quicker) retail price
adjustment speed than was observed when costs rose (fell). The estimated results from the
quadratic partial adjustment model represent a new pattern of possible price adjustment,
where retail price responds slowly to increases in costs and quickly to decreases in costs. This
evidence suggests that a stylized fact of ‘rockets and feathers‘ is observed in some countries,
but a converse fact of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’ is observed in the Taiwan gasoline market.
Unlike one of the possible explanations for asymmetric retail price adjustment, an oligopoly
coordination theory proposed by Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997), this study finds an
alternative possible explanation, consumer search, to the retail price response in the Taiwan
gasoline market. Since the price adjustment formula was implemented in September 2006, the
retail gasoline price setting became public knowledge to consumers, while consumer search
costs reduced. Reduction in search costs might result in faster price response. Our finding is
most closely related to Yang and Ye (2008) and Remer (2015).
This paper highlights a significant efficiency of the price adjustment formula on controlling
the retail price adjustment speed, and provides evidence of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’ in
the Taiwan gasoline supply market. However, there is at least one potential concern about
the price adjustment formula information being shared with competing firm and consumers.
The government is taking the part of two characters (a regulator and a leading firm) in
the Taiwan gasoline market, which results in a conflict of interests concerning differentiating
market efficiency gains and anti-competitive outcomes from the implementation of the price
adjustment formula. Therefore, the effect of the price adjustment formula on market efficiency
gains and anti-competitive outcomes is worth investigating in a future study.
Negative outcomes may be generated by the government’s regulatory policy, the price
adjustment formula, but given the evidence of ‘hot air balloons and bricks’, the government’s
policy seems to be beneficial to consumers nevertheless. If any potential concerns are not
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taken into account, the government’s regulatory policy obviously restrains the retail price
increases in response to cost increases and offers immediate adjustment of the retail price in
response to cost decreases.
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Appendix
2.A Procedure of the Price Adjustment Formula
Before full liberalization of the gasoline supply market, gasoline market prices were regulated
by the domestic gasoline pricing system. Since the gasoline supply market was fully liber-
alized and formally became a competitive market in the early part of 2000, the domestic
gasoline pricing system was abolished and the Petroleum Administration Act was enacted by
the Taiwan government.4 However, in order to reduce the impact of dramatic fluctuations
of international crude oil prices in 2005, the Chen administration of the Taiwan govern-
ment framed the gasoline price adjustment formula in late 2005 and applied it in stabilizing
domestic gasoline prices in 2006.5
The framework of the price adjustment formula (PAF) contains three steps: (i) adjustment
index; (ii) range of adjustment; and (iii) new weekly prices. An illustration is provided at
the end of the paper. The contents of each step and an illustration are drawn as follows:
4The Domestic Gasoline Pricing System was used to stabilize domestic gasoline prices in the monopo-
listic and partially liberalized periods. Afterwards, the gasoline pricing policy was re-discussed since, in the
early part of 2000, the private enterprise, Formosa Petrochemical Corporation (FPCC), started to provide
a domestic gasoline supply. The government of Taiwan deemed that domestic gasoline prices deserved com-
petitive behaviours in the gasoline supply market. Therefore, domestic gasoline prices were deregulated, and
meanwhile, the Petroleum Administration Act was also legislated to govern the petroleum industry.
5The Price Adjustment Formula (PAF) was introduced in late 2005 and revised and executed in 2006.
The main aim of the PAF is to reduce the level of fluctuation of domestic gasoline prices, and the PAF is only
used by the state-owned enterprise, China Petroleum Corporation (CPC).
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2.A.1 Adjustment Index
The government of Taiwan uses international crude oil prices, Dubai and Brent, to measure
the weekly crude oil index. The equation of the adjustment index shows that:
AIt = 70% × p
Dubai
t + 30% × p
Brent
t (2.A.1)
whereAIt is the adjustment index at week t, and p
Dubai
t and p
Brent
t denote the weekly average
prices of Dubai and Brent crude oil prices at week t.
According to government publications and the public statement of CPC addressed by
the Bureau of Energy and China Petroleum Corporation (2011), the shares of the import
expenditure in using Dubai and Brent crude oil prices are 69.27% and 30.73% respectively.
Therefore, for approaching the actual proportions of using Dubai and Brent crude oil prices,
Dubai crude oil would be weighted at 70% of the adjustment index, and Brent crude oil
accounts for the remaining proportion of the adjustment index, 30%.6
2.A.2 Range of Adjustment
Before making a decision on domestic gasoline prices, the range of adjusting domestic gasoline
prices has to be made. The setting of the range of adjusting domestic gasoline prices is based
on fluctuations of international crude oil prices and the exchange rate. The equation of the
range of adjustment is written as:
ARt = 80% ×
{
[(AIt × et)− (AIt−1 × et−1)]
(AIt−1 × et−1)
}
(2.A.2)
6According to the public document addressed by CPC and the government publication, Energy Monthly,
sources of crude oil and its proportions are listed as Middle-East (67.44%), West Africa (26.6%), Southeast
Asia (0.81%), Australia (2.85%), and other areas (2.30%). The whole amount of crude oil from the Middle-
East and half the amount of crude oil from Southeast Asia and Australia are valued by the Dubai crude
oil price. The Brent crude oil price is used to measure sources from West Africa and other areas, and the
remaining amounts of crude oil from Southeast Asia and Australia.
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where ARt is the measure of adjustment for week t, and et is the weekly average exchange
rate for converting USD (US Dollars) to TWD (New Taiwan Dollars).
As stabilization of domestic gasoline prices is one of the major responsibilities of the state-
owned enterprise, CPC absorbs 20% of annual total costs to reduce negative effects, such as
increases in international crude oil prices and the exchange rate, on stabilization of domestic
gasoline prices. Therefore, the range of adjustment is measured by 80% of the fluctuations
of international crude oil prices and the exchange rate.7
2.A.3 New Weekly Prices
New weekly domestic gasoline prices are adjusted according to the range of adjustment.
Equations are given as:
pWBTt+1 = p
WBT
t × (1 +ARt) (2.A.3)
and
pMt+1 = p
WBT
t+1 + Tt+1 (2.A.4)
where pWBTt+1 is the new domestic wholesale price of gasoline before taxes at week t+ 1, p
M
t+1
is the new domestic market price of gasoline after taxes at week t+ 1, and Tt+1 is the taxes
of producing gasoline products at week t+ 1.8
7According to the government publication, Energy Monthly, and the public announcement of CPC, they
claim that the imports of crude oil to Taiwan amount to around 80% of the annual total costs of CPC, and the
remaining amounts of the annual total costs, which are not affected by fluctuations of international crude oil
prices and the exchange rate, are used in administrative, logistic, and productive expenditures, etc. Therefore,
in the PAF, the range of adjustment is not fully influenced by fluctuations of international crude oil prices
and the exchange rate.
8Taxes of producing gasoline products include the import tariff, the trade promotion service fee, excise
tax, the soil and groundwater pollution remediation fee, the air pollution control fee, value added tax, and
the Petroleum Fund. Energy tariffs and taxes are reported in Appendix 2.C.
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2.B Illustration
(1) Adjustment Index:
as the equation (2.A.1) and international crude oil prices of Dubai and Brent at the
current week t: pDubait = 110.46 and p
Brent
t = 116.80, given that the current adjustment
index can be calculated as:
AIt = 70% × 110.46 + 30% × 116.80 = 112.36.
(2) Adjustment Range
Since AIt−1 = 109.85, et = 29.588, and et−1 = 29.129 are known from historical data
and the current adjustment index is obtained from the previous step, the range of
adjustment is written as:
ARt = 80% ×
{
[(112.36×29.588)−(109.85×29.129)]
(109.85×29.129)
}
= 3.12%
(3) New Weekly Price
Given the equations (2.A.3) and (2.A.4), current wholesale price before taxes (pBTt =
23.29) and taxes (Tt+1 = 10.708), the new wholesale price before taxes and the new
market price are given as:
pWBTt+1 = 23.29 × (1 + 3.12%) = 24.02
and
pMt+1 = 24.02 + 10.708 = 34.76.
9
9The amount of taxes is an estimated value, as referred to by the government publication, Energy Monthly.
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2.C Table of Energy Tariffs and Taxes
Energy Tariffs and Taxes
Soil and
Item Import Promotion Excise Petroleum Groundwater Air Pollution Value
Tariff* Service Tax Fund** Pollution Control Fee**** Added
Fee Remediation Fee*** Tax
Crude Oil Free/Free 0.04% Free 109 NT$/KL - - 5%
Gasoline 10%/Free 0.04% 6.83 NT$/L 169 NT$/KL 12 NT$/T 0/0.3/0.19 NT$/L 5%
Diesel 5%/Free 0.04% 3.99 NT$/L 144 NT$/KL 12 NT$/T 0.2NT$/L 5%
Note: Source from Energy Statistics Handbook 2011, Bureau of Energy, Republic of China (Taiwan), Environmental Protection Administration,
Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan), Customs Administration, Ministry of Finance, Republic of China (Taiwan) and Laws and Regulations
Database of The Republic of China. * The current import tariffs of gasoline and diesel are free, which were amended on 30 December 2008. Before
the date of amending import tariffs, gasoline and diesel were imposed import tariffs by 10% and 5%. ** Imposing the Petroleum Fund is based on
the Petroleum Administration Act, which was promulgated in October 2001. *** The Ssoil and groundwater pollution remediation fee has been
imposed fromNovember2001. **** Prior to 2000, there was an exemption from the air pollution control fees, since the government encouraged
individuals to use unleaded gasoline. Between 2000 and 2006, the tariff of the air pollution control fee was set at 0.3 NT$/L. From 2007 the tariff
of the air pollution control fee is has been set at 0.19 NT$/L. The tariff of the air pollution control fee on diesel has not been changed, set at
0.2NT$/L.
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2.D Data Source of Chapter 2
Table 2.D.1: Data Source
Chapter 2
Dataset Data Type Source
CPC’s Retail Price of 95 Unleaded
Gasoline, 1999M01-2012M12
Weekly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
CPC’s Retail Price of 92 Unleaded
Gasoline, 1999M01-2012M12
Weekly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
CPC’s Retail Price of 98 Unleaded
Gasoline, 1999M01-2012M12
Weekly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
CPC’s Retail Price of Diesel,
1999M01-2012M12
Weekly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
Price of Dubai Crude Oil, 1999M01-
2012M12
Monthly Data
Global Economic Monitor (GEM)
Commodities, World Bank
Price of Brent Crude Oil, 1999M01-
2012M12
Monthly Data
Global Economic Monitor (GEM)
Commodities, World Bank
Exchange Rate: USD-TWD,
1999M01-2012M12
Monthly Data
Central Bank of the Republic of
China (Taiwan)
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Chapter 3
Government Regulated
Transparency and Price Leadership
in Retail Gasoline
3.1 Introduction
In order to deal with a high degree of fluctuations in crude oil prices, in September 20061
the Taiwan government introduced and implemented the price adjustment formula (PAF) to
regulate the retail gasoline prices charged by the state-owned gasoline supplier, CPC Corpo-
ration, As the procedure for determining the price adjustment formula is publicly available
on CPC’s official website, CPC’s future retail price information has become transparent and
predictable, both to its competitor, the private gasoline supplier Formosa Petrochemical
Corporation (FPCC)2 as well as to consumers. This type of sharing of price information
is deemed to be unilateral disclosure of information by the state-owned enterprise and can
1The price adjustment formula is an executive order made by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and only
applies to the state-owned gasoline supplier, CPC Corporation.
2For more details about the Taiwan gasoline market, see Chapter 2.
46
also be characterized as planned future price information exchange. This provision of price
information raises concerns about the presence of anti-competitive (collusive) outcomes in
this duopolisitic gasoline market. Thus the purpose of this study is to examine the effect of
the government’s transparent price regulation policy, the price adjustment formula, and the
presence in the market of price leadership.
Determining information exchange in competition investigations is a fundamental chal-
lenge to competition authorities. Information exchange among firms and consumers could
deliver both the benefits and the drawbacks of improving market transparency (Swedish
Competition Authority, 2006). These positive and negative effects of increasing market
transparency through information sharing have been substantially discussed in recent stud-
ies, but the sharing of future information which is unilaterally disclosed by governments is
less discussed in the existing literature. It is difficult to give precise evidence of antitrust law
violations in relation to unilateral information sharing by governments, but some studies have
shown that well-meaning government intervention can result in tacit collusion (e.g. Albæk
et al., 1997), and so we consider the case of anti-competitive outcomes resulting from the
unilateral sharing of future conduct information. In trying to provide a new insight regard-
ing future conduct information exchange, we present empirical analysis which captures the
effect of the information exchange policy implemented by the Taiwan government, in terms
of danger to competition and gains in market efficiency. We also consider the case of price
leadership behavior. It is important to indicate the effect of information sharing on firms’
price-setting strategies, and to examine whether price leadership behavior significantly helps
firms to sustain collusive outcomes. Hence, this study’s overall approach in which both pos-
itives and negatives of the government’s unilateral disclosure of future conduct information
are detailed.
This study addresses two limitations of the existing literature. The first is the investiga-
tion of the case of a duopolistic market (a state-owned enterprise and a private supplier), a
situation which rarely exists in the real world and is infrequently discussed in the relevant
literature. In the second, the government’s transparent price policy, the price adjustment for-
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mula, can be seen as serving as an instance of unilateral future price information disclosure
to both consumers and to the competing firm. These two aspects allow us to investigate the
impact of the government’s policy on the degree of competitive intensity in the market.
The empirical analysis in this chapter limits its attention to the supply side of the gasoline
retailing market, and studies implications of the introduction of the price adjustment formula
for the market, the leading firm and the competing firm. In the first part of the analysis we
focus on whether the introduction of the price adjustment formula affects how the leading
firm adjusts its retail pricing. This enables us to draw conclusions on the effect of the price
adjustment formula on the leading firm’s pricing mechanism. In the second part we test the
hypothesis of the emergence of price leadership, and use two different econometric methods
to demonstrate its emergence. We first use a paired test and the new definition of price
leadership proposed by Seaton and Waterson (2013) to quantify leadership pricing events.
A paired test allows us to compare the difference between pre- and post-PAF periods in
pricing setting. Then we use a logit model to build the link between price leadership and the
price adjustment formula. In the final part of the empirical analysis we use two logit models
to test the hypotheses of whether the price adjustment formula and price leadership affect
how the competing firm makes its dynamic price response. These two econometric models
yield some conclusions on the effects of the price adjustment formula and price leadership on
the competing firm’s pricing. Our empirical results show that the price adjustment formula
curbs the leading firm’s price increases, but causes the emergence of price leadership. We
also find that the competing firm’s pricing is based on the leading firm’s leadership pricing
and on future price information disclosed by the price adjustment formula, rather than on
cost-based pricing.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 give summaries of market transparency,
price leadership and future conduct information exchange from the relevant existing literature,
section 3.3 describes the observed data, section 3.4 presents our empirical frameworks and
discussion of results, and section 3.5 draws a brief conclusion.
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3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Market Transparency
The issue of transparency in competition policy has been substantially discussed in recent
studies in which its effects are reviewed from two dimensions, demand and supply. Firstly,
on the demand side, under the conditions of a perfectly competitive market all information
is symmetric and the market reaches Pareto efficiency. Stiglitz (1989) demonstrates that if
consumers in the market are imperfectly informed and incur higher search costs to maximize
their utility, the presence of imperfect information would offer market power to firms. There-
fore, if the degree of market transparency can be improved, both consumer search costs and
firms’ market power would fall, and thus consumers can be benefited by improvements in mar-
ket transparency. In a Hotelling market, Schultz (2004) studies the transparency effect with
horizontal product differentiation on the demand side, and identifies that by means of lower
transportation costs, market transparency enhancement creates lower prices, less horizontal
differentiation, and greater surplus. Austin and Gravelle (2008) study whether increasing
market price transparency leads to market efficiency in the health sector. Their findings sug-
gest that price transparency might bring efficiency to health care markets, enabling patients
to obtain better health care services.
The above studies show positive effects of increasing market transparency on the demand
side. However, on the supply side the effect of transparency is different. Albæk, Møllgaard,
and Overgaard (1997) found that consumers suffered higher prices for ready-mixed concrete
with market transparency. The Danish antitrust authority decided to publish a quarterly
book of prices of ready-mixed concrete in three regions, with the aim of reducing consumer
search costs and suppliers’ prices for concrete. The aim of the Danish antitrust authority’s
intervention was to improve market transparency for the benefit of consumers. The authors’
findings suggest that government intervention in the ready-mixed concrete market failed to
benefit consumers. Instead, firms could see each other’s prices and this led to an increase in
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the price of concrete and a decrease in the intensity of competition. The Danish ready-mix
concrete case indicates that consumers do not receive benefits through market transparency
imposed by government intervention. Nilsson (1999) studies a Bertrand duopoly from the
aspect of the effects of increased transparency via internet technology. He finds that in a
one-stage game a reduction in consumer search costs would lead to a fall in price, but that
in a repeated game, firms can easily sustain collusion while consumer search costs decrease.
The results in the studies of Albæk, Møllgaard, and Overgaard (1997) and Nilsson (1999)
indicate that increasing market transparency may deliver more negative effects to consumers
than positive effects, if market information is shared by suppliers.
Møllgaard and Overgaard (2006) conclude some general lessons regarding the relationship
between competition policy and market transparency. They summarize some theoretical
studies which are associated with the effects of transparency on competition and collusion, and
detail some existing cases including those of the Danish ready-mixed concrete market, Swedish
retail gasoline, liner shipping, the Airline Tariff Publishing Company, the US Ivy League,
wood pulp, and UK tractors. Cases involved in the study by Møllgaard and Overgaard (2006)
show that it is easier to sustain collusive agreement when market information is shared among
firms. Hence, in the case investigated in their study, improving market transparency would
harm consumers and negatively affect other outcomes in a well-informed market.
3.2.2 Price Leadership
A consideration of the relationship between leadership pricing and tacit collusion is another
topic of this paper.3 Bain (1962) discussed a specific form of collusive activity, price leader-
ship, and argued that:
3Scherer and Ross (1990) have classified three main types of price leadership; the dominant, the collusive,
and the barometric. The definition of dominant leadership is that a single firm has at least 40% of the market,
and its price-setting mechanism is regularly followed by other smaller firms. Collusive leadership occurs when
smaller firms explicitly or tacitly follow a large firm’s price initiatives in an oligopolistic industry. Barometric
leadership describe situations in which the leader acts as a barometer for the market, and its price nearly
approaches competitive price level. These three different types of price leadership enable us to distinguish
which type of price leadership is observed in the Taiwan gasoline market. See Scherer and Ross (1990).
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Evidence of such direct consensual action not being found (and it seldom is), it
is more usual to recognize price leadership as a form of tacit collusion, resulting
from the existence of an “unspoken” agreement (p.277).
As Bain (1962) argued, price leadership can be deemed to be a specific form of collusive be-
havior in the market. Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) study price leadership with asymmetric
information in oligopolistic markets. They demonstrate that the less informed followers could
be benefited by the better informed leader’s price moves, and so leadership pricing could fa-
cilitate collusive pricing with asymmetric information. Mouraviev and Rey (2011) study both
Bertrand and Cournot competitions to examine whether the role of price/quantity leadership
is associated with collusion, and they find a similar result in which collusion is facilitated
by price leadership. Lewis (2012) tests price coordination among stations in the Midwestern
US, and find evidence of price coordination. He reveals that the price leader sets a new price
level as a signal to competitors, who adjust to the exact same price within 24 hours. These
studies suggest that price leadership may be the potential cause of price coordination and
anti-competitive outcomes in the market.
The recent literature examines leadership pricing in the British supermarket industry
and the Italian petrol market. Seaton and Waterson (2013) propose a new definition of
price leadership and use a series of comparisons of two firms’ price-change events to quantify
leadership pricing, using weekly price data from late 2003 to late 2010. Their new definition
of price leadership is as follows:
Price leadership occurs when one firm makes a change in a price (or set of prices)
that is followed within a predetermined short period by the other (more generally,
another) firm making a price change of exactly the same monetary amount in the
same direction on the same product(s), and doing so significantly more often than
would be expected by chance (p.392).
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They find evidence of the emergence of price leadership in the British supermarket industry
and further indicate that the number of downward price leadership events is greater than
upward price leadership events in the supermarket industry.
Furthermore, Andreoli-Versbach and Franck (2015) study the market leader’s pre-announced
price commitments in the Italian petrol market. The new definition of price leadership pro-
posed by Seaton and Waterson (2013) is adopted in their study, and they find that competi-
tors’ pricing behavior significantly follows leadership pricing, resulting in price coordination
in the Italian market.
3.2.3 Future Conduct Information Sharing
Some recent studies review the significance of the exchange of planned future conduct infor-
mation in issues of market efficiency and anti-competitive outcomes.
Ku¨hn (2001) discusses a concern about collusion facilitated by communication between
firms. He identifies two types of future conduct information sharing: private communication
between firms, and public communication to consumers. It is important to make a distinction
when discussing collusion sustained by communication. Ku¨hn argues that private commu-
nication about future conduct information eliminates all possibilities of enhancing market
efficiency for consumers and leads to coordination among firms, whereas public communica-
tion would create significant efficiency effects and is not deemed as breaking antitrust law if
the communication is given to consumers. Finally, according to a consideration about com-
munication, he summarizes his suggestion on competition policy as follows: (i) any type of
private future information sharing should be prohibited, to prevent potential efficiency losses,
and (ii) if communications are clearly stated as public future information sharing relative to
consumers, and if potential market efficiency gains are likely to be significant, allowing public
future information sharing should be considered. Motta (2004) and Vives (2006) also em-
phasize that private communication of future conduct information is likely to carry a high
potential for collusive, whereas public communication of future conduct information may en-
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hance the degree of transparency in prices for consumers, and should therefore be considered
as potential efficiency gains. Discussions of private and public communications about the
sharing of future conduct information will enable us to better raise concerns regarding uni-
lateral future price information disclosed by government policy and to confirm its effect on
the market.
Furthermore, there are several studies which place restrictions on considerations of uni-
lateral and indirect information sharing (Bennett and Collins, 2010; OECD, 2010, 2012).
Bennett and Collins (2010) discuss a conundrum regarding the differentiation between pro-
competitive or anti-competitive public dissemination of future pricing intentions. They ad-
dress two public dissemination scenarios. In the first, it appears that public dissemination of
future pricing intentions could help consumers to plan their purchase responses in advance.
The second, however, suggests that public dissemination of future intentions seems to be a
signal to competitors to achieve fixed price levels, which might significantly harm the degree of
competition. The OECD (2010, 2012) also considers unilateral public announcement of future
intentions to be anti-competitive behavior. Reports state that unilateral information of future
intentions can be deemed as indirect information exchange or as a signal to competitors, if
unilateral information of future intentions is disclosed through public announcement (OECD,
2010, 2012). The OECD (2012) delineates that unilateral announcement has anti-competitive
effects in concentrated markets with homogeneous products, but on a case-by-case basis com-
petition agencies should carefully review whether the enhancing of efficiencies is greater than
any anti-competitive effects.
Faber and Janssen’s (2008) study looked at price in the Dutch gasoline market. Since
suggested prices were published publicly via websites, retailers’ gasoline prices could be eas-
ily coordinated,4 and thus the authors aim to demonstrate the role of suggested prices on
retailers’ gasoline price setting. To measure the effect of suggested prices on retail gasoline
price setting in the Dutch gasoline market a panel data method is applied to a daily dataset
4In the Netherlands, suggested prices are put forward by the larger companies, such as BP and Total,
and are also published on their websites. For more details about suggested price mechanism, see Faber and
Janseen (2008).
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of retail gasoline prices and suggested gasoline prices. It is found that suggested price is able
to help retail gasoline price coordination.
As indicated by some of the above studies, anti-competitive outcomes may be achieved
by future conduct information exchange. Hence, our study casts light on the effect of the
unilateral disclosure of future conduct information on price leadership and collusive price
coordination in the Taiwan gasoline supply market.
3.3 Data
This chapter adopts two different datasets. The first dataset consists of weekly retail gasoline
prices for two existing firms, spot Dubai and Brent crude oil prices and the exchange rate
for the US dollar to Taiwan New dollar (USD/TWD). The period of this empirical study
spans approximately 14 years (713 weeks) from June 2002 to December 2015. Spot prices of
retail gasoline and crude oil are taken from the Petroleum Price Information Management
and Analysis System, which records prices of petroleum products on the basis of weekly
information. The exchange rate for the US dollar to Taiwan New dollar (USD/TWD) is
drawn from the Central Bank of R.O.C. (Taiwan). On the basis of the bulletin of the
government’s regulatory policy, prices of crude oil and the USD/TWD exchange rate are
deemed to be the industry cost of producing retail gasoline product in this study. The first
dataset is summarized in table 3.1 and will be used in analyzing the firms’ pricing strategies
over the empirical study period.
As mentioned above, this chapter analyzes the Taiwan government’s regulatory policy.
The second dataset consists of a variety of binary variables which will be used in evaluating
the effect of the government’s intervention. Using a binary dataset can allow us to compare
the competitor’s reaction between on- and off-policy periods and investigate the emergence
of leadership pricing in the retail gasoline market. Therefore, we return to our raw dataset
which includes the firms’ exact new price-announcement time in hours, τi,t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 23}
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and i ∈ {CPC,FPCC}. The price-announcement time in hours is recorded by the Bureau
of Energy. Using the recorded price-announcement time in hours, we carry out a series of
comparisons of firms’ exact announcement times in hours during the period in which both
firms change their prices, to identify leadership and simultaneous price events, e.g. CPC’s
leadership price move if τCPC,t < τFPCC,t; firms’ simultaneous price move if τCPC,t = τFPCC,t.
On the basis of this empirical analysis, the identification of leadership/simultaneous events
enables us to discuss some effects of the price adjustment formula and price leadership.
Definitions of key binary variables used in this study are summarized in table 3.2.5
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for prices of retail gasoline and crude oil and exchange rate
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.
pCPC 28.026 5.033 18.2 36.4 713
pFPCC 28.064 5.072 18.2 36.4 713
pDubai 70.357 30.019 22.308 138.092 713
pBrent 73.350 30.38 23.207 142.158 713
pcrude 71.255 30.109 22.589 139.312 713
eUSD−TWD 31.867 1.669 28.696 35.114 713
Note: pCPC and pFPCC are retail gasoline prices of suppliers CPC
and FPCC, and are priced in TWD. pDubai and pBrent are Dubai
and Brent crude oil prices, and are priced in the USD. pcrude is the
weighted crude oil price (Dubai: 70% and Brent: 30%) which is based
on the procedure of the price adjustment formula, and is priced in
USD.
5Details about generating dummy variables are presented in Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.2: Definitions of Binary Variable
Variable Definition
PAFt 1 = on-policy period if the government’s policy was exactly applied
0 = otherwise
PChanget 1 = both firms adjusted retail prices in week t
0 = otherwise
leadCPCt 1 = price leadership made by market leader (CPC) in week t
0 = otherwise
upCPCt 1 = market leader (CPC) led positive retail price change in week t
0 = otherwise
downCPCt 1 = market leader (CPC) led negative retail price change in week t
0 = otherwise
sp1t 1 = Type I perfect price alignment
0 = otherwise
sp2t 1 = Type II perfect price alignment
0 = otherwise
3.4 Empirical Analysis
The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of the government’s regulatory policy
from three aspects: (i) how the leading firm behaves in its retail price response after the
introduction of the price adjustment formula; (ii) whether the government’s unilateral price
regulation of the state-owned enterprise results in pricing leadership in the market; and (iii)
how the private gasoline supplier reacts after the government’s unilateral price regulation of
the state-owned gasoline supplier was introduced. In the first part of the empirical analysis
we examine whether the leading firm’s pricing strategies move closely with cost fluctuations
in crude oil prices and the exchange rate. In addition to these pass-through measures in costs
we also test whether the leading firm is affected positively or negatively by the government’s
unilateral regulation policy.
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In the second part of the empirical analysis, we turn our focus to the emergence of
price leadership, by using two different econometric methods. In the first method we adopt
a series of comparisons of exact timings of weekly announcements of retail prices by the
leading and competing firms, to provide evidence about the emergence of price leadership.
Additionally, we use a logit regression model to confirm that price leadership is related to
the implementation of the government’s regulatory policy.
In the final part, we focus on the competitor’s retail price reaction when the government
unilaterally discloses the state-owned enterprise’s retail price to the market. In addition to a
discussion of the government’s policy, we also extensively discuss how the emergence of price
leadership is related to the competitor’s perfect price alignment decisions. The analysis of
government policy and discussion of price leadership will be built on the use of a variety of
logit models.
Analysis of the government’s policy will surround these three econometric tasks. In the
first task we use the firms’ retail price data and industry cost data, crude oil prices and
exchange rate, to verify the firms’ retail price-setting mechanisms and also to extensively
consider the impact of the government’s policy on the firms’ retail price responses. In the
second and third tasks we use exact retail price-announcement timing data for the two firms
to quantify the emergence of price leadership in the retail gasoline market and to provide
evidence about the competitor’s perfect price alignment, by using a variety of dummy variable
data.
3.4.1 Effect of PAF on the Market Leader’s Price Response
A crucial question regarding the government’s price regulatory policy relates to what out-
comes the policy would offer to the market. In the first part of the analysis we explore how
the government’s regulatory policy impacts on the leading firm’s price-setting mechanism.
We use the pass-through model to illustrate the effect of the government’s price regulation
policy on the retail gasoline price.
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As a large share of the retail gasoline market (around 70%) is held by the state-owned
enterprise (CPC) it constitutes the leading gasoline supplier in the retail gasoline market in
Taiwan.6 Therefore, we begin by presenting information about how the leading firm’s retail
price reacts to observed cost shocks, i.e. fluctuations in crude oil prices and the USD/TWD
exchange rate, using a pass-through model. The presentation of the firm’s retail price response
will cover the study period of approximately 14 years.
In addition to pass-through measures, we also have to focus on the fundamental core of
this study: the effects of the government’s policy. In the case of the Taiwanese retail gasoline
market, the government’s policy can be discussed from two aspects. The first aspect is that
it is a price adjustment constraint applying to the state-owned enterprise, and the second
aspect is that the policy is a unilateral disclosure of price adjustment information to the
market, both consumers and the competitor. The first aspect allows us to present informa-
tion which considers how the government’s policy restricts the leading firm’s further retail
price adjustment, and the second aspect permits us to investigate whether the government’s
policy is beneficial or detrimental to the competing firm and to consumers. This section,
section 3.4.1, only focuses on the first aspect, the effect of the policy on the leading firm,
and the second aspect, the effect of the introduction of the price adjustment formula serving
as unilateral information disclosure of the leading firm’s future price to its competitor (and
consumers) will be discussed in section 3.4.3 (Chapter 4).
The purpose of this task is to test whether the introduction of the government’s price
regulation policy, the price adjustment formula, affected how the leading supplier passed
on changes in its costs. Thus, we model the leading firm’s retail price response to cost
fluctuations, and observe the effect of the government’s policy on the setting of retail price
by the state-owned enterprise. To estimate the leading firm’s price response, we use a pass-
through model of weekly firm-level retail price data and industry cost data, crude oil prices
and exchange rate, over 713 weeks, from June 2002 to December 2015. The leading firm’s
6According to official reports, CPC held a dominant position and gained above 70% of market share in
petroleum products from 2002 to 2015. See CPC Business Operation Review Report (2012) and CPC’s Annual
Reports.
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price response equation is given by
∆pCPCt = β0 + β1∆p
crude
t−1 + β2∆e
USD−TWD
t−1 + β3PAFt + β4PAFt ×∆p
crude
t−1 + ut, (3.4.1)
where ∆pCPCt denotes CPC’s retail gasoline week-to-week price change in week t, ∆
crude
t−1
denotes crude oil week-to-week price change in week t− 1, ∆eUSD−TWDt−1 denotes the USD to
TWD week-to-week exchange rate change in week t1, PAFt is a dummy variable being 1 if the
price adjustment formula is implemented in week t, PAFt×∆p
crude
t−1 is the interaction term of
the government’s policy and changes in crude oil price in week t−1, which captures the leading
firm’s dynamic retail price response to a change in crude oil price after the implementation
of the price adjustment formula, and ut denotes the error term in week t.
For discussion in this analysis we split equation (3.4.1) into two parts, cost variations
and policy analysis. First, in the pass-through of cost variations to the retail price the main
coefficients of interest, β1 and β2, measure the pass-through rate to the retail gasoline price
when crude oil prices and exchange rate change positively or negatively, respectively. Both
coefficients enable us to examine whether the retail gasoline price moves in response to cost
variations. In general, we may expect that both coefficients are significant and positive for
the leading firm’s retail price (β1 > 0 and β2 > 0). Second, in addition to investigation
of the relationship between the retail gasoline price and cost variations, we also focus on
policy analysis. The price adjustment formula is designed to stem sharp increases in the
retail gasoline price in response to a steep climb in crude oil prices. Moreover, based on the
procedure of the price adjustment formula, the leading firm’s new price should follow the cost
fluctuations. Therefore, in equation (3.4.1) we add dummy variable, PAFt, and interaction
term, PAFt ×∆p
crude
t−1 , to enable the analysis of the government’s policy,
7 and suppose that
PAFt and PAFt×∆p
crude
t−1 measure the direct and indirect effects of the government’s policy,
respectively. In the policy analysis, the key coefficients of interest, β3 and β4, indicate the
7The government’s price regulatory policy, the price adjustment formula, aims to reduce an impact of
dramatic fluctuations of crude oil prices. Therefore, the leading firm’s retail price response, equation (3.4.1),
only considers the interaction effect between the policy and crude oil price. The interaction effect between the
policy and exchange rate is not encompassed in the price response equation.
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pass-through rate to the retail price with respect to the impact of the government’s policy,
and we may expect that the direct effect of the government’s policy is negative for the leading
firm’s retail price (β3 < 0) and the indirect effect is positive for the retail price (β4 > 0). This
part of the analysis allows us to provide evidence that the government’s policy is related to
the leading firm’s retail price-setting strategy.
To better satisfy the purpose of this task, we consider one potential problem of estimating
the model for all the data for the period. In the case of the leading firm’s price adjustment
strategy in the Taiwanese retail gasoline market, its price was sometimes not adjusted every
week, and so may not provide explicit information on the leading firm’s price response after
the introduction of the government’s policy. Hence, to tackle this, we extensively alter the
estimation dataset and the model specification. First, for the estimation dataset, we compile
price-change-periods data from all such data, and estimate the model for price-changed pe-
riods. Second, for model specification, a new model replaces week-to-week cost changes with
accumulated cost changes.8 The standard week-to-week pass-through model may be misspec-
ified when the price-changed-periods data is adopted. Since the price-changed-periods data
only covers whole price-changed periods, the standard week-to-week changes in crude oil price
and exchange rate, which may involve non-price-changed periods, may be missed. Hence, the
accumulated specification enables us to eliminate the potential risk of misspecification by
including non-price-changed periods. These two alterations will be applied in estimating the
pass-through model, equation (3.4.1).
Table 3.1 reports the coefficient estimates for the leading firm’s retail gasoline price re-
sponse modeled by equation (3.4.1), and the estimates were provided by the ordinary least
squares estimation method. We use four different specifications of equation (3.4.1) and esti-
mate the model separately throughout the whole of the 713 periods and during price-changed
8Due to no price change decision being made in some periods, the estimation results obtained with the use
of the all-periods data may provide under/overestimated coefficients, and cause misleading interpretations of
the leading firm’s pricing behavior. Therefore, we replace week-to-week changes in crude oil price and exchange
rate with accumulated changes. We suppose that week t− δ is CPC’s previous price change period, and δ ≥ 2.
Then the accumulated crude oil price change is the difference in crude oil prices between week t− 1 and week
t− δ, (pcrudet−1 − p
crude
t−δ ), and similarly the accumulated change in exchange rate is (e
USD−TWD
t−1 − e
USD−TWD
t−δ ).
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periods.9 Using different specifications of the model allows us to test the following hypothe-
ses: (i) that cost variations serve as a focal point for adjustments to retail price, and (ii)
that the introduction of the price adjustment formula to CPC is beneficial. Specification (1)
uses cost variations only, over all 713 study periods, to show the pass-through to the retail
gasoline price, while we use cost variations and the policy effect in specifications (2) and
(3). Specifications (2) and (3) are separately estimated for all periods and for price-changed
periods respectively. Finally, specification (4) uses the accumulated changes in crude oil price
and exchange rate to indicate how the leading firm reacts to cost variations during on-policy
periods and to measure the impact of the government’s policy.
First, we focus on the first part of equation (3.4.1): cost variations. The key coefficients
of interest are β1 and β2, which capture the pass-through rate of cost variations to the retail
price. Specifications (1) to (3) use the standard week-to-week crude oil price change, pcrudet−1 ,
and, in particular, specification (4) uses the accumulated changes in crude oil price and
exchange rate, (pcrudet−1 − p
crude
t−δ ) and (e
USD−TWD
t−1 − e
USD−TWD
t−δ ). All except specification (2)
show that the pass-through rate of crude oil price variation is positively significant for the
retail gasoline price (β1 > 0). Additionally, we find a positive pass-through rate of exchange
rate variations (β2 > 0) in specifications (3) and (4). In comparison to the other three
specifications, estimated coefficients for specification (4) in table 3.1, for variations in crude
oil price and exchange rate, are particularly significant to the retail price, which reflects a
positive correlation between the leading firm’s pricing and cost fluctuations. Our expectation
of positive pass-through rates of crude oil price and exchange rate to the retail price (β1 > 0
and β2 > 0) is reflected in specification (4), but it is also suggested that fluctuations in crude
oil price and exchange rate are not fully passed through to the leading firm’s pricing.
We now turn to discussion of the key aspect of this study, policy analysis. To discuss the
effect of the price adjustment formula on the leading firm’s retail price setting, we focus on
key coefficients of interest β3 and β4 serving as the direct and indirect effects of the price
9We suppose price-changed periods are the time if the leading firm changed its retail gasoline price at any
weeks.
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adjustment formula, respectively. In table 3.1, specification (4) is the specification of our
expectations with respect to direct and indirect effects of the price adjustment formula, i.e.
β3 < 0 and β4 > 0. From specification (4) it can be seen that: (i) the direct effect is negative
and significant for the retail price, causing falls in the retail gasoline price with any changes
in crude oil price, and (ii) that the indirect effect is positive and significant, which would
modestly offset the direct policy effect when crude oil price rises. Finally, when we combine
the direct and indirect policy effects as the total effect (β3+β4), it can be seen that the retail
price would rise slightly when crude oil price increases sharply, but the retail price would
decrease significantly when crude oil price falls.
Figure 3.1 displays a comparison between actual and model predicted week-to-week retail
gasoline price changes (actual blue solid line; model predicted: specification (1) red solid
line, specification (2) green solid line, specification (3) yellow solid line, and specification
(4) - teal solid line). As the price adjustment formula (PAF) was introduced in September
2006, we consider two time periods, pre-PAF (weeks 1 to 225) and post-PAF (weeks 226 to
713). Figure 3.1 indicates that: (i) during the post-PAF period the predicted price change
by specification (4) is more likely to be close to the actual retail price change, and during
the pre-PAF period actual price changes did not tend to be based on fluctuations of cost
variables, ∆pcrude and ∆eUSD−TWD; (ii) the price adjustment formula imposed reductions in
retail price in order to absorb positive cost shocks during crude oil shock periods (2010 and
2011); (iii) actual retail price responded instantaneously to decreases in crude oil prices but
lagged in response to increases in crude oil prices.
Comparing estimated results of all specifications in table 1 and figure 1, specification (4)
is the preferred specification as it better describes the leading firm’s pricing behavior after
the introduction of the price adjustment formula. Specification (4) significantly expresses
that: (i) the leading firm’s pricing closely follows fluctuations in costs and (ii) steep rises in
the retail price are curbed due to the introduction of the price adjustment formula.
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Table 3.1: Leader’s Retail Price Response
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable ∆pCPCt
Time Period All All Price change Price change
∆pcrudet−1 0.100*** 0.028 0.308***
(0.006) (0.019) (0.074)
(pcrudet−1 − p
crude
t−δ ) 0.111***
(0.006)
∆eUSD−TWDt−1 -0.029 -0.008 0.141
(0.100) (0.099) (0.173)
(exUSD−TWDt−1 − ex
USD−TWD
t−δ ) 0.161*
(0.085)
PAFt -0.046 -0.351*** -0.222***
(0.032) (0.097) (0.079)
PAFt ×∆p
crude
t−1 0.081*** -0.169**
(0.020) (0.074)
PAFt × (p
crude
t−1 − p
crude
t−δ ) 0.068***
(0.007)
Constant 0.003 0.039 0.369*** 0.231***
(0.015) (0.027) (0.094) (0.077)
Observations 711 711 403 403
R2 0.281 0.298 0.415 0.611
Note: Table 3.1 presents the estimated results of the leading firm’s price response function as shown
by equation (3.4.1). Given equation (3.4.1), we construct four specifications to separately estimate
the leading firm’s pricing behavior throughout the whole of the 713 periods and in the midst of
price-changed periods. Specification (1) only focuses on cost fluctuations throughout the whole of
the 713 periods. Specifications (2) and (3) estimate the leading firm’s pricing behavior through the
whole of the time and in price-changed periods, respectively. In these two specifications the link
between the leading firm’s pricing behavior and cost fluctuations, and the effect of government’s
policy will be discussed. Specifications (1) to (3) are standard specifications of equation (3.4.1).
In specification (4) we use accumulated cost changes rather than standard week-to-week cost
changes to estimate the leading firm’s pricing behavior in price-changed periods. Standard errors
are presented in parentheses. *** Statistically significant level at 0.01, ** statistically significant
level at 0.05, * statistically significant level at 0.10.
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of between Leading Firm’s Actual and Model Predicted Price Changes
Pre−PAF Period (Week1−Week225) Post−PAF Period (Week226−Week713)
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Note: The vertical reference line at week 226 indicates the implementation of the price adjustment formula (PAF) at that point (September
2006).
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3.4.2 Effect of the Price Adjustment Formula on the Incidence of Price
Leadership
As the relevant literature has shown, price leadership has been considered to be one of the
institutional patterns resulting from the facilitation of collusive pricing. Therefore, in the
second part of this analysis we focus on the link between the leadership pricing behavior
seen and the introduction of the price adjustment formula. To determine the link between
price leadership and the government’s policy, we use two methods, a series comparing the
two suppliers’ exact new price-announcement timing and a logit model.
In the first, Seaton and Waterson’s (2013) method is followed by comparing the two
suppliers’ exact new price-announcement timings. Given the new definition of leadership
proposed by Seaton and Waterson (2013) we first restrict our attention to retail price changes
of exactly the same amount, ∆p, made by both firms; then we define that Yt(τt) denotes a price
change of ∆p observed by supplier Y (i.e. CPC and FPCC) at exact time in hours τ in week t.
The paired event between the two suppliers in week t is: {CPCt(τCPC,t), FPCCt(τFPCC,t)}.
In respect of this paired event, we compare both firms’ exact new price-announcement time
at time in hours τ in week t since both firms announced new retail prices in the same week.
The relevant events are addressed as follows:
(i) Simultaneous-announcement event:
{CPCt(τCPC,t), FPCCt(τFPCC,t)} =


1 if time τCPC,t = τFPCC,t
0 , otherwise,
(ii) Leadership event by CPC:
{CPCt(τCPC,t), FPCCt(τFPCC,t)} =


1 if time τCPC,t < τFPCC,t
0 , otherwise,
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where τCPC,t and τFPCC,t are the exact timing in hours of new price announcements by
suppliers CPC and FPCC in week t, and τCPC,t, τFPCC,t ∈{0, 1, 2, . . . , 23}.
The first paired event, the simultaneous-move event, is defined as the two suppliers an-
nouncing retail prices at exactly the same time in hours, τ , in the same week t, τCPC,t =
τFPCC,t. The second event, a leadership event by CPC, is defined as CPC’s new price-
announcement timing being earlier than FPCC’s new price-announcement timing in week t,
τCPC,t < τFPCC,t. On the basis of a series of comparisons of the two firms’ exact new price-
announcement timings, we suppose that the paired events are random across all 713 periods
and that the simultaneous moves and leadership moves have an equal chance of happening.
Therefore, given the above assumptions, we test the following hypotheses: (i) that the chance
of outcomes of the leading firm’s price leadership compared with simultaneous moves is equal
(probabilitysimultaneous = probabilityleadership = 0.5), and (ii) price leadership was unrelated
to price movement. Based on substantial and sufficient numbers of observations, the numbers
of simultaneous and leadership events follow the Binomial distribution, and the hypotheses
are tested by the Normal approximation.
The results of the paired test and significance test are reported in tables 3.2a and 3.2b,
respectively. Both tables 3.2a and 3.2b consist of eight time-period segments based on two
conditions, the timing of the introduction of the price adjustment formula and transformation
of market structure. First, on the basis of the timing of introduction of the government policy
we split the whole study period into two sub time periods, pre-PAF and post-PAF, shown
in the second and third columns. Second, given the transformation of market structure, the
whole period is divided into three sub time periods, 1st duopoly, triopoly and 2nd duopoly
in the fourth, fifth and sixth columns, respectively. In addition, in the last two columns we
also split the 2nd duopoly period into two sub time periods, pre-PAF and post-PAF. Each
segment shows the number of observed periods, the number of leadership events (upward and
downward), the number of simultaneous events (upward and downward), the proportion of
observed leadership, the proportion of observed simultaneous events, and p-values based on
these proportions.
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Tables 3.2a and 3.2b report clear results regarding the hypotheses stated above. First,
we test the hypothesis of the equal chance of both leadership and simultaneous events. In
table 3.2a there is no equal chance of both leadership and simultaneous events in the first,
third, fifth, sixth and last columns according to p-values. Whole, post-PAF, 2nd duopoly
and post-PAF of 2nd duopoly segments indicate that the leading firm’s leadership pricing
behavior frequently emerged in the market. In particular, the emergence of price leadership
occurs in the post-PAF and post-PAF of 2nd duopoly periods. This finding suggests that
price leadership is likely to occur after the introduction of the price adjustment formula.
Furthermore, we test the second hypothesis which relates to the link between price leadership
and price movement. The significant test result is reported in table 3.2b, and confirms that
price leadership is likely to be linked to price movement. With upward and downward price
movements, the facts clearly demonstrate that the leading firm’s leadership pricing behavior
leads to price movement in the whole, post-PAF, 2nd duopoly and post-PAF of 2nd duopoly
periods, respectively.
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Table 3.2a: Leadership and Simultaneous Moves
All Periods
All Periods
1st Duopoly Triopoly 2nd Duopoly
2nd Duopoly
Pre-PAF Post-PAF Pre-PAF Post-PAF
Periods 1-713 1-225 226-713 1-16 17-75 76-713 76-225 226-713
# of CPC leads up 178 5 173 0 0 178 5 173
# of simultaneous up 17 13 4 1 6 10 6 4
p(upcpc|up) 0.913 0.278 0.977 0 0 0.947 0.455 0.977
p(upsimultaneous|up) 0.087 0.722 0.023 1 1 0.053 0.545 0.023
p-value 0.000 0.0593 0.000 0.317 0.014 0.000 0.763 0.000
# of CPC leads down 177 2 175 0 0 177 2 175
# of simultaneous down 9 5 4 0 5 4 0 4
p(downcpc|down) 0.952 0.286 0.978 0 0.978 1 0.978
p(downsimultaneous|down) 0.048 0.714 0.022 1 0.022 0 0.022
p-value 0.000 0.257 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.157 0.000
Note: p(upcpc|up) and p(upsimultaneous|up) are defined as the observed proportions of upward price movements, p(downcpc|down) and
p(downsimultaneous|down) denotes the observed proportions of downward price movements. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Statistically
significant results of p-value at 5% level are reported in bold.
Table 3.2b: Significant Tests of Leadership Moves
All Periods
All Periods
1st Duopoly Triopoly 2nd Duopoly
2nd Duopoly
Pre-PAF Post-PAF Pre-PAF Post-PAF
# of CPC leads up 178 5 173 0 0 178 5 173
# of simultaneous up 17 13 4 1 6 10 6 4
p(upcpc|up) 0.913 0.278 0.977 0 0 0.947 0.455 0.977
# of CPC leads down 177 2 175 0 0 177 2 175
# of simultaneous down 9 5 4 0 5 4 0 4
p(downcpc|down) 0.952 0.286 0.978 0 0.978 1 0.978
Note: p(upcpc|up) and p(upsimultaneous|up) are defined as the observed proportions of upward price movements, p(downcpc|down) and
p(downsimultaneous|down) denotes the observed proportions of downward price movements. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Sta-
tistically significant results of p-value at 5% level are reported in bold.
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We now turn to the second method to examine the link between price leadership and the
introduction of the price adjustment formula. We test the hypothesis that price leadership
occurs through the introduction of the price adjustment formula. We use the logit regression
model to relate the price leadership by the leading firm to the introduction of the government’s
policy, using the following regression equation:
Pr(leadCPCt = 1|PAFt) = Λ(β0 + β1PAFt), (3.4.2)
where leadCPCt is the leading firm’s binary event, being 1 if the leading firm led price change
in week t, Λ(•) is the logistic transformation, and PAFt is a dummy, being 1 if the price
adjustment formula is implemented in week t.
The key parameter of interest, β1, captures the linking of the leading firm’s leadership
pricing behavior to the policy imposed by the government. If the introduction of the price
adjustment formula is deemed as facilitating the emergence of price leadership, we would
expect that coefficient β1 to be positive and significant. The estimated coefficient of equa-
tion (3.4.2) and its marginal effect are reported in table 3.3a, and the predicted probability
of the emergence of price leadership is presented in table 3.3b. When the government’s
policy was introduced into the market, the probability of the emergence of price leadership
increased significantly, by 68.2%. The predicted probability in table 3.3b demonstrates that
the probability of the emergence of price leadership is less than 5% before the price adjust-
ment formula is introduced into the market, while the probability is higher than 70% after it is
introduced. In comparison to the off-PAF period, the predicted probability of the emergence
of price leadership rises dramatically, by approximately 70%, when the policy is introduced.
This evidence suggests that the price adjustment formula results in the emergence of price
leadership.
The results presented in this section confirm that price leadership was probably linked to
the introduction of the price adjustment formula and that the retail gasoline price movements
in the market were based on the leading firm’s leadership pricing behavior rather than on
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cost fluctuations. In the case of the Taiwan retail gasoline market, the state-owned enterprise
(CPC) has around 70% market share. Additionally, its price initiatives have been explicitly
followed by the competing firm (FPCC) in the duopolistic gasoline market as a result of
the introduction of the price adjustment formula. Therefore, we may conclude that the
classification of price leadership as being a feature of the Taiwan retail gasoline market is a
result of a combination of dominant and collusive leadership.
Table 3.3a: Estimation Results of Leadership and Price Adjustment Formula
Dep. Variable
Marginal
Effect
Leadership by CPC
leadCPCt
Time Period All Periods
PAFt 4.349*** 0.682***
(0.397) (0.024)
Constant -3.439***
(0.384)
Observations 713
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** Sta-
tistically significant level at 0.01, ** statistically significant
level at 0.05, * statistically significant level at 0.10.
Table 3.3b: Predicted Probability of Leadership under the Regime of the Price Adjustment
Formula
PAFt = 0 PAFt = 1
Pr(leadCPCt = 1|PAFt) 0.031*** 0.713***
(0.012) (0.020)
χ2(1) 840.80
p-value 0.000
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** Sta-
tistically significant level at 0.01.
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3.4.3 Competitor’s Perfect Price Alignment
One of the important questions in this study is whether the introduction of the price adjust-
ment formula as a form of future conduct information sharing can be deemed anti-competitive
in the market. In the case of the Taiwanese retail gasoline market, the government intro-
duced the price adjustment formula to the market, allowing consumers and the competing
firm (FPCC) to easily obtain future price information for the leading firm (CPC). Therefore,
in this section we test the hypothesis that on the basis of unilateral disclosure of the leading
firm’s future price information provided by the price adjustment formula, the competing firm
perfectly matches the leading firm’s price. We use the logit model to present the compet-
ing firm’s binary decision of perfect price match to the introduction of the price adjustment
formula. The logit regression equation is:
Pr(spmt = 1|PAFt) = Λ(β0 + β1PAFt) and m ∈ {1, 2}, (3.4.3)
where spmt is type m competing firm’s perfect price alignment decision, Λ(•) is the logistic
transformation, and PAFt is a dummy, being 1 if the price adjustment formula is introduced
in week t.
In particular, dependent variable,spmt , refers to the competing firm’s type m perfect price
alignment in week t, m = {1, 2}. To clearly indicate the competing firm’s pricing decision, we
first use the two firms’ exact price-announcement times in hours and the firms’ retail prices
to establish two conditions, which are as follows:
(a) The competing firm’s retail price is restricted to it being the identical price to the
leading firm’s retail price, i.e. pFPCCt = p
CPC
t , and the competing firm (FPCC) must
be a price-follower.
(b) Measure of the competing firm’s perfect price match decision is restricted to the price-
changed periods. A price-changed period is defined as a period in which both the leading
and competing firms had price-changed events, i.e. pFPCCt 6= p
FPCC
t−1 and p
CPC
t 6= p
CPC
t−1 .
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Then, we widely define that sp1t is a binary competing firm’s perfect price match behavior
(type I price alignment decision) and as being 1 if condition (a) is satisfied. In addition, for
better providing evidence about the competing firm’s pricing behavior, we narrowly define
that sp2t is a binary competing firm’s perfect price match behavior (type II perfect price
alignment decision) and being 1 if conditions (a) and (b) are satisfied. The key difference
between sp1t and sp
2
t is that sp
2
t is restricted to the price-changed periods, while sp
1
t does not
require this restriction.10
Table 3.4a reports the estimated parameters and marginal effects of two specifications
from equation (3.4.3), and table 3.4b presents the predicted probability of the competing
firm’s perfect price-match decision. Specification (1) refers to type I competing firm’s price-
alignment decision, and specification (2) is type II competing firm’s price-alignment decision.
As sp2t , type II perfect price alignment, is narrowly defined to focus on price-changed periods,
we can precisely examine whether the competing firm’s perfect price match is made after the
leading firm’s new price is unilateral disclosed by the price adjustment formula. Therefore,
we would expect that specification (2) can explicitly indicate the link between the competing
firm’s pricing behavior and the introduction of the price adjustment formula. The main pa-
rameter of interest is β1 which captures the competing firm’s dynamic price response to the
introduction of the price adjustment formula. As we suppose that the price adjustment for-
mula is deemed to be future conduct information sharing, the competing firm would perfectly
match the leading firm’s new price after the introduction of the price adjustment formula.
We therefore expect key parameter β1 to be positive and significant.
The estimated coefficients of two specifications of the logit regression in table 3.4a show
that the introduction of the price adjustment formula is significant in raising the probability
of perfect price match. In particular, specification (2), type II perfect price match, shows that
after the introduction of the price adjustment formula the probability of perfect price match
increases by 62%. The predicted probability of perfect price match reported in table 3.4b
also reveals the same finding. The probability of perfect price match is greater than 80%
10Two types of competing firm’s perfect price alignment decision are detailed in Appendix 3.A.
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after the introduction of the price adjustment formula according to specification (1), type I
price alignment; however, the probability of perfect price match only decreases to 78% before
the introduction of the price adjustment formula. On the basis of condition (a) sp1t is widely
defined, which may result in a potential issue of overestimation in describing the effect of the
price adjustment formula on the competing firm’s dynamic price response. For this potential
issue, we limit our attention to the probability of specification (2), type II price alignment.
The predicted probability after the introduction of the price adjustment formula is 66%, but
it falls to 3% when the price adjustment formula was not introduced.
Our analysis confirms the perfect price match hypothesis, where the competing firm is
perfectly aligned with the leading firm’s new price during the time of the policy. This gives
evidence that the competing firm used the price adjustment formula to coordinate its retail
price.
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Table 3.4a: Estimation Results of Logit Model 1
Model Logit Model 1
Dep. Var.
Marginal
Effect
Dep. Var.
Marginal
Effect
Price Alignment 1 Price Alignment 2
sp1t sp
2
t
Time Period All Periods
PAFt 0.559*** 0.080** 3.963*** 0.624***
(0.208) (0.032) (0.372) (0.025)
Constant 1.279*** -3.300***
(0.162) (0.360)
Observations 713 713 713 713
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** Statistically significant level at 0.01, **
statistically significant level at 0.05, * statistically significant level at 0.10.
Table 3.4b: Predicted Probability of Competitor’s Price Setting
Logit Model 1
Pr(sp1t = 1|PAFt) Pr(sp
2
t = 1|PAFt)
PAFt = 0 0.782*** 0.036***
(0.028) (0.012)
PAFt = 1 0.863*** 0.660***
(0.016) (0.021)
χ2(1) 6.48 636.44
p-value 0.011 0.000
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** Sta-
tistically significant level at 0.01.
74
An additional concern relating to perfect price match is the emergence of price leadership,
and therefore we test the hypothesis that the competing firm’s dynamic price response is
related to the emergence of price leadership. We use the logit regression to test whether the
competing firm’s pricing mechanism is based on cost fluctuations or on the emergence of price
leadership. The regression model contains two cost variables, crude oil price and exchange
rate. These two cost variables are considered as main factors in the procedure of the price
adjustment formula. The regression equation is:
Pr(spmt = 1|X) = Λ(β0 + β1up
CPC
t + β2down
CPC
t + β3p
crude
t−1 + β4e
USD−TWD
t−1 ), (3.4.4)
where spmt is the competitor’s binary decision with (i) type I price alignment if m = 1 and
(ii) type II price alignment if m = 2, and is interpreted as being 1 if the competitor aligned
with the leader’s new price setting in week t, Λ(•) is the logistic transformation, upCPCt is
a dummy, being 1 if the CPC led an upward price move in week t, downCPCt is a dummy,
being 1 if the CPC led a downward price move in week t,pcrudet−1 is crude oil price in week t1,
and eUSD−TWDt−1 is exchange rate between the USD and the TWD in week t1.
Table 3.5a reports the estimated coefficients of the logit regression and its marginal effects.
Specifications (1), type I perfect price match and (2), type II perfect price match, show that
both cost fluctuations and the emergence of price leadership are significant to the competing
firm’s perfect price match. In particular, specification (2), type II perfect price match, shows
that the emergence of price leadership would increase the chance of the competing firm’s
perfect price match by at least 75% (upward leadership: 76%; downward leadership: 80%).
Comparatively speaking, cost fluctuations (less than 10% in specification (1) and less than
23% in specification (2)) are unlikely to be the main factors in the competing firm’s perfect
price match decision. This finding suggests that the competing firm’s retail gasoline pricing
is based on leadership pricing rather than on cost-based pricing, which is consistent with
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existing literature.11
The predicted probability of the competing firm’s perfect price match is reported in
table 3.5b. The predicted probability indicates that the emergence of price leadership is the
key factor in maintaining perfect price match. The predicted probability of specifications (1)
and (2) is greater than 90% according to the emergence of price leadership. This shows that
the competing firm had an incentive to perfectly match the leading firm’s new price given the
leading firm’s leadership pricing behavior. Similarly, for potential issues of overestimation
from type I perfect price match, we pay attention to specification (2), type II perfect price
match. Specification (2) further shows that the predicted probability decreases to less than
3% when price leadership does not exist in the market. This means the competing firm has
no incentive to perfectly match the leading firm’s new price without the presence of price
leadership.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 depict the predicted conditional probability of competitor’s price
alignment decision given three paired sets of upward and downward leadership events and
changes in crude oil price and exchange rate. The upper figure of figure 3.2 presents that given
three paired sets of leadership events and changes in crude oil price the predicted conditional
probabilities of type I price alignment (sp1) grows and approaches unity by parallel trends.
The lower figure shows that given the emergence of price leadership and changes in crude
oil price the predicted conditional probabilities of type II price alignment (sp2) has a similar
growth trend, but without price leadership the probability of type II price alignment rises
gradually with changes in crude oil price. The predicted probabilities in figure 3.3 are similar
to those in figure 3.2. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 suggest that the emergence of price leadership
and increased costs would result in price coordination, and without price leadership price
coordination outcomes are difficult to sustain in the case of type II price alignment decision.
This analysis confirms that the emergence of price leadership is the key factor in the
competing firm’s pricing strategy and identifies that the competing firm’s pricing mechanism
11See Andreoli-Versback and Franck (2015).
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significantly changes from cost-based pricing to leadership-based pricing. The final part of
the analysis provides evidence identifying that the competing firm alters its new price through
the introduction of the price adjustment formula and price leadership.
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Table 3.5a: Estimation Results of Logit Model 2
Model Logit Model 2
Dep. Var.
Marginal
Effect
Dep. Var.
Marginal
Effect
Price Alignment 1 Price Alignment 2
sp1t sp
2
t
Time Period All Periods
upCPCt 1.408*** 0.080*** 6.177*** 0.768***
(0.387) (0.022) (0.572) (0.048)
downCPCt 1.893*** 0.106*** 6.619*** 0.800***
(0.420) (0.024) (0.614) (0.044)
pcrudet−1 0.109*** 0.007*** 0.091*** 0.018***
(0.013) (0.001) (0.014) (0.003)
eUSD−TWDt−1 1.149*** 0.074*** 1.102*** 0.221***
(0.210) (0.016) (0.237) (0.049)
Constant -43.763*** -45.797***
(7.549) (8.643)
Observations 488 488 488 488
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** Statistically significant level at 0.01, **
statistically significant level at 0.05, * statistically significant level at 0.10.
Table 3.5b: Predicted Probability of Competitor’s Price Setting
Logit Model 2
Pr(sp1t = 1|Leadershipt) Pr(sp
2
t = 1|Leadershipt)
{upCPCt = 1, down
CPC
t = 0} 0.944*** 0.929***
(0.017) (0.019)
{upCPCt = 0, down
CPC
t = 1} 0.965*** 0.953***
(0.012) (0.015)
{upCPCt = 0, down
CPC
t = 0} 0.806*** 0.026**
(0.041) (0.011)
χ2(1) 15.28 2200.63
p-value 0.001 0.000
Note: Leadershipt denotes a paired price leadership event as: (i) upward price leadership, {up
CPC =
1, downCPC = 0}, (ii) downward price leadership, {upCPC = 0, downCPC = 0}, and (iii) no price
leadership, {upCPC = 0, downCPC = 0}. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***
Statistically significant level at 0.01, ** statistically significant level at 0.05.
78
Figure 3.2: Predicted Probability of Competitor’s Price Alignment Given Crude Oil Price
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(a) Predicted Probability of Type I Price Alignment
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(b) Predicted Probability of Type II Price Alignment
Note: Horizontal line tick values are based on the minimum and maximum values of crude oil price which
are presented in table 3.1.
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Figure 3.3: Predicted Probability of Competitor’s Price Alignment Given Exchange Rate
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(c) Predicted Probability of Type I Price Alignment
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(d) Predicted Probability of Type II Price Alignment
Note: Horizontal line tick values are based on the minimum and maximum values of exchange rate which
are presented in table 3.1.
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3.5 Summary of Chapter 3
This paper examines effects of the future information exchange imposed by the government
on the following aspects of the gasoline market: the two firms’ price-setting mechanisms, price
leadership and collusive outcomes. As suggested by our empirical results, we highlight the
following insights: (i) there is price match between the leading firm and the competing firm,
(ii) price leadership is generated by the government’s policy, and (iii) price coordination and
collusive outcomes occur as a result of the existence of future conduct information exchange
and price leadership via the price adjustment formula via the price adjustment formula.
In the first part of the analysis we use the pass-through model to indicate the link between
the leading firm’s pricing strategy and the price adjustment formula. We find that during on-
policy periods the leading firm’s retail gasoline price follows closely with the fluctuations in
crude oil price and exchange rate, but that the introduction of the price adjustment formula
significantly absorbed part of the impact of steep increases in crude oil price to curb steep
increases in retail gasoline price.
In the second part of the analysis we carry out a series of comparisons between both firms’
exact price-announcement time in hours, to examine whether price leadership emerges, and
use a logit regression model to construct a link between price leadership and the price ad-
justment formula. A series of comparisons between the two firms’ exact price-announcement
times provides evidence of the emergence of price leadership during on-policy periods. Addi-
tionally, we run the logit regression model to test the link between price leadership and the
price adjustment formula, and we find evidence of a significant link between price leadership
and the price adjustment formula at the time of the policy.
In the final part of the analysis we run two logit regression models to characterize sepa-
rately the competing firm’s dynamic price response to the introduction of the government’s
policy and the emergence of price leadership. In the first model, our results show that the
competing firm has exhibited perfect price match decisions since the introduction of the
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price adjustment formula publicly disclosed the leading firm’s future price information. In
particular, the specification for type II price alignment gives more precise evidence that the in-
troduction of the price adjustment formula served as future conduct information sharing and
is the key factor facilitating price coordination and collusive outcomes. In the second model
we focus on the competing firm’s pricing mechanism, and evaluate whether the competing
firm’s pricing is based on cost fluctuations or the emergence of price leadership. The results of
the two specifications, type I and type II price alignment, show that the competing firm had
a significantly higher incentive to make perfect price-match decision due to the emergence
of price leadership. Combining findings from the two models, the competing firm’s dynamic
price response clearly shows that: (i) the effect of the price adjustment formula in serving as
future conduct information sharing was to explicitly facilitate price coordination, and that
(ii) the competing firm’s pricing was leadership-based pricing rather than cost-based pricing.
It can therefore be seen that collusive outcomes are unwittingly caused by the government’s
price regulation policy alongside the main objective of the price adjustment formula. This
result is similar to the Danish ready-mix concrete case studied by Albæk, Møllgaard, and
Overgaard (1997).
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Appendix
3.A Dummy Variable Setting
In order to explore the effect of the price adjustment formula, we first focus our attention
on the dummy variable setting of the implementation of the price adjustment formula. The
government’s transparent price regulation policy was implemented from the end of September
2006 (week 226 in our dataset), and so the period of the price adjustment formula regime is
algebraically defined as
PAFt =


1 if t ≥ 226
0 , otherwise,
where PAFt is a dummy of 1 after the transparent price regulation policy was implemented
by the government in week t.
We consider the effect of the price adjustment formula and the presence of price leadership
on the issue of collusive outcomes in the Taiwan gasoline market, and we develop several
dummy variables for answering our concerns regarding tacit collusion. These dummy variables
are based on our dataset, which is reported in table 3.1 and is categorized into three sets as:
(1) did price change from the previous week?
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(2) did CPC lead price changes and FPCC follow?
(3) did CPC and FPCC set identical prices following a price change?
The first set of dummy variables indicates the presence of gasoline suppliers’ price-change
events and their price-change direction. In the second set of dummy variables, we measure
the presence of price leadership events. The third set identifies the presence of identical prices
for both suppliers.
Variables in the first set include the presence of the two suppliers’ price-change events,
and the leading firm’s price-change direction. The first three dummy variables characterize
the pattern of price change and the fourth category variable identifies the leading firm’s price
change direction. The forms of price change are
PChangeCPCt =


1 if pCPCt 6= p
CPC
t−1
0 , otherwise,
PChangeFPCCt =


1 if pFPCCt 6= p
FPCC
t−1
0 , otherwise
and
PChanget = PChange
CPC
t × PChange
FPCC
t ,
and firm i’s price change direction can be expressed as
ChangeDirectionCPCt =


1 if pCPCt > p
CPC
t−1
0 if pCPCt = p
CPC
t−1
−1 if pCPCt < p
CPC
t−1 ,
where PChangeCPCt is a dummy of 1 if CPC adjusted its retail price in week t, PChange
FPCC
t
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is a dummy of 1 if FPCC adjusted its retail price in week t, PChanget is a dummy of 1 if both
suppliers adjusted their prices in week t, and ChangeDirectionCPCt is a category variable of
1 if supplier CPC increased retail price in week t, of 0 if supplier CPC charged previous price
level in week t, and of -1 if supplier CPC decreased retail price in week t.
In the second set, we consider leadership events in the Taiwan gasoline market. This set
of dummy variables is unique to this empirical study. We have collected data at the exact
time of day when price changes were announced. Then, we can define the leadership dummy
variable by using the two gasoline suppliers’ exact time of announcing new retail price. Thus,
the leadership event setting in this study is different from the leadership event setting in
Seaton and Waterson (2013).12 We now turn to our price leadership event setting. We look
at the two suppliers’ exact timing of price-change announcements, so that leadership and
followership events can be distinguished. Given the current duopolistic market structure, we
initially define that if supplier i (i ∈ {CPC,FPCC}) announces new price strategy at time
τi,t in week t, a leadership event from supplier i is
leadit =


1 if τj,t > τi,t and PChanget = 1
0 , otherwise,
where τi,t is firm i’s exact timing of new price announcement in week t, and τi,t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 23}.
13
τj,t > τi,t reflects the extent to which supplier i’s exact timing of new price-change announce-
ment in week t is earlier than supplier j’s exact timing of new price-change announcement
in week t. leadit is a dummy, being 1 when supplier i leads price change in week t. Here we
restrict our attention to leadership events from the leading firm, CPC, only.
We will again define that if suppliers CPC and FPCC announce new price strategy si-
12To investigate price leadership in the British supermarket industry, Seaton and Waterson (2013) only
observe their definition of a price change of exactly the same amount and direction in making a comparison
of two supermarket chains price between current and one or two weeks later. They do not take into account
the exact time of price change in the price leadership event setting.
13Suppliers CPC and FPCC adjusted their prices weekly and adopted new prices on the same day. There-
fore, we can make a comparison of the exact timing of new price change announcement between suppliers
CPC and FPCC.
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multaneously at time τt in week t, a simultaneous price change between two suppliers is
smt =


1 if τFPCC,t = τCPC,t and PChanget = 1
0 , otherwise,
where τFPCC,t = τCPC,t reflects when suppliers CPC and FPCC announce new price strategy
at the same exact timing in week t. smt is a dummy, being 1 if suppliers CPC and FPCC
announce new prices simultaneously.
Given supplier CPC’s leadership event, leadCPCt , simultaneous event, smt, and supplier
CPC’s price-change direction, ChangeDirectionCPCt , leadership and simultaneous events can
be classified according to price-change directions into upward and downward price changes.
First, upward and downward price leadership events of supplier CPC are given as follows:
upCPCt =


1 if leadCPCt = 1 and ChangeDirection
CPC
t = 1
0 , otherwise,
and
downit =


1 if leadCPCt = 1 and ChangeDirection
CPC
t = −1
0 , otherwise,
where upCPCt is a dummy of 1 if supplier CPC leads positive price change in week t, and
downCPCt is a dummy of 1 if supplier CPC leads negative price change in week t
Second, upward and downward price changes in simultaneous moves between two suppliers
can be expressed as
upsmt =


1 if smt = 1 and ChangeDirectiont = 1
0 , otherwise,
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and
downsmt =


1 if smt = 1 and ChangeDirectiont = −1
0 , otherwise,
where upsmt is a dummy of 1 when suppliers CPC and FPCC changed their prices simultane-
ously and had positive price changes in week t, and downsmt is a dummy of 1 when suppliers
CPC and FPCC changed their prices simultaneously and had negative price changes in week
t.
Lastly, we return to consider a case of identical prices set by both suppliers, CPC and
FPCC. In an identical price case, we restrict attention to two types of perfect price alignment
setting. In the first type of perfect price alignment, we suppose that given the elimination
of simultaneous move events between two suppliers, in week t supplier FPCC set exactly the
same retail gasoline price as supplier CPC. The first perfect price alignment setting is
sp1t =


1 if pFPCCt = p
CPC
t and smt = 0
0 , otherwise,
where sp1t is a dummy of 1 if supplier FPCC charged exactly the same price as that set by
supplier CPC in week t and the two suppliers did not adjust their prices simultaneously.
For the second type of perfect price alignment we restrict the first perfect price alignment
setting. We suppose that given the elimination of simultaneous move events between the two
suppliers, supplier FPCC charged exactly the same price level as supplier CPC when both
suppliers made a price change in week t. Thus, the second perfect price alignment setting is
expressed as
sp2t =


1 if pFPCCt = p
CPC
t , PChanget = 1, and smt = 0
0 , otherwise,
where sp2t is a dummy of 1 if supplier FPCC exactly charged the same price as supplier CPC
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set in week t during price-change period, PChanget = 1, and simultaneous price changes
between the two suppliers did not happen.
As relevant data and dummy variables which are used in our econometric analysis of this
chapter are introduced and defined in this section, we re-summarize the description of data
and dummy variables in table 3.A.1.
Table 3.A.1: Variable Description
Variable Description
pCPC CPC’s retail gasoline price
pFPCC FPCC’s retail gasoline price
pDubai Spot price of Dubai crude oil
pBrent Spot price of Brent crude oil
pcrude Weighted crude oil price
exUSD−TWD Exchange rate for the US dollar to Taiwan New dollar
PAF The price adjustment formula
PChange Price-change event
ChangeDirection Price-change direction
lead Leadership move event
sm Simultaneous move event
up Upward-price change event
down Downward-price change event
sp1 Type I perfect price alignment
sp2 Type II perfect price alignment
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3.B Data Source of Chapter 3
Table 3.B.1: Data Source
Chapter 3
Dataset Data Type Source
CPC’s Retail Price of 95 Unleaded
Gasoline, 2002M06-2015M12
Weekly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
FPCC’s Retail Price of 95 Unleaded
Gasoline, 2002M06-2015M12
Weekly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
Price of Dubai Crude Oil, 2002M06-
2015M12
Weekly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
Price of Brent Crude Oil, 2002M06-
2015M12
Weekly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
Exchange Rate: USD-TWD,
2002M06-2015M12
Daily Data
Central Bank of the Republic of
China (Taiwan)
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Chapter 4
Effect of Transparent Price Policy
on Household Gasoline Demand
4.1 Introduction
Since the Taiwanese government implemented its price adjustment formula in September 2006
to regulate the gasoline price of the state-owned enterprise, CPC Corporation, CPC’s price
information has been publicly disseminated to consumers as well as to its main competitor,
Formosa Petrochemical Corporation (FPCC). As a result, improvements in market trans-
parency resulting from the implementation of the price adjustment formula may have arisen.
In the previous chapter we investigated the effect of future conduct information sharing on
the supply side of the market, and provided evidence about tacit collusive outcomes gen-
erated by the government’s transparent price regulation policy. In this chapter, we restrict
our attention to the effect of information sharing on the demand side. The main objective
is to examine whether the sharing of future conduct information carries potential gains for
consumers by enabling them to better anticipate price changes.
Gasoline demand has been modeled by parametric techniques in most of the relevant
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studies, and the relationship between dependent and independent variables has to be appro-
priately postulated within parametric models. Using a parametric model may be potentially
restrictive to the interpretation of the relationship between dependent and independent vari-
ables, and involves the risk of misspecification. On the other hand, gasoline demand can
become flexible without restrictive assumptions and there is a risk of misspecification if gaso-
line demand is modeled by pure nonparametric techniques. A pure nonparametric model may
suffer the particular issue of ‘the curse of dimensionality’ and the lack of interpretable param-
eters. In terms of parametric and nonparametric models, we may face disadvantages from
either of the models. Therefore, the motivation for the use of a semiparametric model is that
such a model, which consists of parametric and nonparametric components, can combine the
advantages of parametric and nonparametric models while reducing the specific limitations
arising from each.
This chapter attempts to determine household gasoline demand in response to changes in
retail gasoline price and price information sharing, and to model household gasoline demand
using semiparametric techniques. The semiparametric specification of household gasoline
demand encompasses parametric estimates of explanatory variables and a nonparametric es-
timate of price elasticity, and this specification can examine whether nonlinear price elasticity
of household gasoline demand varies across regions. In the existing literature, regional gaso-
line demand cannot be explicitly depicted, because of the use of a national household dataset,
and we therefore use a regional household dataset to enable exploration of regional household
gasoline demand using a semiparametric approach.
This study differs from the existing literature in two aspects. First, in geographically
large countries such as the US and Canada, existing studies have modeled gasoline demand
semiparametrically, and have obtained similar results from semiparametric estimates. We
therefore model household gasoline demand in geographically small country of Taiwan to
address the issue of whether differences in gasoline demand exist between geographically
large and small countries. Second, in order to assess the impact of future conduct information
generated by the government’s regulatory policy, the concept of future conduct information
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sharing is added to the discussion of household gasoline demand. This analysis allows us to
examine whether changes in household gasoline demand are impacted by the government’s
regulatory policy.
The contributions of this study can be outlined as follows: first we model Taiwan house-
hold gasoline demand semiparametrically using regional household-level data to disaggregate
household demand for gasoline by urban and rural regions. We find that household demand
for gasoline is relatively inelastic in urban and rich regions and is relatively elastic in rural
and poor regions, with the monthly effects being smaller in an urbanized region. Second, we
consider the effect of future conduct information sharing on household demand for gasoline.
Our results find that current household gasoline consumption would fall when negative future
conduct price-change information is publicly disclosed to consumers. This finding indicates
that the implementation of the price adjustment formula helps consumers to plan future pur-
chase responses via intertemporal substitution in household gasoline-consumption decisions.
Finally, this study provides an application of a semiparametric approach to gasoline demand
outside North America.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: section 4.2 briefly summarizes relevant
existing studies and section 4.3 provides descriptions of our household-level data. Econometric
methods and results, which include specification and estimation of semiparametric models,
are presented in section 4.4. Finally, section 4.5 provides conclusions for this chapter.
4.2 Literature Review
Stoker (1992) has demonstrated that semiparametric methods can enhance efficiency in com-
parison with parametric estimates and thus avoid the curse of dimensionality in depicting
nonparametric estimates graphically. You et al. (2010) and Wang (2011) have also empha-
sized similar advantages to using semiparametric techniques. They mention advantages and
disadvantages of constructing parametric and nonparametric models, and argue that semi-
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parametric models can deliver advantages and reduce disadvantages of parametric and non-
parametric models. Such benefits can be provided by, for example, including the interpretable
parameters of parametric models and the flexibility of nonparametric models while reducing
the possibility of misspecification of parametric models and the curse of dimensionality of
nonparametric models. Semiparametric models encompass advantages of full parametric and
pure nonparametric models, and have been considerably used in much of the literature about
gasoline demand. In existing studies, semiparametric regression techniques have been ap-
plied to estimates of gasoline demand in the US and Canada (Hausman and Newey, 1995;
Schmalensee and Stoker, 1999; Yatchew and No, 2001; Manzan and Zerom, 2010; Wadud,
Noland and Graham, 2010; Liu, 2014). By the application of flexible semiparametric specifi-
cation, these studies provide precise parametric estimates using other explanatory variables
alongside a graphical interpretation of the relationship between gasoline demand and gaso-
line price. Therefore, a semiparametric method is appropriate in this study for estimating
Taiwanese household gasoline demand.
Hausman and Newey (1995) use household-level data from the Residential Energy Con-
sumption Survey for the years 1979, 1980 and 1981 and from the Residential Transportation
Energy Consumption Survey (RTECS) for the years 1983, 1985 and 1988. These surveys were
conducted by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) to estimate gasoline demand
semiparametrically. They find that the price elasticity in nonparametric estimation is more
complicated than parametric estimation and depends on variety of gasoline price, and they
indicate that household income is positively related to gasoline demand. Schmalensee and
Stoker (1999) collect RTECS data from the EIA to estimate the household demand for gaso-
line. They find a positive relationship between household gasoline demand and household
income. Moreover, Yatchew and No (2001) use Canadian data from the National Private
Vehicle Use Survey which was collected by Statistics Canada between 1994 and 1996 in order
to examine Canadian household demand for gasoline. They also confirm positive income
elasticity in Canadian household gasoline demand. Similarly, Manzan and Zerom (2010) re-
examine RTECS data for the years 1991 and 1994 and show a positive relationship between
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household consumption and household income in their nonparametric estimate. Liu (2014)
gathers a state-level panel dataset to evaluate gasoline demand, and finds income elasticity
of between approximately 0.1 and 0.22 across states. These studies indicate that gasoline
demand would not be negatively affected by an increase in income.
However, Judson, Schmalensee and Stoker (1999) investigate the relationship between
economic development and energy demand by using UN sectoral data covering 123 nations.
They point out that energy consumption tends to decline with income in the household
sector, particularly in high income groups. Similarly, Wadud, Noland and Graham (2010)
study household gasoline demand by using data from 1997 to 2002 from the US Consumer
Expenditure Surveys (CEX) conducted by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. They claim that
the income elasticity of gasoline demand becomes negative at high income levels because of
substitution from car leisure trips to air-travel leisure trips. As the above literature generally
indicates a positive income elasticity of gasoline demand in the US and Canadian markets,
we would reconsider the relationship between income effect and household gasoline demand
by using a semiparametric method.
Recent studies have paid limited attention to the effects of future conduct information on
market efficiency and anti-competitive outcomes. Ku¨hn (2001) has argued that public future
conduct information sharing should be considered as a policy option if it is clearly related to
consumers and potential efficiency gains, but that private future conduct information sharing
should be prohibited for the avoidance of efficiency losses. An OECD analysis report (2010)
also demonstrates that increased market transparency would carry benefits for consumers and
produce an increase in consumer welfare. Furthermore, Bennett and Collins (2010) discuss the
topic of public dissemination of future intentions. They argue that public disclosure of future
price would help consumers to plan their future-purchase responses in advance. According
to their argument, efficiency gains to consumers can be deemed to reflect intertemporal
substitution in household gasoline-consumption decisions. Having discussed the effect of
future conduct information sharing to the supply side in Chapter 3, this chapter will consider
the effect of future conduct information on the demand side.
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4.3 Data Description
In this chapter, we study Taiwan household gasoline demand by using monthly household-
level data from the official statistical databases of the ministries of the Interior, Transporta-
tion and Communications, and Economic Affairs. The data are presented as a longitudinal
dataset which includes 177 periods (January 2001 to September 2015) and 20 regions (20
administrative divisions of Taiwan).1 As we restrict our attention to household-level data,
some variables are compiled as household-level variables. For compiling some of the collected
data into household-based format, we collect monthly data for the number of households at
regional level. The compiling dataset is comprised of 3540 observations.
Data on gasoline consumption across 20 Taiwan administrative regions and the relevant
price of gasoline are directly collected from the Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Economic
Affairs. The retail gasoline price is identical across the 20 regions and has been recorded
weekly by the Bureau of Energy, and we compile weekly price data for each calendar month.
Gasoline-consumption patterns are collected as monthly and regional data, and we also com-
pile consumption data into a household-level dataset.
Data on household income refers to annual household disposable income from 2001 to
2015, and we divide this figure by 12 months to obtain monthly household disposable income.
As identical monthly household disposable income data are presented, to accommodate slight
variations in household disposable income we observe the monthly consumer price index to
generate monthly household real disposable income.
Data on the numbers of registered cars and motorcycles and licensed drivers are gath-
ered from the statistical database of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications.
Given our restriction to household-based information, these three variables are reformed as
household-level data. However, there are missing values in the data relating to number of
licensed drivers. We use the linear interpolation method to fill in missing values in the
1The data source and Taiwan administrative map are shown in Appendices 4.G and 4.E.
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time-series.
A key objective of this study is to determine whether future conduct information sharing
generated by the price adjustment formula delivers an impact on household gasoline demand.
Given this objective, some dummy variables need to be constructed and used in our econo-
metric methods. These dummy variables2 are:
(i) PAFt is a dummy for the government’s regulatory policy, the price adjustment formula
(= 1 if the price adjustment formula is implemented at time t, and = 0 otherwise),
(ii) PositiveChanget is a dummy for current conduct information sharing of price increase
(= 1 if retail gasoline price at time t is greater than at time t−1, and = 0 otherwise) and
NegativeChanget is a dummy for current conduct information sharing of price decrease
(= 1 if retail gasoline price at time t is less than at time t− 1, and = 0 otherwise),
(iii) PositiveChanget+1 is a dummy for expected positive price change (= 1 if retail gasoline
price at time t+1 is greater than at time t, and = 0 otherwise) and NegativeChanget+1
is a dummy for expected negative price change of price decrease (= 1 if retail gasoline
price at time t+ 1 is less than at time t, and = 0 otherwise).
In particular, to identify the availability of future conduct information sharing to households,
we define future conduct information sharing as the interaction term of the price adjustment
formula and expected price-change information which is written as
(iv) PAFt+1×PositiveChanget+1 is a dummy (= 1 if future positive price change informa-
tion is available, and = 0 otherwise) and PAFt+1 × NegativeChanget+1 is a dummy
(= 1 if future negative price change information is available, and = 0 otherwise).
Monthly effects are included in our models. Monthly effects capture whether households
display different consumer behavior in each month, thus taking into account holiday periods
2Dummy variable setting is detailed in Appendix 4.B.
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such as Chinese New Year in February, Dragon Boat Festival in June, Mid-Autumn Festival
in September and students’ summer vacations during July and August. For testing the
possibility of endogeneity, we use cost variables as instrumental variables. The cost variables
used are crude oil Dubai and Brent prices, which are valued by the U.S. dollar (USD), and
the exchange rate for the US dollar to Taiwan New dollar (TWD).
In using a time-series dataset, trend should be considered. Trend would result in non-
stationary data which would produce spurious estimated results. In order to obtain reliable
results and meet the assumption of stationarity, we detrend the time-series dataset. Finally,
for the data described in this section and used in this empirical study, we summarize the
description of data in table 4.1 and report descriptive statistics of the 20 administrative
regions in table 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.A.
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Table 4.1: Variable Description
Variable Description
pgasoline Retail gasoline price (TWD/liter)
pDubai Spot price of Dubai crude oil (USD/barrel)
pBrent Spot price of Brent crude oil (USD/barrel)
pcrude Weighted crude oil price (USD/barrel)
eUSD−TWD Exchange rate for the US dollar to Taiwan New dollar
hgas Household gasoline consumption (liter)
hrealhdi Real household disposable income (TWD)
hnrc Household the number of registered cars
hnrm Household the number of registered motorcycles
hnld Household the number of licensed drivers
PAF Government’s policy - the price adjustment formula
PositiveChange Positive price change
NegativeChange Negative price change
Note: pcrude is the weighted crude oil price (Dubai: 70% and Brent: 30%) and is based on
the procedure of the price adjustment formula. USD: US Dollar. TWD: Taiwan New
Dollar.
4.4 Econometric Methods and Results
In general, parametric models could provide a constant price elasticity to interpret the rela-
tionship between gasoline consumption and gasoline price. However, constant price elasticity
cannot reflect a dynamic response of household gasoline consumption across price level. Also,
constant price elasticity of gasoline demand is estimated by using a predetermined relation-
ship between gasoline consumption and gasoline price. This predetermined relationship may
present with the possibility of misspecification. To reduce the possibility of misspecification
and to obtain a dynamic responsiveness of consumption to price, a nonparametric functional
98
form is necessarily involved in the econometric modeling of this study.
In this chapter, we investigate household demand in two aspects, the panel of 20 regions
and an individual region. In accordance with above two aspects, we will apply two different
econometric frameworks. In the panel of 20 regions view, we begin by using panel data
framework to specify gasoline demand for household. One of advantages of using panel data
model is that parameter(s) can be efficiently estimated with the simple computation (Hsiao,
2007). A semiparametric panel data fixed effects model is appropriate to estimate household
gasoline demand in the panel of 20 regions. However, the panel data estimation implies the
same parameters and nonparametric form for each region, which would not be reasonably
accurate to infer the household demand for each independent region. For example, the mix
of urban and rural environments is incorporated into the groups, and this mix impacts upon
the ability to accurately estimate the level of household demand.
To remove this limitation of a mix of urban and rural environments, we model individual
regional household demand. We turn to an individual regional household demand and use
semiparametric difference-based model to independently estimate for each individual region.
The advantages of using the difference-based model are that: (i) it simplifies computation to
obtain parametric and nonparametric estimation; (ii) it can generate efficient estimator in the
semiparametric model (Yatchew, 2003). In accordance with above advantages, the difference-
based model is more efficient estimation method to infer household gasoline demand for each
individual region. Hence, the independent estimation of household demand for each individual
region can be appropriate and accurate via using the difference-based model. These two
estimation methods will enable us to discuss household demand from two different aspects,
the panel of regions and each independent region.
As addressed above, we attempt to model household gasoline demand with Taiwanese
data by using semiparametric approaches. We take two semiparametric models as follows:
(i) a fixed-effects model with cross-regional data and (ii) the difference-based model with
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a single regional household data across six specific municipalities in Taiwan.3 Given these
two semiparametric approaches, gasoline price is chosen as the nonparametric variable, and
so the dynamic responsiveness of consumption to price can be generated by nonparametric
estimate. Parametric factors include household disposable income, the numbers of registered
vehicles and licensed drivers, monthly dummies and information sharing of current and future
conduct. These factors are simply obtained by parametric estimate, and the relationship
between consumption and these factors is easily interpreted. In particular, the inclusion of
future conduct information sharing enables examination of how the government’s regulatory
policy affects gasoline demand for households across regions.
This study also takes into consideration the possibility of endogeneity of gasoline price. It
is well known that price and quantity may be related via a supply-side response, so the error
term in the demand equation may be correlated with gasoline price. This correlation between
error term and gasoline price would result in a biased estimate of price elasticity. If this
consideration were not to be involved in our econometric framework, biased and inconsistent
results might be estimated in relation to price endogeneity. Hence, the test of endogenous
gasoline price is necessary, and is introduced in the following section.
Prior to carrying out the semiparametric estimation, we provide basic econometric mod-
eling ideas regarding the fixed-effects model, the difference-based model and the test of en-
dogeneity. These econometric modeling ideas allow us to understand how the econometric
models, introduced in sections 4.4.1.1, 4.4.2.1 and 4.4.4 respectively, work in this study.
In sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 the specification and estimation of the semiparametric fixed-
effects model and Yatchew’s difference-based semiparametric model are presented; the monthly
effects on gasoline demand for households are discussed and depicted in section 4.4.3; and
finally the test of gasoline price endogeneity is discussed in section 4.4.4.
3The six specific municipalities are Taipei City, New Taipei City, Taichung City, Tainan City, Kaohsiung
City and Taoyuan City, in each of which population is above 1.5 million.
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4.4.1 Specification and Estimation of the Semiparametric Fixed-effects
Model
4.4.1.1 Specification of the Fixed-effects Model
In this chapter, we consider the semiparametric fixed-effects model, and its functional form
is defined as
yi,t = xi,tβ + f(zi,t) + αi + ui,t, i = 1, . . . , N ; t = 1, . . . , T, (4.4.1)
where yi,t is a dependent variable, xi,t is a vector of explanatory variables and zi,tis a non-
parametric variable, αi represents fixed effects, and ui,tis an error term which also assumes
E[u|x, z] = 0.
We follow the series estimation method of Balgati and Li (2002) to estimate our panel data
model with fixed effects. We start to eliminate the fixed effects by using first differencing,
and equation (4.4.1) is rewritten as
yi,t − yi,t−1 = (xi,t − xi,t−1)β + [f(zi,t)− f(zi,t−1)] + εi,t − ui,t−1, (4.4.2)
or is as follows
Yi,t = Xi,tβ + F (zi,t, zi,t−1) + Ui,t, (4.4.3)
where Yit = yi,t − yi,t−1, Xit = xi,t − xi,t−1, F (xi,t, xi,t−1) = f(zi,t) − f(zi,t−1), and Ui,t =
ui,t − ui,t−1.
Since an additive nonparametric function, F (zi,t, zi,t−1)), is generated in equation (4.4.3),
we can meet difficulties in estimating the unknown additive nonparametric function. As in
the series estimation method proposed by Balgati and Li (2002), we use series pK(z) to ap-
proximate unknown nonparametric function, f(z) and an additive nonparametric function,
F (zi,t, zi,t−1), is approximated as p
K(zi,t, zi,t−1) = p
K(zi,t) − p
K(zi,t−1). Therefore, equa-
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tion (4.4.3) is rewritten as
Yi,t = Xi,tβ + [p
K(zi,t)− p
K(zi,t−1)]θ + Ui,t (4.4.4)
and parameters, βˆ and θˆ, can be estimated by using ordinary least squares. The fixed effects,
αˆi, can be obtained by using estimated parameters, βˆ and θˆ, and we could estimate the error
term as
ui,t = yi,t − xi,tβˆ − αˆi = f(zi,t) + εi,t. (4.4.5)
Equation (4.4.5) can be estimated by using a standard nonparametric regression estima-
tor, such as the B-spline method (Libois and Verardi, 2013).
4.4.1.2 Estimation of the Fixed-effects Model
Having presented a description of a semiparametric fixed-effects model in section 4.4.1.1, we
recall equation (4.4.1) and summarize our household gasoline demand in a semiparametric
regression equation which is as follows:
lnhgasi,t = f(ln p
gasoline
t ) + β1 lnhrealhdii,t + β2 lnhnrci,t + β3 lnhnrmi,t
+ β4 lnhnldi,t + β5PositiveChanget + β6NegativeChanget
+ β7PAFt+1 × PositiveChanget+1 + β8PAFt+1 ×NegativeChanget+1
+ θMonthDummies+ εi,t, (4.4.6)
where lnhgasi,t is the log of household gasoline consumption in region i at period t, ln p
gasoline
t
is the log of an identical gasoline price at period t, lnhrealhdii,t is the log of real household
disposable income in region i at period t, lnhnrci,t and lnhnrmi,t are logs of the numbers
of registered cars and motorcycles in region i at period t, lnhnldi,t is the log of the number
of licensed drivers in region i at period t, PositiveChanget and NegativeChanget denote
current conduct price information sharing to households, PAFt+1 ×PositiveChanget+1 and
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PAFt+1 × NegativeChanget+1 are the interaction terms between PAF and future price-
change information and are defined as future conduct information sharing to households,
MonthDummies are monthly effects, and εi,t is an error term.
Equation 4.4.6 is the semiparametric specification of gasoline demand for households. We
assume that household gasoline demand is a function of gasoline price, household income,
the numbers of registered vehicles and licensed drivers, information sharing components, and
monthly effects. In particular, we accommodate gasoline price as a nonparametric variable.
Nonparametric gasoline price can deliver dynamic rather than constant price elasticity, which
allows us to explore how the price elasticity varies with gasoline price. Moreover, as the price
adjustment formula constitutes unilateral information sharing to the public, we assume the
price adjustment formula is the information-sharing component in gasoline demand. We
suppose that an interaction term between the introduction of the price adjustment formula
and future price-change information serves as future conduct information sharing. Because
consumers are able to fully anticipate the new retail price via the introduction of the price
adjustment formula, they will decide to consume more or less gasoline in the current period.
Also, current conduct information sharing is taken into account as a simple comparison be-
tween current and previous prices. We suppose that variation in household income will affect
household gasoline demand. Additionally, some demographic effects, such as the numbers
of registered vehicles and licensed drivers per household, are included in household gasoline
demand. Finally, due to the inclusion of seasonality in household gasoline demand, monthly
effects are included in our model and discussed.
In our semiparametric panel data fixed-effects model, described in equation (4.4.6), we
follow the approach of Balgati and Li (2002) in estimating household demand for gasoline.
We begin to categorize 20 Taiwan administrative regions into four districts, North, Central,
South, and East and Island, and define characteristics of these four districts. First, the
North district contains the Greater Taipei metropolitan area and Hsinchu Science Park, and
we therefore characterize it as urban and the richest district. Second, as the South district
contains two of the high-population specific municipalities and four suburban counties, we
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defined it as the second-richest district. Third, the Central district contains one of the specific
municipalities and three suburban counties, and is therefore characterized as the third-richest
district. Finally, due to a lack of public infrastructure and low population density, the East
and Island district is characterized as a poor and rural area.
We now turn to semiparametric estimation. The semiparametric estimates of equa-
tion (4.4.6) are presented in figure 4.1 for nonparametric variables and in table 4.1 for
parametric variables. Given equation (4.4.5) and the B-spline method, nonparametric es-
timates of price effect are depicted in figure 4.1. Figure 4.1 displays nonparametric price
effects in four regions (North: red; Central: green; South: yellow; East and Island: teal) and
Taiwan across all 20 regions (Taiwan: blue). The horizontal axis represents the log of gasoline
price and the vertical axis represents the residual, which corresponds to household gasoline
consumption. Figure 4.1 represents the sensitivity of price effect for households. As price
effect is depicted in figure 4.1, we find: (i) less sensitivity of price effect in the North district;
(ii) more sensitivity of price effect in the East and Island district and (iii) medium level of
sensitivity of price effect in the Central and South districts and Taiwan. In accordance with
these findings, we conclude that there seems to be inelastic household gasoline demand in
the urban North, South and Central districts, but elastic demand in the rural area East and
Island district.
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Note: Nonparametric price effect is estimated using equation (4.4.5). The horizontal axis represents log
of gasoline price and the vertical axis represents the residual which corresponds to household gasoline
consumption.
Figure 4.1: Nonparametric Price Effect in Fixed Effects Model
In returning to the estimated results of parametric variables in table 4.1, where the
estimated monthly effects are plotted in figure 4.3 in section 4.4.3, we find that income
elasticities are negative in the household demand of Taiwan and four districts. This result
is consistent with similar findings in the existing literature (see Judson, Schmalensee and
Stoker, 1990; Wadud, Noland and Graham, 2010), and it also suggests that in the case of the
Taiwan gasoline market, households display a reduction in gasoline consumption when their
incomes increase. Households may be willing to change to more luxurious or public substitutes
(for example, from car travel to air travel or from private transport to public transport).
Second, the number of registered motorcycles is strongly significant in the Central and South
districts. That indicates that household gasoline demand would rise by approximately 1.85%
in the Central district and 1.1% in the South district if the number of registered motorcycles
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increases by 1%.
In the final part of this analysis, we restrict our attention to consumer price expectation
through the effects of the sharing of current and future conduct price information. First,
table 4.1 reports the effect of current conduct positive price-change information sharing for
households in each district and in Taiwan as a whole, where generally household gasoline
consumption falls by around 1% if households receive current positive change information.
In particular, the East and Island district displays a significantly greater effect from such
information than the other three districts. The coefficients of current conduct negative price-
change information in table 4.1 indicate that household gasoline consumption would gradually
rise if current conduct negative price-change information is received. The analysis of current
conduct information sharing confirms that in general all households increase (decrease) house-
hold gasoline consumption if current conduct negative (positive) information is available.
Second, the coefficients for the sharing of future conduct information show that future
conduct negative price information is significant in decreasing current household gasoline
consumption. Current household gasoline consumption would fall by approximately 5% if
future conduct negative price-change information is transparent to consumers. This finding
indicates that consumers would become more patient in their gasoline-consumption behavior
if future conduct information is disclosed publicly to consumers.
The results reported in this empirical exercise suggest that current conduct positive price-
change information, obtained from a price comparison between current and previous peri-
ods, and future conduct negative price-change information, as publicly disseminated through
the government’s transparent price policy, would result in significant decreases in current
household gasoline consumption. In particular, future conduct information sharing offers
intertemporal substitution opportunities to households planning their future purchases.
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Table 4.1: Semiparametric Estimates of Fixed Effects Model
District Taiwan North Central South East and Island
Dependent Variable Log of Household Gasoline Consumption
Period All Periods
Log of Real Household Disposable Income -0.172** -0.170* -0.161 -0.301** -0.096
(0.072) (0.092) (0.196) (0.125) (0.206)
Log of # of Registered Cars/Per Household 1.359** 0.884 2.390 1.849 2.509
(0.660) (0.760) (1.928) (1.231) (2.014)
Log of # of Registered Motorcycles/Per Household 1.039*** 0.311 1.845** 1.104** 0.654
(0.321) (0.443) (0.754) (0.493) (1.092)
Log of # of Licensed Drivers/Per Household 0.188* 0.069 0.200 0.594 -2.804
(0.113) (0.237) (0.133) (0.412) (1.915)
Current Conduct Information Sharing
Positive Change -0.016*** -0.013** -0.007 -0.016** -0.036**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.018)
Negative Change 0.009* 0.005 0.025** 0.010 -0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.019)
Future Conduct Information Sharing
PAF×Positive Change -0.013 -0.016 -0.027 -0.017 0.015
(0.012) (0.015) (0.029) (0.020) (0.047)
PAF×Negative Change -0.059*** -0.048*** -0.080*** -0.064*** -0.052
(0.012) (0.015) (0.029) (0.020) (0.047)
Monthly Effects - - - - -
Observations 3462 1218 696 1044 504
R2 0.268 0.427 0.285 0.302 0.283
Note: All 20 administrative regions are grouped for this study into four districts, North, South, Central, and East
and Island. North district includes Taipei City, New Taipei City, Taoyuan City, Yilan County, Hsinchu County,
Hsinchu City and Keelung City. Central district includes Taichung City, Miaoli County, Changhua County, and
Nantou County. South district includes Tainan City, Kaohsiung City, Yulin County, Chiayi County, Chiayi City, and
Pingtung County. East and Island district includes Taitung County, Hualien County and Penghu County. For monthly
effects, see figure 4.3 in section 4.4.3. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** Statistically significant level
at 0.01, ** statistically significant level at 0.05 and * statistically significant level at 0.1.
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4.4.2 Specification and Estimation of the Semiparametric Difference-Based
Model
4.4.2.1 Specification of the Difference-Based Model
We now turn to individual regional analysis. For estimating individual regional household
gasoline demand, we use Yatchew’s difference-based estimation technique (Yatchew and No,
2001; Yatchew, 2003). To begin this section, the standard specification of semiparametric
model is written as
y = f(z) + xβ + ε with E[ε|x, z] = 0, (4.4.7)
where y denotes a dependent variable, x denotes a vector of explanatory variables, z denotes
an explanatory variable, f(•) denotes an unknown smoothed function, ε denotes an error
term with E[ε|x, z = 0] and V ar[ε|x, z] = σε.
In following Yatchew’s semiparametric differencing technique (2003), we apply a differ-
encing matrix, D, into the above semiparametric regression function, equation (4.4.7), to
remove nonparametric smoothed function.4 Then, we have
Dy = Dxβ +Df(z) +Dε ∼= Dxβ +Dε. (4.4.8)
As a basic semiparametric regression function has been reformed as equation (4.4.8), we
could use ordinary least squares to estimate parameter, βˆdiff . As βˆdiff is estimated, we use
βˆdiff to subtract parametric variables in equation (4.4.7). Then, we obtain
y − xβˆdiff = x(β − βˆdiff ) + f(z) + ε ∼= f(z) + ε. (4.4.9)
4Yatchew (2003) proposes the higher order of differencing procedures to estimate the partial linear model.
He supposes that m is the order of differencing and d0, d1, . . . , dm are differencing weights which satisfy
conditions as
m∑
i=0
di = 0 and
m∑
i=0
d
2
i = 1. As these conditions are restricted, the differencing matrix can be
defined. Yatchew’s optimal differencing weights are shown in Appendix 4.F.
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Given equation (4.4.9), we could estimate an unknown smoothed function by using the stan-
dard nonparametric method.
4.4.2.2 Estimation of the Difference-Based Model
We compare findings of the fixed-effects model with the difference-based model described in
section 4.4.2.1. Compared with the fixed-effects model, the difference-based model is able to
provide consistent evidence that gasoline demand for households at individual region level
varies with the availability of future conduct information sharing. For a comparison between
fixed-effects estimates and individual regional estimates, we apply Yatchew’s higher order
differencing technique (Yatchew and No, 2001; Yatchew 2003) to estimate individual regional
household gasoline demand and use the same variable setting as in the fixed-effects model
for exploring consistent evidence. Given equation (4.4.7) in section 4.4.2.1, an individual
regional semiparametric specification of household gasoline demand is as follows
lnhgast = f(ln p
gasoline
t ) + φ1 lnhrealhdit + φ2 lnhnrct + φ3 lnhnrmt
+ φ4 lnhnldt + φ5PositiveChanget + φ6NegativeChanget
+ φ7PAFt+1 × PositiveChanget+1 + φ8PAFt+1 ×NegativeChanget+1
+ γMonthDummies+ εt, (4.4.10)
where lnhgast is the log of household gasoline consumption at period t, ln p
gasoline
t is the log
of an identical gasoline price at period t, lnhrealhdit is the log of real household disposable
income at period t, lnhnrct and lnhnrmt are logs of the numbers of registered cars and
motorcycles at period t, lnhnldt is the log of the number of licensed drivers at period t,
PositiveChanget and NegativeChanget denote current conduct price information sharing
to households, PAFt+1 × PositiveChanget+1 and PAFt+1 × NegativeChanget+1) are the
interaction terms between PAF and future price-change information and is defined as future
conduct information sharing to households, MonthDummies are monthly effects, and εt is
the error term.
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We follow Yatchew’s difference-based estimation method procedure of difference-based
estimation, as described in section 4.4.2.1 (Yatchew and No, 2001; Yatchew, 2003). Yatchew
(2003) emphasizes that the estimator would be asymptotically efficient if the order of differ-
encing (m) and sample size increase, and states that the estimator has a relative efficiency of
95 percent if the order of differencing is at 10, m = 10. However, Lokshin (2006) demonstrates
that Yatchew’s difference-based estimation in the Monte Carlo simulations with large sample
size (30,000 observations or more) would obtain efficient estimation if using a higher order
of differencing (m = 10), but with a small sample size (between 1000 and 3000 observations)
would lead to biased estimates. Since our sample size is 177 observations in each individual
region, we use the first order differencing throughout this section to avoid the occurrence of
biased estimates.
This empirical exercise uses a difference-based model to estimate household gasoline de-
mand in six specific municipalities: Taipei City, New Taipei City, Taoyuan City, Taichung
City, Tainan City and Kaohsiung City. Since these six municipalities contain two thirds
of the total population of Taiwan, they are deemed to be representative selections for this
exercise.5 According to the general grant from the central government, these six municipali-
ties are classified into six grades of economic prosperity: 1st richest Taipei City, 2nd richest
New Taipei, 3rd richest Kaohsiung City, 4th richest Taichung City, 5th richest Tainan City
and 6th richest Taoyuan City.6 Semiparametric estimates of equation (4.4.10) are shown in
figure 4.2 and reported in table 4.2.
Given equation (4.4.9), nonparametric price effects are depicted in figure 4.2. The hor-
izontal axis represents the log of gasoline price and the vertical axis represents the residual
which corresponds to household gasoline consumption. Figure 4.2 shows nonparametric price
effects for the six municipalities and indicates that household demand for gasoline is inelastic
5Total population of the six municipalities is approximately 15.8 million (Taipei City: 2.7 million, New
Taipei City: 3.9 million, Taichung City: 2.7 million, Tainan City: 1.8 million, Kaohsiung City: 2.7 million
and Taoyuan City: 2 million). The total population of Taiwan is approximately 23.3 million.
6According to a report of the general grant to local government, amounts of general grant from the central
government are reported as: Taipei City NT$39.648 billion, New Taipei City NT$29.071 billion, Kaohsiung
City NT$27.962 billion, Taichung City NT$24.205 billion, Tainan City NT$18.757 billion, Taoyuan City
NT$18.664 billion.
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if a lower retail gasoline price is charged; in contrast, household demand for gasoline is elastic
if households face a higher retail gasoline price. Furthermore, figure 4.2 also shows that the
richest city has the most inelastic household demand for gasoline. We proceed to test the
significance of the nonparametric gasoline price effect. The significance test presented at the
foot of table 4.2 suggests that nonparametric estimates in price effect are appropriate to de-
scribe the relationship between gasoline consumption and gasoline price in five municipalities:
Taipei, New Taipei, Taoyuan, Tainan and Kaohsiung.
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Note: Nonparametric price effects are estimated using equation (4.4.9). The horizontal axis represents the
log of gasoline price and the vertical axis represents the residual which corresponds to household gasoline
consumption. The significance test of nonparametric price effect is reported in table 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Nonparametric Price Effect in the Six Specified Municipalities
We return to parametric estimates of equation (4.4.10) in table 4.2 in which the estimated
monthly effects are depicted in figure 4.4 in section 4.4. Negative income elasticity in the
six municipalities is consistent with our previous finding in the semiparametric fixed-effects
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model. In the richest regions, households seem to consume less gasoline, possibly because of
substitution from using private vehicles to using public transportation. The number of regis-
tered cars is strongly significant except for Taipei City. In the other five cities, an increase in
the number of registered cars delivers a growth in household gasoline consumption. A growth
in the number of registered motorcycles results in a reduction in household consumption of
gasoline in Taipei City. Our estimates of the number of licensed drivers suggest that an in-
crease in the number of licensed drivers causes a decrease in household gasoline consumption
in the Greater Taipei metropolitan area (Taipei City, New Taipei City and Taoyuan City)
and a growth in household gasoline consumption in the other three cities (Taichung City,
Tainan City and Kaohsiung City). Because of the efficient public transportation infrastruc-
ture and lack of parking spaces in the Greater Taipei metropolitan area, increases in numbers
of licensed drivers would not boost household gasoline consumption.
Again, we limit our attention to the effects of information sharing for current and fu-
ture conduct. Current conduct positive (negative) price-change information sharing is not
significant in affecting household demand for gasoline; in contrast, future conduct negative
price-change information is significant in resulting in decreases in current household con-
sumption for gasoline, except in Taichung City. Our estimates provide evidence of a negative
effect of future conduct negative price-change information sharing on current household con-
sumption of gasoline, and this evidence is consistent with previous evidence of intertemporal
substitution found in section 4.4.1.2.
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Table 4.2: Household Gasoline Demand in Six Special Municipalities
Region Taipei City New Taipei City Taoyuan City Taichung City Tainan City Kaohsiung City
Dependent Variable Household Gasoline Consumption
Period All Periods
Log of Real Household Disposable Income -0.207 -0.364 -0.114 -0.232 -0.041 -0.467**
(0.174) (0.224) (0.166) (0.221) (0.151) (0.220)
Log of # of Registered Cars/Per Household 0.209** 0.884*** 0.829*** 1.533*** 1.330*** 0.990***
(0.095) (0.318) (0.204) (0.430) (0.227) (0.238)
Log of # of Registered Motorcycles/Per Household -0.170** 0.070 -0.505* 0.094 0.103 -0.116
(0.074) (0.295) (0.280) (0.368) (0.152) (0.148)
Log of # of Licensed Drivers/Per Household -0.416*** -0.322 -0.108 0.434 0.562** 0.106
(0.140) (0.397) (0.143) (0.294) (0.217) (0.145)
Current Conduct Information Sharing
Positive Change -0.008 -0.011 -0.015 0.017 -0.012 -0.010
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.026) (0.017) (0.015)
Negative Change -0.000 -0.009 -0.007 0.030 -0.002 -0.004
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.027) (0.017) (0.015)
Future Conduct Information Sharing
PAF×Positive Change -0.032*** -0.014 -0.029 -0.011 -0.025 -0.006
(0.010) (0.013) (0.018) (0.027) (0.017) (0.021)
PAF×Negative Change -0.040*** -0.029** -0.062*** -0.041 -0.059*** -0.042*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.028) (0.018) (0.022)
Monthly Effects - - - - - -
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174
R2 0.852 0.784 0.701 0.314 0.535 0.626
Significance Test for Price Effect
Vstat 5.059 3.231 2.218 0.632 2.968 2.695
p− value 0.000 0.001 0.013 0.264 0.001 0.004
Note: Significant test of nonparametric price effect is based on Yatchew’s significance test procedure (2003). Significance Test statistic as follows
Vstat = (m×n)
1/2 (s
2
nopeffect
−s2
diff
)
s2
diff
D
−→ N(0, 1), where m denotes the order of differencing, n denotes sample size, s2nopeffect denotes the estimator of the
residual variance without price effect, s2diff denotes the m-th order differencing estimator of the residual variance. For more details, see Proposition
4.3.1, Yatchew (2003). For monthly effects, see figure 4.4 in section 4.4.3. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** Statistically significant
level at 0.01, ** statistically significant level at 0.05 and * statistically significant level at 0.1.
113
4.4.3 Monthly Effects
Since gasoline consumption for households typically shows seasonal variation, studying sea-
sonality allows us to investigate whether household gasoline consumption varies with seasonal
patterns. These seasonal patterns include national holidays and students’ summer vacations,
i.e. Chinese New Year (February), Boat Festival (June), Mid-Autumn Festival (September)
and students’ longest break, which occurs in the summer (July and August). Therefore, we
add monthly dummies in both the fixed-effects model and the difference-based model, and
estimated monthly effects are plotted in figures 4.3 and 4.4.7
Figure 4.3 depicts the estimated monthly effects in the semiparametric fixed-effects model
and shows that the North, Central, and South districts have similar monthly effects on house-
hold demand for gasoline, while the East and Island district has obvious monthly variations
in gasoline consumption. Peak gasoline consumption occurs during July and August due
to the summer holiday period. The estimated February effect shows that households in the
North district reduce their gasoline consumption by roughly 10%. Short-term reduction in
gasoline consumption in the North district happens during the Chinese New Year celebration
in February since households celebrate Chinese New Year with family in the Central, South
and East and Island districts. In consequence, the Chinese New Year celebration in Febru-
ary results in short-term increases in gasoline consumption in the Central, South and East
and Island district. Although both Dragon Boat and Mid-Autumn festivals are celebrated in
June and September, there are no obvious increases in gasoline consumption in these months
during these two festivals. Comparatively speaking, the monthly effect in rural and poor
districts is greater, and differs from the other three richer districts.
Returning to the semiparametric difference-based model, Figure 4.4 displays that the six
specified municipalities have similar estimated monthly effects. However, households who live
in the Greater Taipei metropolitan area (Taipei City, New Taipei City and Taoyuan City)
7The monthly dummies of semiparametric difference-based model of remaining 14 regions are plotted in
figures 4.D.2 in Appendix 4.D.
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consume 10% less gasoline in February because many of these households celebrate Chinese
New Year in their parents’ native homes located in central or southern Taiwan.8
The estimates of the monthly effects from equations (4.4.6) and (4.4.10) present a con-
sistent finding about obvious reduction in gasoline consumption in February in the northern
parts of Taiwan, and also identify that the monthly effects on gasoline consumption would
lessen if a region becomes more urbanized.9
8The estimated monthly effects of the remaining 14 regions are graphically shown in figure 4.D.2, and we
find that Hsinchu County, Hsinchu City and Keelung City also have similar estimated February effects.
9The estimated monthly effects of the remaining 14 regions in figure 4.D.2 also show that Taitung County,
Hualien County and Penghu County have dramatic monthly variations in household gasoline consumption.
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4.4.4 Endogeneity
As a concern about the possibility of endogeneity of nonparametric variable is discussed by
existing studies in adopting semiparametric and nonparametric regression methods, we begin
to introduce a standard semiparametric specification, and then assume that a nonparametric
variable, z, is endogenous. The functional form is written as
y = f(z) + xβ + ε with E[ε|z] 6= 0. (4.4.11)
Therefore, we follow the approach of correcting endogeneity in estimating the semipara-
metric regression model which has been described in several studies by Blundell and Duncan
(1998), Blundell et al. (1998), Yatchew and No (2001) and Yatchew (2003). In the case of
the endogeneity of z, there exists an instrumental variable, w, which is uncorrelated with the
residual such that
z = wγ + ν with E[ν|w] = 0. (4.4.12)
Then, we add the residual of equation (4.4.12), ν, into equation (4.4.11), and a new
semiparametric model is as follows
y = f(z) + xβ + ρν + ε with E[ε|z, x, ν] = 0, (4.4.13)
where x is a vector of explanatory variables, z is a nonparametric variable, ν is the residual
in the instrumental variable function from equation (4.4.12), and ε is an error term.
In the new semiparametric regression model shown in equation (4.4.13), we could estimate
ρ to construct a test of exogeneity as null hypothesis H0 : ρ = 0. If the estimated coefficient
of the residual, ρˆ, is significantly different from zero, then we could argue that endogeneity
exists in our model.
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4.4.4.1 Testing Endogeneity
Recalling equation (4.4.11) in section 4.4.4, we can test the null hypothesis that gasoline
price is endogenous in our semiparametric model, equation (4.4.11). We follow the approach
of correcting endogeneity to take the possibility of endogeneity into account. Yatchew and
No (2001) and Manzan and Zerom (2010) use regional dummies as instrumental variables
and Liu (2014) use three state-level instrumental variables, gasoline tax, the domestic oil
first purchasing price and average gasoline price of nonadjacent states, to test possible price
endogeneity. However, since gasoline price in Taiwan is identical, with identical petroleum
product taxes across all 20 regions, we are be unable to use either regional dummies or
regional-level variables such as gasoline tax as our instrumental variables. Hence, according
to the procedure of the price adjustment formula, we use cost variables, crude oil price
and exchange rate, as instrumental variables to examine whether retail gasoline price is
endogenous.
We suppose retail gasoline price is endogenous and that there exist instrumental variables,
crude oil price (pcrude) and exchange rate (eUSD−TWD), which are uncorrelated with the
residual such that
ln pgasolinet = γ1p
crude
t−1 + γ2e
USD−TWD
t−1 + νt with E[ν|p
crude, eUSD−TWD] = 0, (4.4.14)
where pgasolinet is retail gasoline price at period t, p
crude
t−1 is crude oil price at period t − 1,
eUSD−TWDt−1 is the exchange rate for USD to TWD at period t−1, and ν denotes the residual.
Then, we rewrite our semiparametric models to include the residuals in equation (4.4.14),
and new semiparametric models are given by
• Semiparametric fixed-effects model
lnhgasi,t = f(ln p
gasoline
t ) + xβ + ρνi,t + εi,t, (4.4.15)
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and
• Semiparametric difference-based model
lnhgast = f(ln p
gasoline
t ) + xφ+ ρνt + εt, (4.4.16)
where lnhgas is the log of household gasoline consumption , ln pgasoline is the log of an
identical gasoline price, x is a vector of explanatory variables: the log of real household
disposable income (lnhrealhdi), the log of the number of registered cars and motorcycles
(lnhnrc, lnhnrm), the log of the number of licensed drivers (lnhnld), and dummy variables
(Current conduct information sharing, Future conduct information sharing, MonthDummies).
ν is the residuals in equation (4.4.14) and E[ε| ln pgasoline, ν, x] = 0.
We estimate equations (4.4.15) and (4.4.16) by using Balgati and Li’s approach (2002) for
fixed-effects models and Yathchew’s differencing technique (2003) for differenced-based mod-
els, and report parametric estimates in tables 4.3 and 4.4.10 Recalling equation (4.4.13), we
would fail to reject the null hypothesis as exogenous gasoline price if our estimated coefficient
of residual, ρˆ, is insignificantly different from zero. As the estimated parameter, ρˆ, reports
in tables 4.3 and 4.4, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of exogenous gasoline price.
This result is consistent with existing literature.11 Since exogenous gasoline price is unable
to be rejected, our estimates of other explanatory variables are similar to semiparametric
estimates in previous sections 4.4.1.2 and 4.4.2.2.12 The results of the price exogeneity test
suggest that gasoline price can be treated as an exogenous variable when we follow the price
adjustment formula and use crude oil price and exchange rate as instrument variables. Fi-
nally, it is worthwhile to emphasize that the test of price endogeneity enables us to examine
10The estimated monthly effects of equation (4.4.15) and (4.4.16) are graphically shown in figures 4.C.
11In testing the possibility of price endogeneity, Yatchew and No (2001) and Manzan and Zerom (2010)
fail to reject the null hypothesis as price exogeneity by using regional dummies as instrumental variables, and
Liu (2014) also obtains price exogeneity by using gasoline tax, the domestic oil first-purchasing price and the
average gasoline price of nonadjacent states.
12We also test the possibility of endogeneity in the remaining 14 regions by using equation (4.4.16), and
report the estimated results in table 4.D.2 and plot the monthly effects in figure 4.D.4 in Appendix 4.D. The
estimated results suggest that we are unable to reject the null hypothesis, exogenous gasoline price.
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whether measurement errors emerge in the estimation of household gasoline demand. The
rejection of the hypothesis of price endogeneity demonstrates that the nonparametric esti-
mate of price elasticity achieved by using semiparametric approaches is reasonably accurate
and without measurement errors.
Table 4.3: Semiparametric Fixed-effects Model with Possible Endogeneity
District Taiwan North Central South East and Island
Dependent Variable Log of Household Gasoline Consumption
Period All Periods
Log of Real Household Disposable Income -0.173** -0.180* -0.162 -0.301** -0.084
(0.072) (0.092) (0.196) (0.125) (0.206)
Log of # of Registered Cars/Per Household 1.359** 0.875 2.382 1.849 2.496
(0.660) (0.760) (1.929) (1.231) (2.013)
Log of # of Registered Motorcycles/Per Household 1.036*** 0.292 1.825** 1.104** 0.729
(0.321) (0.443) (0.756) (0.494) (1.094)
Log of # of Licensed Drivers/Per Household 0.188* 0.064 0.199 0.594 -2.779
(0.113) (0.237) (0.134) (0.413) (1.915)
Current Conduct Information Sharing
Positive Change -0.016*** -0.011* -0.006 -0.016** -0.041**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.018)
Negative Change 0.009* 0.004 0.025** 0.010 -0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008) (0.019)
Future Conduct Information Sharing
PAF×Positive Change -0.013 -0.016 -0.026 -0.017 0.014
(0.012) (0.015) (0.029) (0.020) (0.047)
PAF×Negative Change -0.059*** -0.047*** -0.080*** -0.064*** -0.054
(0.012) (0.015) (0.029) (0.020) (0.047)
ν -0.010 -0.119 -0.066 -0.002 0.293
(0.064) (0.077) (0.151) (0.105) (0.245)
Monthly Effects - - - - -
Observations 3462 1218 696 1044 504
R2 0.268 0.429 0.286 0.302 0.285
Note: All 20 administrative regions are regrouped into four districts, North, South, Central, and East and Island.
North district includes Taipei City, New Taipei City, Taoyuan City, Yilan County, Hsinchu County, Hsinchu City and
Keelung City. Central district includes Taichung City, Miaoli County, Changhua County, and Nantou County. South
district includes Tainan City, Kaohsiung City, Yulin County, Chiayi County, Chiayi City, and Pingtung County.
East and Island district includes Taitung County, Hualien County and Penghu County. For monthly effects, see
figure 4.C.1 in Appendix 4.C. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** Statistically significant level at 0.01,
** statistically significant level at 0.05 and * statistically significant level at 0.1.
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Table 4.4: Household Gasoline Demand in Six Special Municipalities with Possible Endogeneity
Region Taipei City New Taipei City Taoyuan City Taichung City Tainan City Kaohsiung City
Dependent Variable Household Gasoline Consumption
Period All Periods
Log of Real Household Disposable Income -0.204 -0.406* -0.134 -0.208 -0.030 -0.473**
(0.175) (0.240) (0.167) (0.231) (0.153) (0.220)
Log of # of Registered Cars/Per Household 0.211** 0.889*** 0.775*** 1.549*** 1.336*** 0.999***
(0.095) (0.317) (0.210) (0.432) (0.227) (0.239)
Log of # of Registered Motorcycles/Per Household -0.177** 0.022 -0.650** 0.175 0.143 -0.093
(0.080) (0.313) (0.315) (0.432) (0.173) (0.161)
Log of # of Licensed Drivers/Per Household -0.414*** -0.339 -0.120 0.415 0.561** 0.107
(0.140) (0.399) (0.143) (0.298) (0.217) (0.144)
Current Conduct Information Sharing
Positive Change -0.008 -0.011 -0.015 0.016 -0.012 -0.010
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.026) (0.017) (0.015)
Negative Change -0.001 -0.010 -0.010 0.031 -0.000 -0.002
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.027) (0.017) (0.016)
Future Conduct Information Sharing
PAF×Positive Change -0.032*** -0.013 -0.026 -0.015 -0.028 -0.007
(0.011) (0.014) (0.018) (0.029) (0.018) (0.021)
PAF×Negative Change -0.040*** -0.029* -0.061*** -0.043 -0.061*** -0.043*
(0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.029) (0.018) (0.022)
ν -0.015 -0.054 -0.130 0.084 0.070 0.047
(0.072) (0.114) (0.131) (0.235) (0.145) (0.131)
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174
R2 0.852 0.784 0.704 0.315 0.536 0.627
Significance Test for Price Effect
Vstat 4.264 2.406 2.137 0.552 2.830 2.513
p− value 0.000 0.008 0.016 0.290 0.002 0.006
Note: Significant test of nonparametric price effect is based on Yatchew’s significance test procedure (2003). Significance Test statistic as follows
Vstat = (m×n)
1/2 (s
2
nopeffect
−s2
diff
)
s2
diff
D
−→ N(0, 1), where m denotes the order of differencing, n denotes sample size, s2nopeffect denotes the estimator of the
residual variance without price effect, s2diff denotes the m-th order differencing estimator of the residual variance. For more details, see Proposition
4.3.1, Yatchew (2003). For monthly effects, see figure 4.C.2 in Appendix 4.C. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** Statistically significant
level at 0.01, ** statistically significant level at 0.05 and * statistically significant level at 0.1.
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4.5 Summary of Chapter 4
Using household structure in modeling Taiwanese gasoline demand provides precise findings
which simply describe household gasoline consumption in different regions. In this study we
use regional household-level data to determine Taiwan’s household gasoline demand in areas
of different levels of economic development. Our results highlight the following insights: (i)
the household demand for gasoline seems to be inelastic in urban regions, but elastic in
rural regions; (ii) negative income elasticities are estimated in urban and rich regions; (iii)
there are potential benefits for consumers under the sharing of future conduct price-change
information.
First, we use a semiparametric fixed-effects model and a difference-based model to non-
parametrically estimate price effect on the household demand for gasoline, and explore inelas-
tic household gasoline demand in rich urban regions and elastic household gasoline demand
in poor rural regions. The nonparametric price effect varies according to each district at
semiparametric fixed-effects estimates. Moreover, our nonparametric estimates of price effect
across six municipalities find little evidence of inelastic gasoline demand in the richest and
most urban region, which is consistent with nonparametric estimates of price effect from the
fixed-effects model.
Second, both semiparametric estimates reveal negative income elasticities. Following our
empirical semiparametric specifications, we discover that in rich urban regions, households
would reduce gasoline consumption as income rises. This finding may reflect substitution
from privately owned vehicles to public transportation.
Third, we turn to the main discussion on the effect of information sharing. We consider
future conduct information sharing in relation to our empirical specifications. Our estimates
suggest that future conduct negative price-change information sharing has a larger effect
for decreases in current gasoline consumption. This finding evidently shows that potential
efficiency gains to consumers come from future conduct information sharing because it enables
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intertemporal substitution. Nevertheless, the effect of future conduct information sharing to
consumers does not seem likely to outweigh the costs of tacit collusion found in the earlier
chapter.
It is interesting to reflect on the difference between our finding from Taiwan and the
previous semiparametric literature based on the US and Canadian data. For example, our
results demonstrate that gasoline consumption would not increase as household income rises
in a geographically small country such as Taiwan, in contrast to larger countries such as the
US and Canada. We also graphically present differences in price effect across an individual
region, an effect not discussed in existing literature in which most of them study price effect at
the national level. In general, in both large or small countries, the semiparametric approach
is reasonably accurate to model gasoline demand.
Moreover, we identify the potential market efficiency gains generated by the sharing of
future conduct information. On the other hand, in comparing our discussion of collusive
outcomes from future conduct information sharing in Chapter 3 with the study in this chapter,
future conduct information sharing seems to maximize its effect on the supply side rather
than the demand side.
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Appendix
4.A Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Region Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Taipei City pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 76.94 7.87 58.537 93.552
hrealhdi 104997.73 2421.166 99953.102 110845.461
hnrc 0.649 0.034 0.605 0.708
hnrm 1.082 0.051 0.935 1.129
hnld 1.391 0.045 1.338 1.541
New Taipei City pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 91.347 10.751 68.693 113.761
hrealhdi 76911.505 1874.385 73548.156 82498.219
hnrc 0.629 0.019 0.603 0.664
hnrm 1.588 0.06 1.449 1.653
hnld 1.196 0.034 1.145 1.279
Taichung City pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 133.561 12.671 70.807 163.859
hrealhdi 73456.066 3970.287 66981.906 81837.883
hnrc 1.028 0.028 0.966 1.069
Continued on Next Page
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Region Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
hnrm 1.893 0.079 1.771 2.013
hnld 1.59 0.041 1.525 1.664
Tainan City pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 120.704 10.218 98.409 145.725
hrealhdi 65757.187 2905.579 59526.813 70650.102
hnrc 0.872 0.032 0.8 0.92
hnrm 2.085 0.11 1.913 2.238
hnld 1.423 0.031 1.377 1.485
Kaohsiung City pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 94.81 10.241 75.276 117.934
hrealhdi 71469.911 3830.518 64735.902 79877.555
hnrc 0.747 0.02 0.708 0.786
hnrm 2.108 0.108 1.867 2.23
hnld 1.398 0.15 1.267 1.731
Taoyuan City pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 143.871 17.702 109.403 178.967
hrealhdi 82087.394 3893.021 75649.625 91560.945
hnrc 0.922 0.021 0.886 0.968
hnrm 1.587 0.056 1.478 1.669
hnld 1.426 0.064 1.34 1.665
Yilan County pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 104.778 9.247 86.476 133.737
hrealhdi 66184.888 5979.009 57263.563 81073.414
hnrc 0.845 0.027 0.783 0.89
hnrm 1.867 0.071 1.647 1.928
hnld 1.355 0.064 1.264 1.479
Hsinchu County pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 167.715 16.283 137.895 211.455
Continued on Next Page
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Region Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
hrealhdi 84553.425 5607.987 74236.547 93248.938
hnrc 1.1 0.021 1.068 1.144
hnrm 1.686 0.051 1.525 1.738
hnld 1.528 0.17 1.381 1.971
Miaoli County pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 137.607 10.847 112.049 163.355
hrealhdi 66788.242 3916.041 60331.746 76812.211
hnrc 1.085 0.031 1.019 1.131
hnrm 1.984 0.081 1.746 2.077
hnld 1.517 0.081 0.988 1.713
Changhua County pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 123.089 12.291 94.604 152.16
hrealhdi 64688.93 2374.824 57996.938 68954.945
hnrc 1.142 0.046 1.028 1.209
hnrm 2.41 0.107 2.146 2.539
hnld 1.688 0.049 1.631 1.872
Nantou County pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 131.453 12.932 104.356 173.483
hrealhdi 62290.701 3900.647 56174.328 70232.938
hnrc 1.06 0.041 0.962 1.133
hnrm 1.971 0.091 1.768 2.103
hnld 1.481 0.077 1.404 1.742
Yunlin County pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 116.412 8.809 96.799 138.87
hrealhdi 56949.579 3559.862 50325.188 64304.844
hnrc 0.971 0.047 0.863 1.052
hnrm 2.059 0.096 1.803 2.161
hnld 1.418 0.054 1.36 1.54
Continued on Next Page
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Region Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Chiayi County pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 116.994 12.219 93.036 151.949
hrealhdi 55901.963 3452.781 50303.672 63355.688
hnrc 0.959 0.045 0.85 1.029
hnrm 2.016 0.086 1.803 2.121
hnld 1.409 0.12 1.314 1.681
Pingtung County pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 116.847 11.603 91.614 146.813
hrealhdi 60768.37 2610.543 55783.258 67135.398
hnrc 0.877 0.045 0.771 0.950
hnrm 2.399 0.145 2.151 2.605
hnld 1.383 0.037 1.332 1.462
Taitung County pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 97.754 11.991 77.163 132.913
hrealhdi 53202.678 3434.831 46968.84 60755.496
hnrc 0.786 0.05 0.681 0.887
hnrm 2.1 0.121 1.867 2.278
hnld 1.225 0.086 1.133 1.421
Hualien County pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 101.56 11.777 77.473 132.95
hrealhdi 60312.404 3097.695 53654.754 66811.75
hnrc 0.854 0.024 0.804 0.915
hnrm 1.93 0.099 1.624 2.044
hnld 1.286 0.051 1.228 1.41
Penghu County pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 58.184 8.263 40.756 79.42
hrealhdi 57530.699 5705.323 48468.133 69602.266
hnrc 0.622 0.046 0.491 0.704
Continued on Next Page
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Region Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
hnrm 1.999 0.077 1.856 2.113
hnld 1.007 0.028 0.969 1.095
Keelung City pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 81.741 6.886 67.485 103.944
hrealhdi 68276.59 4269.966 59451.574 75631.359
hnrc 0.551 0.019 0.504 0.578
hnrm 1.256 0.05 1.171 1.327
hnld 1.113 0.037 1.057 1.209
Hsinchu City pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 132.444 14.712 100.224 159.534
hrealhdi 96434.388 5515.933 84584.039 107727.031
hnrc 0.911 0.022 0.884 0.954
hnrm 1.817 0.067 1.626 1.908
hnld 1.406 0.071 1.187 1.477
Chiayi City pgasoline 27.275 5.466 18.2 36.052
hgas 116.958 11.636 95.529 145.801
hrealhdi 67294.346 8318.674 56186.652 86755.531
hnrc 0.848 0.024 0.799 0.887
hnrm 2.063 0.079 1.841 2.147
hnld 1.513 0.137 1.378 1.748
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4.B Dummy Variable Setting
As the government’s price regulation policy, the price adjustment formula, was implemented in Septem-
ber 2006, which is the 69th month in our monthly dataset, the effect of the government’s policy on
the demand side needs to be discussed. Therefore, we set a dummy variable of the implementation of
the price adjustment formula which is algebraically defined as
PAFt =


1 if t ≥ 69
0 , otherwise,
where PAFt is a dummy of 1 after the transparent price regulation policy was implemented by the
government at period t.
For capturing the effect of price information sharing on household gasoline demand, we suppose
that households would make a comparison of gasoline price between period t and t1, and this compari-
son is defined as current conduct price information sharing. Current conduct price-change information
can be defined as two dummy variables which are expressed as:
PositiveChanget =


1 if pt > pt−1
0 , otherwise,
and
NegativeChanget =


1 if pt < pt−1
0 , otherwise,
where PositiveChanget is a dummy variable of 1 if there exists a positive change in gasoline price at
period t, and NegativeChanget is a dummy variable of 1 if there exists a negative change in gasoline
price at period t.
Next, we consider the sharing of future conduct price information. Since the state-owned enter-
prise’s new gasoline price is publicly disclosed through the price adjustment formula, households can
obtain the new retail gasoline price. New retail price-change information is written as two dummies
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PositiveChanget+1 =


1 if pt+1 > pt
0 , otherwise,
and
NegativeChanget+1 =


1 if pt+1 < pt
0 , otherwise,
where PositiveChanget+1 is a dummy variable of 1 if retail gasoline price increases at period t + 1,
and NegativeChanget+1 is a dummy variable of 1 if retail gasoline price declines at period t+ 1.
Thus, the future conduct price information sharing to consumers is defined as the interaction
terms between two dummy variables, price adjustment formula and new price change information,
which are given by
PAFt+1 × PositiveChanget+1,
and
PAFt+1 ×NegativeChanget+1,
where PAFt+1×PositiveChanget+1 is a dummy variable of 1 if future positive price change informa-
tion is available to consumers, and PAFt+1 ×NegativeChanget+1 is a dummy variable of 1 if future
negative price change information is available to consumers.
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4.C Monthly Effects: Semiparametric Estimates with Possi-
ble Endogeneity
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Figure 4.C.1: Monthly Effects in Fixed Effects Model with Possible Endogeneity
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Figure 4.C.2: Monthly Effects in Six Special Municipalities with Possible Endogeneity
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4.D Household Gasoline Demand in Remaining 14 Regions
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Figure 4.D.1: Nonparametric Price Effect in 14 Regions
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Figure 4.D.2: Monthly Effects in 14 Regions
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Table 4.D.1: Household Gasoline Demand in Remaining 14 Regions
Region Yilan County Hsinchu County Miaoli County Changhua County Nantou County Yunlin County Chiayi County
Dependent Variable Log of Household Gasoline Consumption
Period All Periods
Log of Real Household Disposable Income -0.048 0.157 -0.015 0.400** -0.051 -0.016 -0.145
(0.119) (0.119) (0.164) (0.195) (0.130) (0.098) (0.151)
Log of # of Registered Cars/Per Household 1.483** 0.569* 0.374 0.776** 1.601*** 1.437*** 2.201***
(0.571) (0.313) (0.312) (0.330) (0.299) (0.282) (0.481)
Log of # of Registered Motorcycles/Per Household -0.434 -0.568*** -0.578*** -0.116 0.025 0.412 0.210
(0.321) (0.165) (0.206) (0.229) (0.187) (0.275) (0.299)
Log of # of Licesed Drivers/Per Household 0.415 -0.106 -0.026 0.532 0.570*** 1.501*** 0.471
(0.416) (0.076) (0.155) (0.380) (0.154) (0.458) (0.354)
Current Conduct Information Sharing
PositiveChange -0.018 -0.025 -0.015 -0.019 -0.024 -0.016 -0.014
(0.024) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021)
NegativeChange 0.006 -0.012 0.006 -0.007 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005
(0.024) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021)
Future Conduct Information Sharing
PAF×PostiveChange 0.138*** -0.023 0.032* -0.010 0.017 0.018 -0.023
(0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019)
PAF×NegativeChange 0.093*** -0.051** -0.010 -0.061*** -0.025 -0.023 -0.064***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021)
Monthly Effects
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174 174
R2 0.623 0.572 0.403 0.432 0.499 0.433 0.516
Significance Test for Price Effect
Vstat 1.159 2.342 3.086 1.751 3.214 2.837 3.888
p− value 0.123 0.010 0.001 0.040 0.001 0.002 0.000
continued on next page
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Region Pingtung County Taitung County Hualien County Penghu County Keelung City Hsinchu City Chiayi City
Dependent Variable Log of Household Gasoline Consumption
Period All Periods
Log of Real Household Disposable Income -0.115 -0.048 -0.124 -0.124 -0.027 -0.021 0.041
(0.169) (0.143) (0.180) (0.121) (0.082) (0.107) (0.059)
Log of # of Registered Cars/Per Household 0.839*** 1.233*** 1.694*** 0.778** 2.005*** 0.990*** 0.266
(0.179) (0.283) (0.550) (0.298) (0.163) (0.319) (0.237)
Log of # of Registered Motorcycles/Per Household -0.087 0.008 0.125 -0.044 0.357** -0.082 -0.223
(0.181) (0.302) (0.373) (0.548) (0.163) (0.144) (0.179)
Log of # of Licesed Drivers/Per Household -0.024 0.822** 0.552 -0.007 0.760*** -0.225 0.215
(0.380) (0.341) (0.504) (0.543) (0.145) (0.161) (0.172)
Current Conduct Information Sharing
PositiveChange -0.012 -0.019 -0.013 -0.031 -0.014 -0.009 -0.026
(0.021) (0.028) (0.026) (0.034) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
NegativeChange -0.003 -0.010 -0.002 -0.008 -0.024* 0.002 -0.011
(0.021) (0.028) (0.026) (0.034) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Future Conduct Information Sharing
PAF×PostiveChange -0.023 0.049** 0.044* 0.008 0.025* 0.015 -0.009
(0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.013) (0.017) (0.023)
PAF×NegativeChange -0.065*** 0.009 0.022 -0.057* 0.015 -0.010 -0.039*
(0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.029) (0.013) (0.018) (0.022)
Monthly Effects
Observations 174 174 174 158 174 174 174
R2 0.471 0.592 0.507 0.631 0.744 0.712 0.546
Significance Test for Price Effect
Vstat 3.026 2.394 2.335 1.161 3.174 2.499 3.802
p− value 0.001 0.008 0.010 0.123 0.001 0.006 0.000
Note: Significant test of nonparmetrically price effect is based on Yatchew’s significance test procedure (2003). Significance Test statistic as follows Vstat = (m ×
n)1/2
(s2
nopeffect
−s2
diff
)
s2
diff
D
−→ N(0, 1), where m denotes the order of differencing, n denotes sample size, s2nopeffect denotes the estimator of the residual variance without
price effect, s2diff denotes the m-th order differencing estimator of the residual variance. More details, see Proposition 4.3.1, Yatchew (2003). For monthly effects, see
figure 4.D.2. Standard erros are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** Statistically significant level at 0.01, ** Statistically significant
level at 0.05 and * Statistically significant level at 0.1.
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Table 4.D.2: Household Gasoline Demand in Remaining 14 Regions with Possible Endogeneity
Region Yilan County Hsinchu County Miaoli County Changhua County Nantou County Yunlin County Chiayi County
Dependent Variable Log of Household Gasoline Consumption
Period All Periods
Log of Real Household Disposable Income -0.044 0.170 -0.021 0.418** -0.099 -0.013 -0.151
(0.122) (0.130) (0.163) (0.196) (0.136) (0.098) (0.151)
Log of # of Registered Cars/Per Household 1.504** 0.596* 0.293 0.832** 1.728*** 1.556*** 2.323***
(0.581) (0.331) (0.323) (0.341) (0.319) (0.298) (0.500)
Log of # of Registered Motorcycles/Per Household -0.400 -0.546*** -0.675*** -0.035 0.169 0.585* 0.343
(0.361) (0.187) (0.231) (0.258) (0.228) (0.310) (0.338)
Log of # of Licesed Drivers/Per Household 0.420 -0.109 -0.036 0.565 0.565*** 1.616*** 0.535
(0.417) (0.077) (0.155) (0.382) (0.153) (0.466) (0.361)
Current Conduct Information Sharing
PositiveChange -0.019 -0.024 -0.015 -0.020 -0.024 -0.017 -0.015
(0.024) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019) (0.021)
NegativeChange 0.007 -0.011 0.001 -0.004 0.003 0.004 -0.002
(0.025) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.020) (0.021)
Future Conduct Information Sharing
PAF×PostiveChange 0.138*** -0.023 0.035* -0.013 0.009 0.014 -0.025
(0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020)
PAF×NegativeChange 0.094*** -0.050** -0.010 -0.063*** -0.031 -0.025 -0.064***
(0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021)
residuals 0.041 0.037 -0.155 0.121 0.219 0.199 0.150
(0.206) (0.145) (0.169) (0.181) (0.199) (0.168) (0.179)
Monthly Effects
Observations 174 174 174 174 174 174 174
R2 0.623 0.572 0.407 0.434 0.504 0.440 0.519
Significance Test for Price Effect
Vstat 1.008 2.309 2.534 1.599 3.349 2.972 3.890
p− value 0.157 0.010 0.006 0.055 0.000 0.001 0.000
continued on next page
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Region Pingtung County Taitung County Hualien County Penghu County Keelung City Hsinchu City Chiayi City
Dependent Variable Log of Household Gasoline Consumption
Period All Periods
Log of Real Household Disposable Income -0.111 -0.059 -0.155 -0.151 -0.032 -0.017 0.038
(0.170) (0.143) (0.180) (0.122) (0.084) (0.106) (0.061)
Log of # of Registered Cars/Per Household 0.845*** 1.255*** 1.882*** 0.712** 2.011*** 1.039*** 0.254
(0.180) (0.284) (0.563) (0.300) (0.165) (0.320) (0.246)
Log of # of Registered Motorcycles/Per Household -0.056 0.075 0.347 0.293 0.382* -0.155 -0.243
(0.198) (0.316) (0.405) (0.600) (0.195) (0.155) (0.208)
Log of # of Licesed Drivers/Per Household -0.025 0.818** 0.619 0.055 0.756*** -0.172 0.220
(0.380) (0.340) (0.502) (0.541) (0.147) (0.166) (0.173)
Current Conduct Information Sharing
PositiveChange -0.012 -0.020 -0.013 -0.032 -0.014 -0.008 -0.026
(0.021) (0.028) (0.025) (0.033) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
NegativeChange -0.002 -0.006 0.007 -0.000 -0.024* -0.002 -0.011
(0.021) (0.028) (0.026) (0.034) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017)
Future Conduct Information Sharing
PAF×PostiveChange -0.026 0.043* 0.041* -0.003 0.024 0.014 -0.009
(0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.029) (0.015) (0.017) (0.023)
PAF×NegativeChange -0.066*** 0.004 0.023 -0.063** 0.014 -0.012 -0.039*
(0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) (0.014) (0.018) (0.022)
residuals 0.067 0.163 0.298 0.343 0.028 -0.152 -0.026
(0.178) (0.233) (0.219) (0.259) (0.119) (0.122) (0.140)
Monthly Effects
Observations 174 174 174 158 174 174 174
R2 0.472 0.593 0.515 0.637 0.744 0.716 0.546
Significance Test for Price Effect
Vstat 2.728 2.374 2.545 1.389 2.853 2.135 3.266
p− value 0.003 0.009 0.005 0.082 0.002 0.016 0.001
Note: For monthly effects, see figure 4.D.4. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *** Statistically significant level at 0.01, ** Statistically significant level at 0.05
and * Statistically significant level at 0.1.
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4.E Taiwan Administrative Regions Map
Note: Taiwan map data source from National Land Surveying and Mapping Center, Ministry of the Interior,
Taiwan (R.O.C.), and Taiwan map is plotted by R.
138
4.F Yatchew’s Optimal Differencing Weights
m (d0, d1, . . . , dm)
1 (0.7071,-0.7071)
2 (0.8090,-0.5000,-0.3090)
3 (0.8582,-0.3832,-0.2809,-0.1942)
4 (0.8873,-0.3099,-0.2464,-0.1901,-0.1409)
5 (0.9064,-0.2600,-0.2167,-0.1774,-0.1420,-0.1103)
6 (0.9200,-0.2238,-0.1925,-0.1635,-0.1369,-0.1126,-0.0906)
7 (0.9302,-0.1965,-0.1728,-0.1506,-0.1299,-0.1107,-0.0930,-0.0768)
8 (0.9380,-0.1751,-0.1565,-0.1389,-0.1224,-0.1069,-0.0925,-0.0791,-0.0666)
9 (0.9443,-0.1578,-0.1429,-0.1287,-0.1152,-0.1025,-0.0905,-0.0792,-0.0687,-0.0588)
10 (0.9494,-0.1437,-0.1314,-0.1197,-0.1085,-0.0978,-0.0877,-0.0782,-0.0691,-0.0606,-0.0527)
Note: Source from Yatchew (2003).
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4.G Data Source of Chapter 4
Table 4.G.1: Data Source
Chapter 4
Dataset Data Type Source
CPC’s Retail Price of 95 Unleaded
Gasoline, 2001M01-2015M09
Weekly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
Price of Dubai Crude Oil, 2001M01-
2015M09
Weekly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
Price of Brent Crude Oil, 2001M01-
2015M09
Weekly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
Exchange Rate: USD-TWD,
2001M01-2015M09
Monthly Data
Central Bank of the Republic of
China (Taiwan)
Regional Gasoline Consumption,
2001M01-2015M09
Monthly Data
Bureau of Energy, Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs, Taiwan
Regional Household Disposable In-
come, 2001M01-2015M09
Annual Data National Statistics, Taiwan
# of Registered Vehicles (Cars and
Motorcycles), 2001M01-2015M09
Monthly Data
Ministry of Transportation and
Communications, Taiwan
# of Licensed Drivers, 2001M01-
2015M09
Monthly Data
Ministry of Transportation and
Communications, Taiwan
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This concluding chapter summarizes the findings in each chapter and considers further direc-
tions of these three studies. This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 summarizes our
findings in each chapter and section 5.2 provides a consideration about future extensions in
these three studies.
5.1 Summary of Chapters and Policy Implication
This thesis consists of three empirical analyses in the government’s transparent price regu-
lation policy, the price adjustment formula (PAF). Chapter 2 considers a concern in which
the asymmetric pricing upward/downward adjustment is changed by the implementation of
the price adjustment formula. In the later two chapters, we suppose that the government’s
transparent price policy has the effect of becoming a future method of information exchange.
We focus our attention on investigating the effects of the government’s transparent price on
the supply side in Chapter 3 and on the demand side in Chapter 4, respectively.
The first empirical study is presented in Chapter 2 and investigates the role of the gov-
ernment’s transparent price policy, the price adjustment formula, in a retail gasoline price
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setting. Using monthly data over 161 months from 1999 to 2012, we identify the response
of retail gasoline prices to fluctuations of international crude oil prices. Our findings show
that: (i) the price adjustment formula resulted in a quicker response of retail gasoline prices
to changes in crude oil prices, but it delayed an increase in retail gasoline prices when crude
oil prices rose; and (ii) due to indirect government intervention, the retail price adjustment
in response to changes in crude oil prices is ‘hot air balloons and bricks’ rather than ‘rockets
and feathers’.
Chapter 3 investigates the effect of the government’s transparent price policy on the
supply side: firms’ price setting mechanism, price leadership and potential anti-competitive
outcomes. According to our results, we provide evidence that: (i) the leading firm’s retail
price response was most likely to be ‘hot air balloons and bricks’ when the price adjustment
formula was adopted, which is consistent with the previous finding in Chapter 2; (ii) the price
adjustment formula led to greater incidence of price leadership; and (iii) the price leadership
frequently resulted in the competing firm’s perfect price alignment, which lowers the degree
of competition in the retail gasoline market.
In Chapter 4, we turn our attention to the effect of the government-regulated price trans-
parency on the demand side. We investigate household gasoline demand across 20 Taiwan
administrative regions by using a longitudinal dataset, and take into account a considera-
tion of the government’s policy on household gasoline demand. Our results present findings
about disaggregate household gasoline demand by urban and rural regions, the effect of a
future method of information sharing. First, household gasoline demand is inelastic in ur-
ban and rich regions, but is elastic in rural and poor regions. Second, future negative price
change information sharing resulted in significant decreases in current household gasoline
consumption, which suggests that future price information sharing may effectively generate
intertemporal substitution on the demand side. In addition, we also provide an application
of a semiparametric approach in a geographically small country.
Finally, the policy was designed to address one thing: that the stability of retail gasoline
142
prices should be maintained, but the government needs to consider implications on both the
supply and the demand sides. In the case of the price adjustment formula, this may have
resulted in collusion, treated as a better intertemporal substitution by consumers. However,
in the Taiwan gasoline market, the implications of the transparent price policy on the supply
side seem to outweigh the demand side.
5.2 Further Research
Given empirical evidence from Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we understand the effects of the govern-
ment’s transparent price policy on the retail gasoline market. In particular, we suppose the
government’s transparent policy to be future practise of unilateral information sharing in this
thesis, and investigate the effects of information sharing on the supply and demand sides.
Nevertheless, there are some possible suggestions for natural directions of future research.
First, we could investigate another country with a different type of government intervention,
which could be deemed as a future conduct information sharing in petrol retailing. In addi-
tion, we could further investigate a consideration of a future method of information exchange
on another Taiwan market, where the state-owned enterprise takes a dominant position and
a similar type of government intervention is adopted, e.g., the telecommunications market.
Second, the government is taking two roles - a regulator and a leading firm - in the re-
tail gasoline market. We restrict our attention to the second role, a leading firm, and have
considered the government’s transparent price regulation as a unilateral future method of
information sharing in Chapters 3 and 4. We have not considered a regulator’s view in these
two chapters, which might not provide a representative argument on identifying the govern-
ment’s transparent price regulation. Hence, we might provide a clear explanation of why
the government continues to implement the price adjustment formula in the petrol retailing
market if a consideration of a regulator’s view is taken into account. These suggestions are
worth extending in future studies.
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